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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION
“It never pays to write off an amendment.” 
      -- Supreme Court Justice David Souter1 
 
If there were a contest for the constitutional amendment that historians, legal 
academics, and political scientists have most thoroughly written off, the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment would have to be the winner.  Passed in 1971 after the most rapid ratification 
process in American history, the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowered the minimum voting 
age in state and federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen.  The voting age 
amendment garnered very little academic interest at the time, and the scholarly silence 
over the subsequent decades has been deafening.  Very few commentators have devoted 
any serious attention to the subject, and perhaps as a consequence, the short list of writers 
who have briefly touched on the Twenty-sixth Amendment in the course of broader 
projects have usually characterized the amendment’s origins as relatively straightforward 
and unexciting. 
In my opinion, students of politics have been too quick to dismiss the Twenty-
sixth Amendment as a topic unworthy of further inquiry.  To be sure, I do not claim that 
the ratification of the voting age amendment was a major moment in American history, 
                                                 
1 Linda Greenhouse, “After 30 Years, Supreme Court History Project Turns a Final Page,” New York 
Times, December 30, 2005, A15.  Justice Souter was referring specifically, and ruefully, to the 11th 
Amendment, which Chief Justice Rehnquist resurrected from obscurity to serve as a newly robust doctrinal 
source of state sovereignty. 
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nor that it had a dramatic effect on the national political landscape.  However, I contend 
that the Twenty-sixth Amendment offers a fascinating case study of political debate.  
Drawing on a careful reading of Congressional discussions about eighteen-year-old 
voting over three decades, I show how both advocates and opponents of lowering the 
voting age offered a wide range of justifications for their respective claims.  Through 
these arguments, members of Congress tried to both respond to current political 
circumstances and wrestle with broader, more timeless questions.  The resulting debates 
were complicated and often inconsistent, but inevitably interesting.   
I.  The Literature 
 To say that the Twenty-sixth Amendment has been of limited interest to the 
scholarly world is a wild understatement.  In the more than three-and-a-half decades since 
the amendment was ratified, only one book about the amendment has been published.  In 
his 1992 work, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in America2, 
educational consultant Wendell W. Cultice chronicles the history of voting age legislation 
in the United States.  Emphasizing description over analysis, Cultice sifts through a great 
deal of archival material to detail the numerous eighteen-year-old voting proposals, at 
both the state and federal level, that ultimately culminated in a national constitutional 
amendment.   
 Despite negative reviews from historians,3 Cultice’s book—as the only major 
work on the subject—has often been a key source for the few scholars who have 
                                                 
2 Wendell Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in America, (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1992). 
3 Kenneth Heineman, review of Youth’s Battle for the Ballot: A History of Voting Age in America, by 
Wendell Cultice, The Journal of American History 80 (March 1994): 1535–36; David Kyvig, Explicit and 
Authentic Acts; Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776–1995 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
1996), 532 n. 41. 
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subsequently addressed the Twenty-sixth Amendment in the course of broader projects.  
Researchers who have written about voting rights,4 constitutional amendments,5 youth 
rights,6 and military service7 have occasionally touched on the voting age issue.  
However, these treatments have generally been brief, with the authors’ main focus lying 
elsewhere.  
 Indeed, although there is a vast literature about the history of 1960s America, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment is barely acknowledged in some of the most celebrated of such 
works.  In his award-winning, magisterial survey of postwar America, Grand 
Expectations, historian James Patterson mentions the voting age amendment only once, 
in a footnote.8  Another extensive, well-regarded study of the period similarly devotes 
only one line to the eighteen-year-old voting amendment, erroneously referring to it as 
                                                 
4 Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen Control and Popular Acquiesence 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1982), 11–13; Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The 
Contested History of Democracy in the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 277–81; Judith 
Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 
17—19; Donald Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Right to Vote: Rights and Liberties Under the Law (Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 248–53. 
5 Bruce Ackerman, We The People 1: Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 91; 
Richard B. Bernstein with Jerome Agel, Amending America: If We Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do 
We Keep Trying to Change It? (New York: Random House, 1993), 138–40; Alan P. Grimes, Democracy 
and the Amendments to the Constitution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978), 141–47; Kyvig, 
Explicit and Authentic Acts, 363–68; David A. Strauss, “The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments,” 
Harvard Law Review 114 (March 2001): 1488; Clement E. Vose, Constitutional Change: Amendment 
Politics and Supreme Court Litigation Since 1900 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1972), 357–59. 
6 Richard Farson, Birthrights (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1974), 176; Elizabeth S. Scott, “The 
Legal Construction of Adolescence,” Hofstra Law Review 29 (Winter 2000): 562–64; Lee E. Teitelbaum, 
“Children’s Rights and the Problem of Equal Respect,” Hofstra Law Review 27 (Summer 1999): 808. 
7 Manfred Berg, “Soldiers and Citizens: War and Voting Rights in American History,” in Reflections on 
American Exceptionalism, eds. David K. Adams and Cornelis A. van Minnen (Staffordshire, England: 
Keele University Press,1994), 211–14; Elaine Scarry, “War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, 
Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 139 (1991): 1304–5. 
8 James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 719 n. 30. 
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the “Thirty-sixth Amendment.”9  Many notable histories of the 1960s do not mention the 
amendment at all.10  
 There are several plausible reasons for this lack of scholarly attention.  For one 
thing, the story of the Twenty-sixth amendment is not particularly dramatic, especially as 
compared to that of other constitutional amendments that expanded the franchise.  
Although state and federal legislators began introducing proposals to lower the voting age 
to eighteen as early as the 1940s, the issue attracted only limited interest and debate until 
the very late 1960s.  This history contrasts sharply with that of say, the Nineteenth 
Amendment, which was preceded by nearly a half-century of contentious struggle over 
woman suffrage.   
 Furthermore, the Twenty-sixth Amendment was, and continues to be, 
overshadowed by contemporaneous events.  The debate over eighteen-year-old voting 
reached its peak in 1970, an eventful year that came at the end of a very tumultuous 
decade.  While, as I explain in this dissertation, eighteen-year-old voting was inextricably 
linked with some of the most important phenomena of the 1960s—including the Vietnam 
War, the explosion of higher education, the antiwar protests, and the civil rights 
movement—the voting age issue itself was generally a second-order matter.  Historians 
of the era, too, have understandably focused their attentions on the more dramatic and 
arguably far-reaching events of the 1960s.  
                                                 
9 Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 281. 
10 See, for example, Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995); William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995); Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam, 1993).  
The Columbia Guide to the 1960s, by David Farber and Beth Bailey (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001) references the Twenty-sixth Amendment only in a chronology included as an appendix.  Ibid., 
443.   
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 The perception that the voting age amendment is of particularly limited scope has 
also contributed to the general lack of scholarly interest in the amendment’s history.  
Indeed, unlike the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, which declared that American 
citizens could not be denied the vote on the basis of race or sex respectively, the Twenty-
sixth Amendment did not abolish age discrimination in voting, but only moved the age at 
which it was acceptable to discriminate.  Perhaps in part because of this narrow focus, 
constitutional lawyers have rarely sought to deploy the Twenty-sixth Amendment in new 
legal contexts or use it as the basis for other rights, and accordingly, the historical 
research and debate that is so often prompted by creative constitutional arguments has 
been missing as well.11  
Finally, academic interest in the history of the Twenty-sixth Amendment may also 
have been dampened by the fact that it was passed within living memory of many 
contemporary scholars.  A number of modern-day historians, political scientists, and legal 
scholars were themselves in their late teens or early twenties when the amendment was 
ratified, and they often remember the lowering of the voting age vaguely, if fondly.  
However, their personal recollections are likely incomplete, for—as I explain in this 
dissertation—the Twenty-sixth Amendment was primarily a top-down event, driven by a 
small group of federal legislators whose motivations and rationales were quite complex 
and not necessarily fully understood by young sympathizers.  For some academics, their 
own memories of the voting age amendment as a relatively straightforward and positive 
                                                 
11 One of the very few constitutional scholars to offer a new legal analysis of the Twenty-sixth Amendment 
is Michael Dorf, who has argued that the Twenty-sixth Amendment, along with the Fifteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments, should be incorporated into the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Incorporating the voting age amendment into the Equal Protection Clause, Dorf argues, 
would offer heightened constitutional protections against age discrimination.  Michael C. Dorf, “Equal 
Protection Incorporation,” Virginia Law Review 88 (September 2002): 951–1024. 
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development may well have distracted them from considering it as a valid research 
question.   
II.  New Contributions 
 In this dissertation, I offer a new analysis of the Twenty-sixth Amendment.  My 
research relies mainly on Congressional documents published between 1942 and 1970. 
Based on a close reading of these remarks, floor debates, committee hearings, and 
reports, I present a typology of the remarkably varied and complex arguments that 
surfaced in the course of debating a three-year reduction in the national voting age.  This 
project has two goals: one narrow, one broad.    
 First, I hope to deepen our understanding of the history behind the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment.  While this dissertation is certainly not a comprehensive historical analysis 
of the amendment’s background, I believe that my research helps to refute two popular 
misconceptions about the story of the voting age amendment: first, that it was brief; and 
second, that it was simple.  As I detail in Chapter 2, the voting age issue had a much 
longer history than is often acknowledged.  Although eighteen-year-old voting did not 
rise to the top of the legislative agenda until about 1969, various legislators had been 
introducing and debating proposals to lower the voting age since World War II, and one 
such proposal even made it to the Senate floor in 1954.   
 I also argue that the motives and arguments that propelled advocates of a lower 
voting age are more varied and complicated than generally acknowledged.  As I discuss 
at length in Chapter 3, commentators have tended to emphasize the role of arguments 
connecting the minimum voting and draft ages.  While I agree that the ‘old enough to 
fight, old enough to vote’ rationale played a very significant role in the eighteen-year-old 
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voting movement, not enough attention has been paid to the other rationales that also 
motivated those who sought to lower the voting age.  In particular, the way in which the 
student protests of the late 1960s frightened federal legislators into looking for 
alternative, more acceptable channels for youthful political expression has been 
insufficiently addressed in the literature. 
 More broadly, however, I suggest that the story of the Twenty-sixth Amendment 
offers a window into the nature of political debate.  If we look closely at the intermittent, 
often meandering Congressional debates over eighteen-year-old voting, we can see a 
remarkably complex, textured illustration of the way in which those involved in politics 
seek to justify their preferences. 
 One striking feature of the voting age debates is the intersection between the 
various rationales for and against eighteen-year-old voting and contemporaneous events.  
The power of different arguments and counterarguments waxed and waned over the 
course of three decades, as the surrounding political and social circumstances changed.  
In the early 1950s, for example, advocates of a lower voting age frequently suggested that 
modern American youth were far more educated and sophisticated than previous 
generations.  While such claims were consistent with the tenor of the times, these 
arguments were greeted with increasing skepticism amidst the mounting turmoil of the 
mid-to-late 1960s.  Other arguments were reframed to address new realities:  In the early 
years of the voting age debates, proponents often invoked the longstanding ideal of the 
brave citizen-soldier to justify their claims, but as the Vietnam War escalated and became 
increasingly controversial, advocates began to emphasize a different connection between 
military service and voting—specifically, the notion that it was unfair to demand 
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compulsory military service from disenfranchised citizens.  Similarly, those who 
maintained in the 1970 debates that the voting age of twenty-one was unconstitutional 
were putting a new spin on arguments about discrimination that had been a part of the 
discussion since the beginning.  Finally, new arguments arose out of new circumstances: 
the ‘channeling’ or ‘safety valve’ rationale mentioned above was a direct product of the 
campus unrest of the late 1960s.   
However, while the arguments advanced in the voting age debates were often 
highly contingent, they also reflected participants’ efforts to grapple with bigger 
theoretical issues.  Eighteen-year-old voting raised difficult, complex questions about the 
contours of citizenship, the meaning of the franchise, and the boundary between 
childhood and adulthood, among other things. Different arguments for or against the 
lower voting age were rooted not only in current events, but also in different 
presuppositions about these very fundamental matters.   
For instance, those who emphasized the importance of military service drew on a 
more traditional, specifically male vision of citizenship than did those politicians who 
argued that young people should be enfranchised chiefly because they knew a lot about 
politics.  Advocates who stressed the knowledgeability rationale for a lower voting age 
implied that the suffrage was properly a reward for a certain level of political 
engagement; those argued that voting rights should be extended to subdue dissent 
suggested that voting was itself a useful training mechanism for building a more engaged 
citizenry.   The politicians who debated whether excluding eighteen- to twenty-one year-
olds from the franchise amounted to unconstitutional discrimination disagreed about the 
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extent to which legal distinctions between children and adults were or were not like 
distinctions based on race or gender.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the voting age debates are exceedingly messy.  Many times 
logic seemed to have little to do with the balance of persuasive power.  Legislators on 
both sides of the issue moved fluidly between different rationales, and were often 
unwilling to pursue theoretical arguments to their logical conclusions.  Certain 
inconsistencies or tensions went largely unremarked, and arguments that seem entirely 
unconvincing to many contemporary readers were nonetheless powerful at the time.  Few 
opponents, for example, tried to exploit the obvious conceptual tensions in advocates’ 
frequent analogies to African-American and woman suffrage.   At other times, though, 
politicians did reframe or rework their justifications when they ran onto logically or 
philosophically problematic ground; proponents scrambled to respond to opponents who 
noted that the male-only nature of the draft undermined arguments that the voting age 
should be lowered in order to correspond to the draft age.  
In The Politics, Aristotle maintains that human beings’ need to justify their 
actions—a characteristic peculiar to our species—is precisely what makes us ‘political 
animals.’12 The notion of eighteen-year-old voting was the slightest imaginable proposal, 
an attempt to change a minor detail in the regulation of the American suffrage.   Yet even 
this seemingly narrow proposal prompted decades of debate, a lengthy process of 
justification in which those on both sides were forced to wrestle with a number of 
difficult, broader issues, just as they also struggled to respond to events and trends 
                                                 




outside the Capitol’s walls.  The voting age debates, then, offer insight not only into the 
history of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, but also into the essence of politics itself. 
III.  Methodology 
 This dissertation is based almost entirely on my analysis of Congressional 
documents pertaining to the voting age between late 1942, when the first eighteen-year-
old voting amendment proposal was introduced, and mid-1970, when both houses of 
Congress passed the eighteen-year-old voting statute that would eventually become the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment.  These texts include debates and remarks published in the 
Congressional Record; committee and subcommittee hearings, prints, and reports; and a 
few speeches.  I have not included documents from late 1970 and early 1971 because, for 
reasons that I detail in Chapter 2, the Congressional debates from those months had very 
little to do with the merits of eighteen-year-old voting and much to do with administrative 
problems presented by the Supreme Court’s December 1970 decision invalidating part of 
the statute that Congress had passed. 
 These Congressional documents illuminate the arguments that those involved in 
the voting age debates—at least at the federal level—offered to justify their positions.  By 
taking these discussions seriously, we can see which arguments that politicians 
themselves found persuasive, the sorts of issues that they considered to be relevant or 
irrelevant to eighteen-year-old voting, and the way in which they struggled with the 
difficult but unavoidable theoretical questions that arose in the course of debate.  The 
political philosopher Dennis Thompson, for one, has argued that political theorists should 
regularly study the arguments that citizen and their representatives make in public fora.  
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“The province of political theory should include not only the manifestly theoretical, but 
also the incompletely theoretical.” 13     
 Critics will correctly note that the Congressional Record in particular has serious 
problems with accuracy.  One commentator has described the Record as “an enigma of 
government documentation,” noting that “[u]nder the guise of correcting transcription 
errors, some legislators change, omit, or add remarks, creating a fascinating, and often 
indistinguishable, blend of truth and fiction.”14  Others may point out that only the most 
naive reader would assume that politicians’ statements on the Senate or House floor 
reflected their true beliefs on a given issue. 
 While these limitations might be a real challenge for someone taking a more 
exclusively historical approach to the story of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, for my 
purposes, the fact that the Congressional Record likely reflects neither exactly what was 
said on the floor of Congress on a given day nor what any given legislator truly thought 
about eighteen-year-old voting is not much of a problem.  The fact that a legislator 
thought an argument was convincing enough to record for posterity is what is most 
relevant to my inquiry.   
 Along similar lines, a comprehensive historical analysis of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment would need to address sources beyond Congressional documents.  Between 
1942 and 1970, the voting age issue was debated in nearly every state legislature, in the 
pages of newspapers and magazines, on the radio and on television, and in countless 
school debate tournaments across the nation.  To be sure, federal documents might well 
                                                 
13 Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), ix. 
14 Judith Schiek Robinson, Tapping the Government Grapevine: The User-Friendly Guide to U.S. 
Government Information Sources (Phoenix, AZ: The Oryx Press, 1993), 91. 
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be the most relevant sources even in a purely historical inquiry, since the push for 
eighteen-year-old voting—unlike other suffrage movements—was driven primarily by 
federal legislators.  But someone writing a more thorough history of the amendment 
would still have to delve more substantially into other kinds of texts than I have done 
here.  As I am studying the amendment’s history primarily as an example of political 
debate, though, limiting myself to Congressional documents made this project 
manageable without detracting from my central goal.   
IV.  Outline 
 The rest of this dissertation is divided into five chapters.  In Chapter 2, I give a 
brief descriptive overview of the eighteen-year-old voting movement.  Chapters 3 
through 6 each explore a different set of rationales that advocates offered in favor of 
lowering the voting age: arguments about military service, education, student dissent, and 
discrimination, respectively.  In Chapter 7, I conclude with a few final reflections on the 
significance of the voting age debates. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
A SHORT HISTORY OF EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLD VOTING
 Before launching into the different arguments that animated proponents and 
opponents of eighteen-year-old voting, it is useful to go through the chronology of events 
that ultimately led to the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971.  In his 
book, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot, Wendell Cultice offers quite a bit of detail about the 
various voting age proposals that state and federal legislators considered during the 
1940s, 50s, and 60s.  However, other commentators—especially those in the legal 
academy—have tended to focus their attention on the rather more dramatic events of 
1970 and 1971, overlooking the years of relatively subdued debate that preceded them.   
Perhaps because of this narrow historical focus, a few writers have concluded that 
the Twenty-sixth Amendment was nothing more than an administrative response to the 
Supreme Court’s partial invalidation of the eighteen-year-old rider to the Voting Rights 
Act Amendments of 1970.15  Constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman has gone so far as 
to characterize the Twenty-sixth Amendment as merely a “superstatute.”16 
By putting the eighteen-year-old voting amendment in historical perspective, 
however, we can see that the effort to lower the voting age by statute was actually a 
response to many years of legislative stalemate on proposed constitutional amendments.  
As I describe below, a few federal legislators first began introducing eighteen-year-old 
                                                 
15 See, for example, David A. Strauss, “The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments,” Harvard Law 
Review 114 (March 2001), 1488; Bruce Ackerman, We the People I: Foundations (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), 91. 
16 Ackerman, We the People I, 91.   
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voting proposals during World War II, and they made hundreds of such proposals over 
the subsequent decades.  However, apart from a brief moment in 1954, when the entire 
Senate considered (and rejected) a proposed amendment sponsored by Senator William 
Langer (R-ND), the voting age issue rested towards the bottom of the legislative agenda 
until the late 1960s, when the matter began to gain momentum.  In early 1970, a move by 
Senators Edward Kennedy and Mike Mansfield to try and lower the voting age by statute, 
rather than constitutional amendment, breathed new life into the eighteen-year-old voting 
movement, which ultimately culminated in the Twenty-sixth Amendment itself.  
I. The Early Years 
 The genesis of the twenty-one year voting age is unfortunately lost in the mists of 
time, although one popular explanation holds that it originated from the age at which a 
medieval adolescent was thought capable of wearing a suit of heavy armor, and was 
therefore eligible for knighthood.17  In America, the colonies established a minimum 
voting age of twenty-one in accordance with British common law at the time.  One 
historian notes that even in colonies that did not establish a formal minimum age for 
voting, custom prohibited males under the age of twenty-one from voting.18 
 The voting age issue next arose in the early 1820s, when both Missouri and New 
York considered—but rejected— the idea lowering their voting ages during their 
respective conventions.19  A few decades later, New York revisited the question again, 
                                                 
17 Legislators often referenced this theory in the voting age debates.  See Chapter 3. 
18 Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America: A Study of Elections in the Thirteen Colonies (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 30–31.  Boys under the age of twenty-one were apparently occasionally 
allowed to vote in some New England militia elections, however.  Ibid., 21; Albert Edward McKinley, The 
Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1905), 474.  At one point in the late 1600s, both Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
briefly raised their voting ages to twenty-four.  Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America, 474. 
19 Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot, 7. 
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when a delegate to the state constitutional convention of 1867 proposed amending the 
state constitution to enfranchise native-born white males between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-one.  This proposal, along with a couple of other similar ones, were soundly 
defeated by the convention.20 
 The first proposal to amend the federal constitution to provide for eighteen-year-
old voting came in October 1942, when Representative Victor Wickersham (D-OK) 
offered such an amendment on the same day that the House voted to lower the minimum 
draft age from twenty to eighteen.21  Several days later, Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-
MI) and Representative Jennings Randolph (D-WV) both introduced similar proposals.22  
A few states also began to consider lowering their own voting ages, but the only one to 
actually do so was Georgia, which established eighteen-year-old voting in 1943.23 
 There was a flurry of activity around the voting age issue during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s.  Between 1945 and 1952, federal legislators introduced fourteen 
different proposals to amend the constitution, and Cultice notes that during that same 
time period, nearly one hundred voting age bills were proposed in state legislatures.24 
 In March 1953, Senator Langer introduced Senate Joint Resolution 53, proposing 
a constitutional amendment that would lower the voting age for both state and federal 
elections to eighteen.25  After committee hearings on this and another similar bill, 
Langer’s proposal made it to the Senate floor on May 21, 1954, where it failed to gain the 
necessary two-thirds majority with a vote of 43 to 24, with 37 Senators not voting.  While 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 13. 
21 H.J. Res. 352, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 88 (October 17, 1942): 8312.  I discuss the 
relationship between military service and the voting age in Chapter 3. 
22 S.J. Res. 166, 77th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 88 (October 19, 1942): 8316; H.J. Res. 354, 
77th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 88 (October 21, 1942): 8507.    
23 Cultice, 24–27. 
24 Cultice, 30–32. 
25 83rd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 99 (March 2, 1953): 1513. 
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I discuss the substance of this debate elsewhere in this dissertation, one aspect worth 
noting here is that S.J. Res. 53 was a Republican initiative.  All Republicans who cast 
votes voted in favor of the bill; Democrats were split, but skewed against the proposal, 
with the strongest opposition coming from Southern Democrats.26 
 Despite the defeat of S.J. Res. 53, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting 
continued to introduce proposals to lower the voting age at the state and federal levels 
throughout the 1950s and 60s.  A very small minority of these were successful, with 
those pertaining to the American territories especially so:  Guam lowered its voting age to 
eighteen in 1954, the then-Territory of Hawaii lowered its voting age to twenty in 1958, 
and American Samoa established eighteen-year-old voting in 1965.  Outside the 
territories, Kentucky reduced its state voting age to eighteen in 1955, and Alaska became 
a state in 1956 with a voting age of nineteen.27 
 In Congress, however, eighteen-year-old voting proposals were more or less 
stymied by the implacable opposition of Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY), who 
chaired the House Judiciary Committee continuously from 1955 to 1972.  Born in 
Brooklyn, Celler had first been elected to Congress in 1922.  The liberal Democrat had a 
longtime reputation as a tough-minded partisan, an energetic campaigner, and a staunch 
advocate for African-American civil rights.28  From his powerful position as House 
                                                 
26 Extension of Voting Rights to Citizens at Age of 18, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 100 
(May 21, 1954): 6956–59; 6963–68; 6969–80. 
27 Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot, 24–27, 54–56, 58–59, 86.  Congressional documents contain a a 
very brief discussion of the thoughts behind twenty-year-old voting in Hawaii.  Senate Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, [Territorial Miscellaneous Legislation], 85th Cong., 2d sess., July 22, 1958, 
51–53; House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Amending the Hawaiian Organic Act to Lower 
the Voting Age of Citizens of the Territory of Hawaii to 20 Years, 85th Cong., 2d. sess., May 8, 1958, H. 
Rep. 1692.   
28 Charles Whalen and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1985), 29–30.  The Whalens describe how Celler entertained 
large crowds of children with magic tricks on his campaign stops.  Ibid, 30. 
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Judiciary Committee chairman, Celler was one of the chief architects of both the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.29  Celler was, however, 
emphatically opposed to eighteen-year-old voting, and throughout his tenure as 
committee chair, he steadfastly refused to hold hearings on any and all proposals for a 
voting age amendment.  (Celler was also opposed to women’s rights and employed 
similar tactics to successfully stall proposals for an Equal Rights Amendment.30)  
Significantly, this sort of heavy-handed leadership infuriated some of his younger 
colleagues, who resented the virtual lock that elderly committee chairmen like Celler had 
on the legislative process.31 
 Toward the end of the 1960s, the voting age issue began to percolate a bit closer 
to the surface of the national political agenda, with an increasing number of state and 
federal legislators introducing proposals.  The Senate Judiciary subcommittee on 
constitutional amendments held hearings in 1968 and early 1970.32  Over time, eighteen-
old-voting had become more closely identified with the Democratic Party, although 
support came from both sides of the aisle, and Southern Democrats continued to 
consistently oppose the idea.  At the federal level, proposals inevitably died a quick 
death—thanks in no small part to Celler—and even when state legislatures passed 
                                                 
29 Donald Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Right to Vote: Rights and Liberties Under the Law (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 250; Whalen and Whalen, The Longest Debate, passim.   
30 Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts, 404; Mary Frances Berry, Why ERA Failed: Politics, Women’s 
Rights, and the Amending Process of the Constitution (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 
63. 
31 Whalen and Whalen, The Longest Debate, vii, 30. 
32 Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee of the Judiciary United States Senate 
Ninetieth Congress Second Session on S.J. Res., 8, S.J. Res. 14, and S.J. Res. 78 Relating to Lowering the 
Voting Age to 18, 90th Cong., 2d sess., May 14–16, 1968; Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the 
Committee of the Judiciary United States Senate Ninety-First Congress Second Session on S.J. Res. 7, S.J. 
Res. 19, S.J. Res. 32, S.J. Res. 34, S.J. Res. 38, S.J. Res. 73, S.J. Rees. 87, S.J. Res. 102, S.J. Res. 105, S.J. 
Res. 141, S.J. Res. 147, 91st Cong., 2d sess., February 16–17, March 9–10, 1970. 
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eighteen-year-old voting amendments, these proposals were invariably rejected in 
subsequent public referenda.33  Matters seemed to be at a stalemate. 
II. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 
In March 1970, Emanuel Celler was eighty-one years old and in his forty-eighth 
year of service in the Senate.  Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) had just turned thirty-
eight and had been a senator for seven years.34 When certain provisions of Celler’s 
beloved Voting Rights Act of 1965 came up for renewal, Kennedy saw an opportunity to 
finally generate some movement on the eighteen-year-old voting issue.  Joined by Senate 
majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-MT), Kennedy proposed adding a clause that would 
establish a minimum voting age of eighteen in both state and federal elections. 
This strategy was risky.  Lowering the voting age by statute, as opposed to 
constitutional amendment, raised important legal questions about the limits of 
Congressional authority.  Apart from the specter of Supreme Court intervention, which 
loomed large, these constitutional issues offered easy cover for those who were dubious 
about the merits of a lower voting age but might have been reluctant to voice those 
opinions for the record.  As Alexander Keyssar has noted, from the perspective of an 
incumbent legislator, as soon as it seems even possible that a particular suffrage 
movement will succeed, “the potential political cost of a vote against enfranchisement 
r[ises] dramatically.” 35  The nonvoters of yesterday, after all, may be tomorrow’s 
vengeful constituents.   
 And indeed, Senate debate on the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal revolved largely 
around the question of whether Congress could legitimately lower the national voting age 
                                                 
33 Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot, 87–91, 140–170.   
34 “Edward Kennedy,” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, bioguide.congress.gov. 
35 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 214. 
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through statute alone.  Even Senators who had previously gone on record as being 
opposed to, or at least skeptical about, the wisdom of eighteen-year-olds having the right 
to vote now couched their objections almost entirely in terms of constitutionality and 
states’ rights.36  On the one hand, this suggests that by this point eighteen-year-old voting 
was enough of a possibility that members of Congress were increasingly unwilling to risk 
alienating a group of future voters by openly questioning their fitness for the franchise.  
On the other hand, it also seems likely that at least some legislators felt more comfortable 
opposing the voting age rider—which could be objected to on purely legal grounds—than 
they would have a constitutional amendment. 
What’s more, the statutory approach also divided advocates of eighteen-year-old 
voting.  A number of senators seemed quite sincere in their support of a lower voting age 
but nonetheless expressed reservations about the proposed rider.  Most notably, the 
venerable proponent Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV), who had been introducing 
voting age proposals since 1943, urged his colleagues to lower the voting age through 
constitutional amendment instead.  Randolph seemingly could not bring himself to 
openly criticize the Kennedy-Mansfield provision, but he repeatedly stressed that his 
latest proposed amendment had enough votes that it could be quickly brought to the 
Senate floor and passed.37   
                                                 
36 Compare, for example, Senator Spessard Holland’s (D-FL.) lengthy and substantive arguments against 
eighteen-year-old voting in 1968 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings with his brief March 11 statement 
on the Senate floor.  Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on the Committee of the Judiciary 
United States Senate Ninetieth Congress Second Session On S.J. Res. 7, S.J. Res. 14, and S.J. Res. 78 
Relating to Lowering the Voting Age to 18, 90th Cong., 2d sess., May 15, 1968, 29–35; Voting Rights Act 
Amendments of 1969, Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 116 (March 11, 1970): 6957.  
37 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1969, Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 116 (March 
11, 1970): 6927–28, 6943–44, 6961. 
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A few other supporters of eighteen-year-old voting were more willing to voice 
their doubts.  Senator Roman Hruska (R-NE), for example, agreed that eighteen- to 
twenty-one year-olds had the requisite intelligence and education to exercise the 
franchise,38 but he was concerned about what might happen if the Supreme Court 
invalidated the Kennedy-Mansfield rider after the 1972 elections: 
If the votes of 18-year-old citizens were disregarded as invalid, an election might 
be thrown into the House of Representatives.  This uncertainty and confusion 
would arise at the very time when the Nation can ill afford to await the outcome 
of protracted litigation, and even worse, be divided by it.39  
 
Senator Robert Griffin (R-MI) also emphasized his support for eighteen-year-old voting40 
but questioned the merits of attaching a constitutionally questionable rider to the “vitally 
important” Voting Rights Act.41  
 For their part, those pushing for the voting age rider argued that a constitutional 
amendment, while preferable, was no longer a realistic goal.  Mansfield became irritated 
with Randolph’s continued assurances that an amendment would pass quickly: 
‘The distinguished Senator from West Virginia himself has been introducing resolutions 
[for a constitutional amendment] since 1942, and where are they?  Still in committee.  
Where are they when Congress adjourns?  Dead.”42  Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) 
agreed, “[I] see nothing but frustration if we try to go the constitutional amendment route.  
The amendments get into the Judiciary Committee and they just seem to rot and die 
                                                 
38  Ibid., 6952. 
39 Ibid., 6946. 
40 Ibid., 6945, 6968–69. 
41 Ibid., 6932. 
42 Ibid., 6944. 
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there.”43  Mansfield also reminded his colleagues that the House Judiciary Committee, 
with Celler at the helm, would surely never pass such a proposal.44 
 Supporters of the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal energetically maintained that the 
law was constitutional, as I discuss at length in Chapter 6.  They ultimately prevailed: 
Despite a series of proposed amendments from Senator James Allen (D-A) designed to 
derail the bill, the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal passed the Senate by a large margin, with 
67 in favor, 19 against, and 14 Members not voting.  (The yeas included Senator 
Randolph, who finally announced his intention to vote for the bill despite his concerns.45) 
  At this point, Representative Celler was backed into a corner: Either he could 
abandon his objections to eighteen-year-old voting and speed the legislation through, or 
he could stand his ground and endanger the renewal of the Voting Rights Act extension 
bill.  There were good reasons for him to be concerned:  In July 1969, Celler’s Judiciary 
Committee had voted to simply extend the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for five more 
years, but when it reached the House floor, a coalition of conservative Representatives 
managed to substitute and pass a different bill, one that had been proposed by the Nixon 
administration and which the liberals regarded as considerably weaker.  When the 
administration’s bill arrived in the Senate, however, that chamber reversed the change, 
substituting and passing Celler’s original five-year extension.  It was at this point that 
Kennedy and Mansfield proposed the voting age rider.46 
 Desperate to avoid a conference committee with conservative Senator James 
Eastland’s (D-MS) Senate Judiciary committee, which long had been a killing field for 
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civil rights legislation, Celler and his allies decided to bypass the normal legislative 
process.  Instead, Representative Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) proposed a resolution calling 
for the House to simply approve the Senate bill—including the eighteen-year-old voting 
amendment—and send it to the President.  The House Rules Committee approved the 
resolution, as well as a one-hour limitation on debate.47 
 It was in this form, then, that the voting age issue finally reached the floor of the 
House of Representatives on June 17, 1970.  Within the first few minutes of discussion, 
Celler rose to essentially concede that he had been outmaneuvered: 
 [I] want to point out to you my good friends that a vote against [the 
resolution] is tantamount to a vote against the extension of the Voting Rights Act. 
 If there is any change in the bill, the bill then goes to conference and there, 
I can assure you, there would be the death knell of the bill . . . . I say that because 
of my knowledge of what would happen in the other body . . . . If this bill goes 
back to the other body, then this bill is as dead as that flightless bird called the 
dodo.  
 . . . Unlike many Members, I do hold doubts as to the wisdom of 
extending the franchise to persons 18 to 21. . . . I also hold reservations about the 
constitutional authority of Congress to statutorily amend voting age requirements. 
. . .  
 . . . Despite these reservations and concerns, to which, as you know, I have 
given vent recently, I am now, today, firmly and finally of the opinion that we 
must brook no obstacle to the immediate extension of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.  That extension is of such paramount national importance that it must be 
effectuated as promptly as possible and at a minimum of risk.48 
 
 The House debate was both more contentious and wide-ranging than the Senate 
debate had been.  While the senators had focused primarily on constitutional questions, 
members of the House were much more willing to launch into broader discussions about 
                                                 
47 Representative H. Allen Smith (R-CA) recounted the legislative history leading up to the House floor 
debate, Congress, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 116, pt. 15 (June 
17, 1970): 20160. 
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eighteen-year-old voting itself.49  Such discussions were overwhelmingly dominated by 
speakers announcing themselves in favor of lowering the voting age, although a few 
Members—most passionately, Representative John Rarick (D-LA) 50—staked out the 
other side.   
However, the House also argued about the same constitutional issues that had so 
preoccupied the Senate, with a proportionately higher number of speakers voicing doubts 
that the legislation could survive Supreme Court scrutiny.  The debate became heated at 
times.  Representative Lawrence Fountain (D-NC), for instance, was beside himself about 
what he saw as an unacceptable extension of Congressional power: “How ridiculous can 
we become in our effort to evade proper constitutional processes. . . . [T]here is no end to 
the folly of man.  Let us be done with this charade; with this flimsily disguised seizure of 
power.” 51 On the other side, Representative Carl Albert  (D-OK) spoke for many 
proponents when he declared that there was no room for neutrality on this issue. “Those 
who endeavor to equivocate that they are for the 18-year-old vote but insist that the 
cumbersome time-consuming constitutional amendment route be pursued, are in effect 
against extending the franchise to 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds.”52 
More than a few Members were infuriated by the circumstances under which they 
were being forced to consider the eighteen-year-old voting rider.  Representative Gerald 
Ford (R-MI) characterized Matsunaga’s resolution, with its accompanying time limit, as 
“the most indefensible combination of legislation and parliamentary procedure I have 
                                                 
49 For analysis of the sorts of arguments advanced in these discussions, see Chapters 3–6.. 
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ever seen.”53  Others chafed at what they saw as an acquiescence to Senate power.  
Representative William Randall (D-MO) declared, “If we adopt this rule the House 
agrees that it is the second-class body of the Congress.  I cannot understand why so many 
seem so intent to eliminate ourselves as a legislative body.”54  Representative William 
Colmer (D-MS), who had been outvoted by the Rules Committee he chaired, mournfully 
described the resolution as “a tragic situation.”  “What you are really doing here. . . is 
making of [sic] this body a unicameral legislative body.  We might as well quit and ask 
the other body what they think we ought to do over here; and permit them to write the 
legislation in the first place.”55 
Despite such objections, however, the resolution ultimately passed by a vote of 
276 to 128, with 17 members not voting.56  President Nixon signed the amended Voting 
Rights Extension Act on June 22.57  The fight to lower the voting age was not over, but 
advocates had won a crucial round.  By repackaging the eighteen-year-old voting issue 
into a Congressional statute, rather than a constitutional amendment, Kennedy, 
Mansfield, and their allies had managed to break a decades-old stalemate.  
III. Oregon v. Mitchell and the Twenty-sixth Amendment 
 With the 1972 elections looming, the Supreme Court quickly agreed to hear a set 
of cases challenging the constitutionality of the eighteen-year-old voting provision, as 
well as two other provisions of the newly amended Voting Rights Act.   The case was 
argued on October 19, 1970, and the Court rendered its decision a scant two months later, 
on December 21. 
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 In Oregon v. Mitchell,58 the Court handed down a remarkably messy collection of 
fractured opinions.  Justice Black, writing for the majority, upheld the eighteen-year-old 
voting statute with respect to federal elections, but struck it down as it applied to state 
and local elections.59  However, Black was essentially writing for a majority of one:  
Four Justices—Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall—maintained that the voting age 
provision was a legitimate exercise of Congressional authority with respect to both 
federal and state elections.60  Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and 
Blackmun asserted that Congress did not have constitutional authority to lower the voting 
age in either state or federal elections.61  Black’s position, then, that Congress had 
extensive power to set the qualifications for national elections but sharply limited 
authority to interfere in state elections, expressed the judgment of a majority on both 
points and therefore became the binding opinion of the Court. 
 For the forty-seven states that had minimum voting ages over eighteen, the 
Supreme Court decision presented a massive administrative problem.  State election 
officials reported that the costs of administering a dual-age voting system—with one age 
limit for elections of federal officials and another for elections of state and local 
officials—would be staggering.  Many worried that the logistical complications would 
create serious delay and increase the possibility of election fraud.62 
 In response, a number of state legislatures immediately began to consider 
amending their own constitutions to provide for eighteen-year-old voting.  However, not 
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all states would be able to ratify a constitutional amendment before the 1972 elections, as 
many had internal amending procedures that required two successive legislatures to pass 
any proposed amendment, and sometimes a popular referendum as well.63 
 Congress also immediately took action.  On March 10, the Senate unanimously 
passed a joint resolution, sponsored by Senator Randolph, that called for a constitutional 
amendment lowering the voting age to eighteen in both state and federal elections.64  
Shortly thereafter, the House took up an identical proposal, cosponsored by none other 
than Representative Celler.  In urging the chamber to pass the proposal, Celler noted that 
the voting age movement had gained an irreversible momentum: “[A]ny effort to stop the 
wave for the 18-year-old vote would be as useless as a telescope to a blind man.”65  
Celler was right.  A few dissenters—mainly Southern Democrats and conservative 
Republicans—objected to the proposal, maintaining that Congress should either leave the 
states to their own devices or simply repeal the voting age amendment to the Voting 
Rights Act.66  Nevertheless, the House overwhelmingly backed the proposed 
constitutional amendment, passing the joint resolution with a vote of 401 to 19, with 12 
Members not voting.67 
 Within an hour, both the Delaware and Minnesota legislatures ratified the new 
amendment. Over the next several months, other states followed suit.   On June 30, 1971, 
Ohio became the thirty-eighth state to ratify the voting age amendment, cutting the 
previous ratification speed record—which had been held by the Twelfth Amendment—by 
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half.  On July 5, President Nixon signed the new amendment, as did the General Services 
administrator and three eighteen-year-olds chosen from a concert group in attendance.68   
                                                 
68 Cultice, Youth’s Battle for the Ballot, 192–215. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
MILITARY SERVICE 
It is common knowledge that eighteen-year-old voting had something to do with 
the war in Vietnam.  Indeed, the conventional wisdom about the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment is that it was passed specifically to align the nation’s minimum voting and 
draft ages. Americans in their 50s and 60s today may remember the amendment’s 
passage only dimly, but many readily recall the slogan, “old enough to fight, old enough 
to vote.”    
 Academic commentary on the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, what little of it that 
exists, has also tended to stress the soldier-voter connection.  In the only full-length book 
about the history of voting age legislation in America, Wendell Cultice contends that the 
voting age issue has always been inextricably linked to young people’s service in the 
military, and never more so than in the decades after World War II.69  Scholars who have 
written about the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in the course of broader projects have also 
often emphasized the role of the Vietnam War and the apparent injustice of denying 
draftees the right to vote in their analyses.70 
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 To some degree, such explanations are correct.  A close reading of the 
Congressional debates on eighteen-year-old voting reveals that a connection between 
military service, especially compulsory military service, was absolutely central to 
discussions about the voting age.  The very first proposals to lower the voting age 
through constitutional amendment, in 1942, were prompted by Congress’s decision to 
revise the draft age downward, from twenty to eighteen, and advocates would continue to 
invoke the soldier-voter link for the next three decades.  Furthermore, as the Vietnam 
War escalated in the late 1960s, the argument that soldiers—especially conscripted 
soldiers—should have a right to vote for the nation’s leaders undoubtedly took on new 
urgency and helped to propel the eighteen-year-old voting issue onto the legislative 
agenda. 
 However, the significance of the soldier-voter link in the history of the Twenty-
sixth Amendment has been somewhat overstated.  In Congressional debates, advocates of 
lowering the voting age surprisingly often explicitly rejected the ‘old enough to fight, old 
enough to vote’ angle in favor of other sorts of arguments.   
 In this chapter, I first investigate how arguments about fighting and voting 
worked to push the eighteen-year-old voting cause along.  I maintain that ‘old enough to 
fight, old enough to vote,’ actually encompassed several different conceptual 
relationships between military service and suffrage.  I then examine the limitations of this 
collection of arguments.  I assert that despite the military service–suffrage angle’s 
considerable usefulness as a rhetorical strategy, the force of such arguments were 
ultimately limited by some inconvenient facts about the nature of military service, 
especially in the late 1960s.  Specifically, the restriction of the draft to males only, the 
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longstanding military policy of preferring young draftees to older ones, and eighteen-
year-old voting activists’ ambivalence about military service all undermined efforts to 
connect the voting and draft ages.   
I.  Brave Warriors, New Adults, and Disenfranchised Servants 
 Right from the beginning, arguments linking military service and voting rights 
were front and center in the voting age debates.  Representative Victor Wickersham (D-
OK) offered the first proposed eighteen-year-old voting amendment to the federal 
constitution on the same day—October 17, 1942—that the House voted to lower the 
minimum draft age from twenty to eighteen.71  Several days later, Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg (R-MI) and Representative Jennings Randolph (D-WV) introduced similar 
proposals in the Senate and House, respectively.72  When introducing his bill, 
Vandenberg specifically cited the newly lowered draft age.73  Randolph similarly stressed 
the relevance of the new draft age in the subcommittee hearings that he convened only a 
few days later, “I strongly feel one of the very cogent reasons why we should consider 
this proposal today is that the impact of war has lifted, through the process of the draft, 
from our home front millions of young men and women in the age bracket of 18 to 20, 
inclusive.”74 
 For the next three decades, proponents of eighteen-year-old repeatedly argued that 
the minimum voting age should be brought into line with the minimum draft age to 
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ensure that all members of the armed forces—or at least all those subject to 
conscription—could vote.  Indeed, the occasional legislator maintained that the voting 
age should be lowered only for members of the armed forces.75  When the Senate debated 
the eighteen-year-old voting amendment in March 1970, Senator Warren Magnuson (D-
WA) declared that military service was still “the most potent argument we can think of,” 
that “if a man is old enough to fight for his country, to bleed and die and serve for his 
country, he or she is old enough to have a say in how this country is governed.”76 
This conceptual link between soldiering and voting was cashed out in at least 
three different ways in the voting age debates:  Some advocates of lowering the voting 
age invoked the venerable ideal of the citizen-soldier, while other suggested that 
maturity, or adulthood, was at the core of the military service–voting relationship.  Still 
others rejected these two formulations—especially in the later years of the debates, at the 
height of the Vietnam War—in favor of arguments about representation.  These different 
lines of argument were not mutually exclusive, and legislators often cited more than one, 
sometimes simultaneously. 
A.  The Citizen-Soldier 
 One strand of the ‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’ argument invoked the 
venerable ideal of the citizen-soldier.  Advocates of a lower voting age maintained that 
young soldiers who bravely risked their lives to protect their country were the truest 
American citizens, and as such, deserved to vote. 
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 The idea that citizenship is linked to military service dates to antiquity and has 
surfaced repeatedly since.77  The quintessential citizen-soldier, described perhaps most 
memorably by Machiavelli, willingly goes to war to defend his beloved nation, and when 
the war ends (if he survives) he eagerly returns home to resume his active participation in 
the polity.78  According to one scholar of the subject, in the United States “the citizen-
soldier ideal became the epitome of a liberal ideology that combined a high esteem for 
military virtues with a deep distrust of military professionalism.”79 
 And indeed, proponents of eighteen-year-old voting not infrequently suggested 
that young soldiers’ dedication to their country earned them the right to vote.  
Representative Lucien Nedzi (D-MI) praised President’s Johnson 1968 proposal for a 
lower voting age, “The right to vote is an inherent right of all Americans.  There can be 
no good reason for denying this right to young men and women who have demonstrated 
their citizenship by . . . their sacrifice in the defense of freedom around the world.”80  In 
1969, Representative Richard Fulton (D-TN) inserted statistics regarding the percentage 
of soldiers under twenty-one in Vietnam, as well as their casualty rate.  He asserted, “Our 
18-, 19- ,and 20-year-olds have earned their right to be heard through the ballot.  They 
have earned this right through their service to the Nation.”81 
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 Advocates who drew on the citizen-soldier ideal tended to emphasize young 
soldiers’ bravery and dedication.  Upon introducing House Joint Resolution 842 in 1967, 
Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL) rejected opponents’ claims that fighting and voting 
required different sets of qualities: 
It seems to me, nonetheless, that both fighting and voting assume a sense of duty 
and responsibility in the individual.  I submit that our 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds 
have displayed a keen sense of duty and responsibility when it comes to fighting 
for our country.  This is particularly true today in Vietnam.  Reports from the 
battle zone indicate that our military leadership considers the young men serving 
in the Armed Forces today among the most responsible and intelligent ever to 
have served.82 
 
 Such legislators were careful to recognize compulsory military service as a 
legitimate civic obligation, but they implied that even drafted soldiers served, if not 
eagerly, then certainly willingly.  In 1968, Senator Mansfield referred to the draft when 
he urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to begin hearings on S.J. Res. 8: “Our younger 
citizens . . . know that they are up front, and they are prepared to carry out their 
constitutional responsibilities under the Constitution.”83  In sharp contrast to many of 
those who framed the military-voting link in terms of representation,84 those inspired by 
the citizen-soldier model rarely questioned the merits of the draft or the Vietnam War 
itself.  Indeed, they characterized the war as being fought by committed troops and for 
noble goals.  Young soldiers in Asia were “offering . . . their lives for democratic 
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ideals,”85 “demonstrating their citizenship by . . . their sacrifice in the defense of freedom 
around the world.”86  In 1965, Representative Fulton declared: 
[W]e are calling upon [young Americans] to give their lives in a remote but 
important region of the world where Godless communism threatens world peace 
and security and they are prepared to offer the ultimate sacrifice to protect the 
freedoms which we hold so sacred. . . . Mr. Speaker, if we can demand all this 
from these, who have proved themselves ready, willing, and able to serve their 
country, then I submit it is discrimination to perpetuate the existing situation 
which denies them the right to vote.”87 
 
 The longstanding ideal of the courageous and dedicated citizen-soldier was a 
recurrent motif in the voting age debates, especially before 1968.  As the Vietnam War 
escalated, however, political circumstances effectively undermined the rhetorical force of 
the link between military service and good citizenship.  A soldier who fought to protect 
his country might be a hero, but one who fought in a morally ambiguous, increasingly 
unpopular conflict was at best a victim.   
Perhaps in response to this tension, during the latter half of the 1960s proponents 
of eighteen-year-old voting frequently tried to expand the concept of military service to 
include civilian activities like serving in the Peace Corps or tutoring inner-city children. 
According to Representative Lester Wolff (D-NY), young people were “assuming many 
of the most vital responsibilities faced by any citizen. . . . In Vietnam they are fighting a 
bloody war; in the Peace Corps and VISTA they are fighting a war of humanity, for the 
benefit of their fellow man.”88  Representative Frank Clark (D-PA) maintained that 
young Americans serving in the Armed Forces or Peace Corps were “telling the 
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American story of democracy.”89 
Such analogies fell a little flat, however, and in the last years of the 1960s, 
advocates of eighteen-year-old voting invoked the soldier-citizen ideal less and less often, 
drawing instead on arguments about maturity and, especially, representation. 
B. Passage to Adulthood 
Perhaps the most literal take on the ‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’ 
canard was that military service was in and of itself proof of adulthood.  Proponents of 
lowering the voting age suggested that the minimum draft age, more than any other legal 
marker, reflected a collective decision that eighteen-year-olds were adults, and as such, 
they should be permitted to vote. 
Legislators like Senator Arthur Moody (D-MI) argued that if eighteen-year-olds 
were able to manage under grueling, highly dangerous combat conditions, then surely 
they were mature enough to make a decision between candidates on a ballot.  “If they are 
old enough to fight, if they have sufficient maturity to be entrusted with jet airplanes and 
assigned to foxholes to defend our liberties, then they are old enough to vote.”90  More 
than fifteen years later, Representative John Rooney (D-NY) declared: 
I have great feeling for all the youth who today face the dilemma of being 
expected to react and perform as adults even to making the supreme sacrifice for 
their country in the rice paddies of Vietnam yet being categorized as children [for 
purposes of voting].91   
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Speaking in Senate subcommittee hearings in 1970, now-Senator Randolph 
similarly stressed the heavy expectations placed on youthful soldiers: 
 They are on the battlefield faced with the alternatives of kill or be killed.  
Immaturity is incompatible with what we expect of them under these 
circumstances. 
 Mr. Chairman and Senator Cook, on January 28, 1968, the Pueblo with 83 
men was captured by North Korea.  There were 18 men aboard doing their duty 
for their country under the age of 21.  We not only expected them to bear the 
brunt of the physical and mental strain and torture while prisoners of North Korea, 
but we subjected them later on to a court of inquiry.92 
 
 Congressmen seemed particularly impressed by youthful soldiers’ apparent 
facility with sophisticated, expensive military equipment.  Speaking on the Senate floor 
in May 1954, Senator William Langer (R-ND) expressed amazement that the military 
readily employed 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds as fighter or bomber pilots: 
Some of these tremendously complicated instruments of warfare require a 
knowledge and understanding which would confound many an older person . . . . 
To my mind, the maturity required to exercise these feats of warfare are 
commensurate with the maturity required to choose between candidates for 
election to a public office.”93 
 
 A slightly different version of the argument that military service is proof of 
adulthood rested on cultural (and specifically gendered94) ideas about the transformative 
potential of combat experience.  An eighteen-year-old might be a boy when he left for 
war, but he would come back a man.  In mid-1968, Senator Tydings (D-MD) criticized 
opponents who argued that a lower voting age would bring inexperienced youth into the 
electorate: “Thousands of Maryland boys between eighteen and twenty-one are not only 
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getting practical experience in ‘adult society,’ they are getting it in a very hard school—
in the jungles and on the battlefields of Vietnam.”95  Representative Kenneth Hechler (D-
WV) suggested that service in Vietnam was unusually onerous: “To be in the Armed 
Forces today is a much more sobering and aging process than it was in either World War 
II or the Korean conflict.”96 
Advocates of eighteen-year-old voting also often referenced historical lore linking 
the current voting age of twenty-one to medieval standards for military readiness. 
Randolph was the first to suggest, in 1961 Senate subcommittee hearings, that laws 
defining the age of majority at twenty-one derived from the age at which young men in 
the Middle Ages were considered old enough to bear the weight of armor.97  This 
unsubstantiated historical tidbit quickly became accepted wisdom.  Over the next decade, 
legislators like Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) frequently argued that this antiquated 
rationale had “an especially bitter relevance” in the Vietnam era.98   In 1970 House floor 
debate, Representative Robert McClory (R-IL) argued: 
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21 was established as the minimum voting age because young men were not 
considered to be strong enough to bear their suits of armor until they attained the 
age of 21.  But today our young men are considered old enough – and strong 
enough to carry bullet-proof vests – and arms – when they are 18.99   
 
Representative Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) similarly cited the supposed origins of the 
current minimum voting age, noting, “While we have revised the age for bearing arms to 
18, we have kept the age for voting at 21.”100 
 Throughout the voting age debates, legislators regularly argued that soldiers were 
by definition adults and were therefore entitled to the right to vote.  As I discuss later, 
however, this argument was somewhat weakened by a countervailing thread in American 
military thought and policy, which considered soldiering to be a job best suited to young 
people, who were presumably healthier, less-encumbered by dependents, and more 
daring.  Still, the notion that military service was in and of itself all the proof of 
adulthood one could reasonably demand to grant the franchise was an important strand of 
argument from the 1940s through 1970. 
C.  Reciprocity and Representation 
The third, and perhaps the most important strand of the ‘old enough to fight, old 
enough to vote’ argument was present right from the beginning.  On October 19, 1942, 
when Senator Vandenberg introduced his proposed amendment to lower the voting age to 
eighteen, right in the middle of Senate debate about lowering the minimum draft age 
from twenty to eighteen, he remarked only, “Mr. President, if young men are to be 
drafted at 18 years of age to fight for their Government, they ought to be entitled to vote 
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at 18 years of age for the kind of government for which they are best satisfied to fight.”101  
This argument, that the minimum voting age should be brought into line with the 
minimum draft age to ensure that all soldiers have political representation, would 
ultimately become the single most-heard refrain in the voting age debates.  Over and over 
again, proponents of lowering the voting age insisted that it was crucial for soldiers, 
especially conscripted soldiers, to be able to vote for or against the political leaders who 
sent them to war.   
 This argument rested on an assumption of reciprocity between political 
obligations and the right to representation.  Advocates of eighteen-year-old voting argued 
that it was only fair to give those who were subject to the obligations of citizenship the 
power to help select the country’s leaders.  Along with his comments invoking the 
citizen-soldier model, discussed above, Senator Mansfield also referred to this matter of 
reciprocity when he introduced S.J. Res. 8 in 1967: “Surely, when citizens of the United 
States reach an age when they can be so clearly and directly bound by policies of 
government, they ought to be able to participate in the choice of political 
representatives.”102  The next year, Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN), who would eventually 
sponsor the joint resolution that became the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, declared: “We 
require our 18- to 21-year-olds to accept the adult responsibilities of living in our society. 
. . . In simple justice, they should be given the right to participate as adults in the 
democratic process.”103 
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 Indeed, proponents of lowering the voting age often mentioned that along with 
military service, eighteen- to twenty-year-olds also had to pay taxes on their earnings and 
were generally treated as adults for purposes of criminal and civil liability. Like woman 
suffragists decades earlier,104 these advocates seized on Revolutionary rhetoric.  When 
Representative William St. Onge (D-CT) introduced H.J. Res. 232 in early 1967, he 
asserted:  
To tax our 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds without giving them the right to vote ignores 
the great rallying cry of our War of Independence that there be ‘no taxation 
without representation.’  At the very least we should allow these young people a 
role in selecting those who will have the responsibility of determining how their 
tax dollars are to be spent.105 
 
In a 1970 hearing, Representative Thomas Railsback (R-IL) noted, “Our laws tax these 
18-year-olds but our voting laws do not permit them representation in enacting that tax 
law.  The Boston Tea Party was supposed to have been the spark that put that issue to rest 
in this country.”106 
But advocates of eighteen-year-old voting always circled back to military service, 
which they characterized as the greatest civic obligation of all.  Denying the vote to 
eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds who paid taxes was a great enough injustice, 
declared Representative John Davis (D-GA), “but when an 18-year-old is serving in one 
of our armed forces, the injustice is multiplied.”107  Upon introducing H.J. Res. 479 in 
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mid-1967, Representative Lester Wolff (D-NY) poignantly described the burden of 
military service: 
[O]f all the obligations of society, none is more seriout [sic] than service in the 
Armed Forces in time of war.  To be uprooted from one’s life, family, friends is 
costly enough.  To die in an unfamiliar land is ultimate.  No other sector of 
society is asked to give so much.  A young man’s death signifies a brief and 
uncompleted story.  To go prepared to die, to find a duty so far from homes and 
friends, so far from anyone they have come to know and love; to die on the 
battlefield amid the cries of others—this is the greatest sacrifice which can be 
asked of any man.108 
 
In his 1970 testimony before Congress, former special counsel to President Kennedy 
Theodore Sorensen asserted, “If taxation without representation was tyranny, then 
conscription without representation is slavery.”109 
 Advocates who invoked arguments about representation stressed that military 
service was not only a tremendous burden, but also often a coerced one.  Unlike those 
inspired by the citizen-soldier ideal, who tended to blur the distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary military service, those who focused on representation frequently 
emphasized that drafted soldiers’ service was compulsory.  Young men, Senator Everett 
Dirksen (R-IL) argued on the Senate floor in 1954, should have voting rights  
“because . . . they have an interest in fulfilling their own destiny, because they have an 
interest in somehow fulfilling every hope and ambition in life, when suddenly the long 
hand of Government intervenes . . . .”110  More than fifteen years later, Senator Mansfield 
departed from his earlier implications that young draftees went willingly to war, “[T]he 
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Federal government can . . . pick up an 18-year-old by the back of his neck, put him in 
uniform, send him overseas, and  perhaps send him to his death.”111 
 The representation formulation of the military service–voting relationship further 
differed from arguments about citizen-soldiers in that it was compatible with challenges 
to the legitimacy of both the draft and the particular war being fought.  Indeed, Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg, one of the earliest and strongest proponents of a lower voting age, 
had also been one of the most prominent opponents of both the Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940 and the United States’ entry into World War II.112  And as the 
conflict in Vietnam intensified, a small minority of legislators connected their support of 
eighteen-year-old voting to their opposition to what Representative Fredrick Schwegel 
(R-IA) called “this misbegotten war.”113  In 1969, Representative Seymour Halpern (R-
NY) called for eighteen-year-old voting, the abolition of the draft and the immediate end 
of the Vietnam War: 
[T]he draft is a device difficult to justify under any circumstances, but when it 
operates to send American boys to die in a war in which many of them do not 
believe in and in which our official aim has never been clarified, then it becomes 
outrageous.114  
 
 It is worth noting here that even the most hopeful antiwar legislator almost 
certainly did not believe that enfranchising eighteen- to twenty-year-olds would actually 
stop the war in Vietnam.  However, in the late 1960s, many members of Congress did 
think that lowering the voting age would moderate the burgeoning antiwar protests by 
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channeling campus dissent into more conventional political channels.  I discuss this 
phenomenon at length in Chapter 5. 
 Arguments about representation were crucially important to the debates over 
eighteen-year-old voting, from the 1940s straight through to 1971.  They were, however, 
less conclusive than commentators have suggested, and in the next section I explore the 
conceptual weaknesses on all three strands of the ‘old enough to fight, old enough to 
vote’ group of arguments.   
II.  A Limited Connection 
 Those who opposed eighteen-year-old voting strenuously objected to the notion 
that the minimum voting age should have anything to do with the minimum draft age, and 
I discuss their arguments at various places in this section.  However, what is more 
interesting is that beginning in 1968, supporters of a lower voting age also began to 
occasionally distance themselves from arguments connecting military service and 
eligibility for the franchise.  Senator Stephen Young (D-OH) disavowed such rationales 
when arguing for a lower voting age in 1969, “Frequently, we hear the claim that 18-
year-olds, old enough to be drafted and to fight in Vietnam, are old enough to vote.  This 
is not a valid argument.  It is, in fact, a perfect example of a non sequitur.”115  Young, 
like others, offered alternative reasons why eighteen- to twenty-year-olds should have the 
right to vote, including improved educational qualifications and the need to redirect 
youthful dissent into more acceptable channels.116  “The old cliche about being old 
enough to vote if they were old enough to soldier for their country is valid, I believe,” 
remarked Senator Gale McGee (D-WY) in 1970, “but there are even better 
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arguments.”117  In this section, I examine three different phenomena that undermined the 
soldier-voter link in the debates over eighteen-year-old voting:  women’s exclusion from 
the draft; the longstanding military preference for younger soldiers; and the fact that most 
young eighteen-year-old voting activists were not themselves soldiers. 
A.  The Woman Problem 
 Perhaps the most serious challenge to the conceptual link between military service 
and the franchise was that women were not subject to the draft, as indeed they never have 
been in America.  Only a few decades earlier, this fact had not been lost on those who 
opposed woman suffrage.118 Women managed to gain the franchise anyway, though, and 
by the time Congress began considering proposals to lower the voting age, their status as 
voters was established enough for opponents of eighteen-year-old voting to use women’s 
experience to challenge these new arguments.  Speaking in 1954, Representative 
Emanuel Celler (D-NY) criticized the link between voting and military service, asking 
rhetorically whether it meant that “if a person votes, he must also fight?  And does [it] 
mean that girls must also fight?”119  Senator Spessard Holland (D-FL) argued:  
[T]he draft age and the voting age are as different as night and day . . . citizens of 
the female sex are not subject to be drafted but do have a right to vote, just as 
citizens of the male sex do.120   
 
 Women’s exemption from compulsory military service was a particularly 
inconvenient fact for those who pressed the ‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’ 
angle.  Arguments about courageous citizen-soldiers and boys being forged into men by 
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the heat of battle undeniably rested on assumptions that military service was a 
specifically masculine enterprise.121  For those who invoked representation arguments, 
the male-only nature of the draft was especially problematic; if the best reason for 
lowering the voting age was to allow drafted soldiers to vote for their nation’s leaders, 
then what about the female eighteen- to twenty-year-olds who would never be drafted?  
While the fact that women were not drafted did not logically undermine military-voter 
arguments, exactly, it was an awkward reality nonetheless. 
 Indeed, the matter of women put advocates into something of a bind.  They could 
not realistically suggest that women should not have been granted the right to vote in the 
first place. (Although Senator Roman Hruska (R-NE), who grudgingly supported the 
lower voting age, had a little more trouble coming to terms with the events of 1920, 
“[T]he idea of ‘they are old enough to fight,’ . . . means that women would be left out, 
and that would not be fair; would it, because some of the women are smart enough to 
vote, too.  In fact, all of them are.”122)  On the contrary, as I discuss in Chapter 4, 
proponents of reducing the voting generally sought to define their campaign as the 
natural successor to the woman suffrage movement.  Nor could proponents argue that if 
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the voting age were lowered, young women could be required to serve as well; arguing 
that women should be drafted has generally been a politically untenable position in 
America.123  Indeed, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), who vehemently opposed a 
national voting age of eighteen, invoked the coed-draft bugaboo when the Senate debated 
S.J. Res. 53 in 1954:   
[T]his amendment likewise will grant suffrage to girls of 18.  Are we to say that 
we are voting for this proposal because we intend to vote for a draft of women in 
the next war, and that because they are old enough to vote we intend to make 
them fight, and send them along with the boys, if war should come again, which 
God forbid?124 
 
Some of those who favored a lower voting age tried to preserve the rhetorical 
force of the soldier-voter link by emphasizing the military work that women did do.  In 
the years after World War II, advocates for a reduced voting age pointed to women’s 
work on production lines.  Speaking before a House committee in 1943, Georgia 
Governor Ellis Arnall argued that both young men “lying in a foxhole in New Guinea or 
piloting a Liberator or Mustang over occupied Europe” and “young women in our 
munitions factories, in our airplane factories, in the auxiliary services” deserved the right 
to vote.125 As time went on and female soldiers began to take on a greater role in 
Vietnam,126 some legislators simply glossed over women’s exemption from the draft: 
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Senator Joseph Clark (D-PA) remarked, “I have never understood why we felt it 
appropriate, proper, and ethical to require young men and women to fight for their 
country, to be shot and and often killed, at the age of 18, but did not give them the 
privilege of the vote.”127 
Still others highlighted women’s traditional role as tenders of home and hearth 
during wartime.  Representative Hechler maintained that the Vietnam War prematurely 
aged not only the young men who served in Asia, but also the young women who 
supported them. “I submit that the young wives, sweethearts, sisters, and classmates of 
our younger members of the Armed Forces fighting in Vietnam have a far more mature 
outlook on civic developments . . . .”128  In 1970, Representative Pete McCloskey (R-CA) 
asserted that the draft put a great onus on women as well. “[T]he burden is not just on 
young men.  It also falls on those who love them and who watch and wait for their 
homecoming, the young girls whose lives are linked with theirs.”129 
Interestingly, the fact that plenty of men also did not serve in the military rarely 
surfaced in the voting age debates.  During the late 1960s, military participation rates 
declined sharply.  The postwar baby boom had produced a unusually large cohort of 
draft-eligible men, and despite the expansion of the Vietnam War, the supply of men 
exceeded Selective Service’s demand.  One 1969 study estimated that half of all adult 
males had served in the armed forces.130 
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Perhaps because military service had been much closer to a universal male 
experience during their own youth,131 opponents of eighteen-year-old voting only very 
occasionally pointed to the large of numbers of men who were neither soldiers nor 
veterans.  One exception was Representative John Rarick (D-LA), who rejected the 
military service–voting connection as an “appalling non sequitur”: 
It logically disenfranchises all of those Americans who are not eligible for 
military service – including all of the women of this country.  It would result, 
carried to its own logical conclusion, in an electorate consisting exclusively of 
honorably discharged veterans.132 
 
More commonly, opponents noted (and some advocates conceded) that in addition to 
women, older men were also not subject to the draft.  Senator Holland commented in 
1968, “[W]e have heard the argument that if you are old enough to fight you are old 
enough to vote; however, we have never heard it argued that if you are too old to fight, 
you are too old to vote.”133 
To be sure, counterrarguments about the many Americans who did not serve in 
the military were problematic in their own right; after all, advocates were not claiming 
that military service was a necessary condition for the franchise, only that it was a 
sufficient one.  Nevertheless, proponents seemed to feel compelled to respond.  Some, for 
example, broadened their definitions of national service.  As I discussed above, during 
the second half of the 1960s a number of legislators who supported eighteen-year-old 
voting—particularly those who emphasized citizen-soldier arguments—sometimes tried 
to expand the concept of soldiering to include civilian activities done by both men and 
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women, such as serving in the Peace Corps or working for antipoverty programs.  
Lumping military service in with Peace Corps and VISTA volunteering arguably helped 
to paper over the fact that in the Vietnam era military service was far from a universal 
experience, for both genders, 
The fact that young women were excluded from the military draft and served in 
the armed forces at rates far lower than that of their male counterparts seriously 
diminished advocates’ arguments that the voting age needed to be lowered specifically to 
enfranchise the nation’s soldiers.  Ultimately, those who sought a lower voting age would 
to have to look for more gender-neutral ways of expressing why eighteen-, nineteen, and 
twenty-year-olds deserved the vote.   
B.  A Young Man’s Job 
 Another countercurrent working against efforts to link the minimum draft and 
voting ages was the longstanding military preference for younger soldiers.  At least since 
World War I, both uniformed and civilian war planners had argued for a fighting force 
made up mainly of men in their late teens and very early twenties. For the most part, 
Congress acceded to these requests, and after the induction age was lowered from twenty 
to eighteen in 1942, in the wake of Pearl Harbor, it never went higher than nineteen 
again.  The central rationales behind this phenomenon—the military’s belief that young 
men made better soldiers and domestic resistance to drafting fathers and/or key industrial 
workers—arguably undermined military service arguments for eighteen-year-old voting. 
 Some background about age and compulsory military service is useful here.  
Children as young as six have served in the United States military.  Throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many boys (and a very few girls) sixteen and under 
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served in the different branches of the armed forces.134 Indeed, during 1954 floor debate 
on the eighteen-year-old voting proposal S.J. Res. 53, opponents noted that during the 
Civil War, plenty of boys under the age of eighteen, some as young as ten, had fought.  
Senator Russell remarked sarcastically, “It is considered a great discovery now that 
because a man might be selected for service at the age of 18, that fact of itself, requires 
the Federal Government to . . . confer suffrage upon him.”135  But when it came to 
compulsory service, both the North and the South set their draft ages rather higher.  The 
Confederate Conscription Act of 1862 authorized drafting all white male residents 
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, with the maximum age subsequently raised 
to forty-five.  In February 1864, the Confederate government expanded the draft even 
further, conscripting seventeen-year-olds and those between the ages of forty-five and 
fifty into a reserve for local defense.136  In the North, the Enrollment Act of 1963 
established compulsory service for men between twenty and forty-five.137 
  During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States’ conscription 
policy reflected a series of compromises between those who pushed for service across the 
age spectrum and those who favored limiting military liability to young men only.  Broad 
registration requirements appealed to Americans’ sense of fairness; in both World Wars, 
politicians were particularly sensitive to concerns that the burden of military service 
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should not fall only on one age group.138  The government also recognized the rhetorical 
benefits of describing a particular conflict as a battle that all Americans had to fight.139   
 At the same time, there were reasons to restrict compulsory service (and to some 
extent, volunteer service) to men in their late teens and early twenties.  One commentator 
notes that “[t]he Army had always preferred a narrow age range as a more efficient and 
adequate means of developing a fighting force.”140  Young men were significantly 
healthier, as a group, than men in their late twenties,141 and, some argued, the mental and 
emotional attitudes characteristic to youth were military assets.  They maintained that 
young men were more daring, more enthusiastic, and even more patriotic than were older 
soldiers.142  Some also suggested, albeit more subtly, that younger men were more easily 
indoctrinated into military values and habits.143  
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Concentrating military liability on a few age groups could also limit the disruption 
to domestic industrial and agricultural enterprises, some of which were necessary to the 
war effort.  In formulating military policy, the United States government deliberately 
departed from its allies’ preference for universal service.  Historian George Q. Flynn 
approvingly notes that the American lobby for conscription in World War I was acutely 
aware of the need to protect militarily useful domestic industries: “[France and Britain] 
had failed to realize the necessity of coordinating military conscription with general 
manpower requirements. . . . In contrast, the United States identified the connection 
between military and industrial manpower early on.”144  The World War I draft law 
specifically exempted skilled labor and managers in “necessary” agricultural and 
industrial enterprises,145 and the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 followed 
suit. 
   The American conscription system was also designed to avoid as much 
disruption as possible to nuclear family units.  In World War I and the first years of 
World War II, married men were largely exempt from military service.  Fathers with 
dependent children were excused from compulsory service in both wars.   However, in 
both world wars, there came a point at which the military claimed that manpower needs 
exceeded the number of men classified as liable for military service.  Congress was 
unwilling to reject the armed forces’ demand for more men, so the choice was stark: 
either increase the pool of available soldiers or invade the protected classes.   
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Both times, after much debate, legislators decided to expand the age range for 
military liability rather than draft men in the exempted categories.  In August 1918, the 
draft range was expanded from twenty-one to thirty, to eighteen to forty-five.146  In 
December 1942, the minimum draft age was lowered from twenty to eighteen.147 
 After expiring in 1947, the draft was quickly reinstated in 1948 in response to 
mounting tensions between Russia and the United States.148  The 1948 draft reflected the 
military’s victory in obtaining a draft that applied only to young men.  The law required 
all men from the ages of eighteen to twenty-six to register, and those nineteen and over 
could be inducted for a tour of twenty-one months.  Eighteen-year-olds could volunteer, 
however, for a one-year-tour followed by six years in the reserve.149 
The 1948 draft law, with minor modifications, governed conscription policy in 
both the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  In 1951, military officials sought to reduce the 
minimum induction age to eighteen, but Congress agreed only to lower it to eighteen-
and-a-half.150  Draft calls fell sharply after the Korean War ended, and there was some 
tension between the Selective Service Administration, which sought to make sure that 
men did not escape service by drafting the oldest eligible men first, and the armed forces 
themselves, who strongly preferred younger soldiers.151 
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 During Vietnam, all men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five were 
required to register with Selective Service. Those who passed pre-induction testing and 
did not receive a deferment could be drafted beginning at age eighteen-and-a-half, 
although the effective minimum age was nineteen.152 As in previous wars, the draft also 
prompted many of those who were liable to volunteer—which they could do at 
eighteen—so that they could choose their branch of service and possibly reduce the 
length of their tour.153   
 From 1948 onward, then, the notion that the military draft was the province of 
men in their late teens and very early twenties, as opposed to a broader cross-section of 
society, was fairly well-established in the United States.  This sensibility crept into the 
voting age debates, where it worked against some of advocates’ arguments for connecting 
the minimum draft and voting ages. 
 Most obviously, proponents’ insistence that military service was a specifically 
adult activity was undermined by the fact that the draft age had been set at eighteen for 
the very reason that combat was supposedly a task peculiarly suited to the young.  This 
dissonance did not go unnoticed by a few of those who opposed eighteen-year-old voting.  
Indeed, opponents pointed out that not only were the skills needed for fighting unrelated 
to those needed for responsible voting, but the malleability so valued in a young soldier 
was detrimental in a voter.  In his memorable 1954 remarks on the subject, 
Representative Celler declared: 
[V]oting is as different from fighting as chalk is from cheese . . . . When the draft 
age was lowered from 21 to 18 years of age, the generals told us that this was a 
                                                 
152 Those between eighteen-and-a-half and nineteen were the very lowest priority draftees, to be called even 
after those over the age of twenty-six.  Flynn, The Draft, 172. 
153 Flynn estimates that at least forty percent of the volunteers who served in the military during the 1960s 
were motivated by the draft. Ibid., 197. 
 
 55
necessary move because young men under 21 were more easily molded into good 
soldiers than were their elders who had grown to maturity.  Young men under 21 
are more pliable and more amenable to indoctrination.  They are not likely to 
exercise critical judgment and matters demanding instant obedience.  Instant and 
unquestioning obedience may be most desirable from soldiers in the battlefield, 
but in a voter such obedience would be most undesirable.  Self-interested groups 
and corrupt politicians would find such obedience a fertile playground.154 
 
Much later, Senator Holland echoed Celler’s comments: 
[T]he draft age and the voting age are as different as night and day.  For soldiers 
are called upon to be obedient to command and to follow the strictest of military 
rules and orders.  They are not in a position to determine matters of policy for 
themselves.  For this reason to draw a parallel between the draft age and the 
voting age is utterly fallacious for no such parallel exists.  The voter must have 
the ability to separate promise from performance and to evaluate the candidates 
on the basis of fact which is a prerequisite of good voting.155 
 
 Even some of those who favored eighteen-year-old voting occasionally agreed 
that military readiness did not necessarily infer being prepared to vote.  In May 1968, the 
day after Holland made his remarks, Senator Bayh, who strongly supported a lower 
voting age, echoed his opponent’s comments.  Military service, he remarked, was: 
one of the bits and pieces of the picture we put together to try and support the case 
[for eighteen-year-old voting] and it is the most emotional.  But the voting process 
is a totally mental one, whereas that which makes one a good private, pfc., or 
corporal is not necessarily pointed to that same degree.156 
 
 Beyond these issues, arguments invoking the citizen-soldier ideal were also at 
odds with the other core reason for drafting teenagers—that they could be more easily 
spared from their responsibilities on the home front.  If the citizen-soldier model put the 
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fighting man at the center of political policy, then Selective Service put him on the 
periphery.  Civilian war planners had succeeded in concentrating the obligations of 
military service on young men precisely because they were presumably the least 
integrated into domestic social and economic institutions.  The ideal soldier was not the 
person deeply embedded in civic life, but the person whose absence would be missed the 
least.  
 This last inconsistency went unremarked in the voting age debates, however.  
Indeed, the tension between the policies and philosophy behind the minimum draft age 
and advocates’ efforts to connect the voting age to the draft age prompted rather less 
back-and-forth than did, say, the woman issue.  At a minimum, though, the fact that the 
military and civilian planners of earlier generations had gotten their way effectively 
removed one potential area of compromise between those who sought to enfranchise 
underage soldiers and those who felt that young people under twenty-one were simply 
too immature to vote:  the option of raising the draft age back to twenty-one was simply 
never an option. 
C.  Youth Involvement 
 Finally, ambivalence about military service on the part of those young people who 
were actually involved in the campaign for eighteen-year-old voting may have further 
undercut this line of argument.  Although there was little grass-roots mobilization around 
the voting age issue, those young people who were involved were, by and large, not in 
the military themselves and in fact likely were quite reluctant to serve in Vietnam.  
Despite the popularity of the “old enough to fight, old enough to vote,” slogan, activists 
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who testified before Congress had a marked tendency to distance themselves from such 
arguments in favor of other rationales for lowering the voting age. 
As I emphasize elsewhere in this dissertation,157 efforts to lower the national 
voting age were largely driven by federal legislators, rather than by the disenfranchised 
themselves.  Indeed, the issue did not exactly galvanize young people.  One commentator 
notes that even in the contentious climate of the late 1960s, few young people were 
demanding voting rights, although they were making plenty of other demands: “Student 
discontent was focused upon the Vietnam war, race relations, social policy, institutions of 
higher education, almost every aspect of American society but the suffrage.”158 
Still, the role of youth activism should not be overlooked entirely.  Student and 
youth groups pressed the eighteen-year-old voting issue at both the state and federal 
levels throughout the 1950s and 60s.159  The movement became rather more organized in 
early 1969, when a number of youth organizations banded together with civil rights and 
educational groups—including the NAACP, the National Educational Association, and 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference—to form the Youth Franchise 
Coalition.160  Representatives from these groups often appeared before Congressional 
committees to argue for the need to lower the voting age.   
 When testifying before Congress, at least, these youth activists tended to 
downplay military-voter arguments, especially in the late 1960s.  In the May 1968 Senate 
subcommittee hearings mentioned above, young witnesses acknowledged military service 
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as one reason to lower the voting age, but emphasized alternative rationales.161  The same 
was even more true two years later, at the hearings that Bayh convened in early 1970.162 
 Youth representatives may have shied away from arguments about military 
service for a variety of reasons, including the same issues—such as women’s exclusion 
from the draft—that gave some members of Congress such pause.  However, it also 
seems likely that these activists—who were overwhelmingly male—had their own 
motives for arguing that while of course it was only fair that a soldier be able to vote for 
the nation’s leader, there were other, better reasons to lower the voting age, such as 
improved education.  The young men who appeared before Congress were not  
themselves fighting in Vietnam, either because they were exempt for medical reasons, 
their service was deferred during their education, or, in one case, they were serving in the 
Reserves.163  Indeed, while they may well have been sympathetic to their drafted 
compatriots, presumably few of them were eager to go off to Asia as soldiers, vote or no 
vote.  Focusing on the military-voter connection might well have seemed uncomfortable, 
if not unseemly.   In fact, Representative Rarick once pointed rather nastily to precisely 
this problem: 
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[T]he screaming mob espousing [‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’] are 
not veterans nor fighting men but rather draft dodgers, draft card burners, and 
revolutionary vandals who have no intention whatsoever of fighting – at least not 
for the United States.164 
 
 It is impossible to say, of course, whether or not the fact that the young people 
who came to testify before Congress about eighteen-year-old voting tended to 
deemphasize the military service angle had any effect on members of Congress 
themselves.  However, it certainly seems plausible that it helped to shift the locus of 
discussion—at least in the hearings themselves—towards other types of arguments for a 
lower voting age. 
III.  Conclusion 
 Arguments connecting the right to vote to military service, especially compulsory 
military service, were crucially important to the voting age debates in Congress 
throughout the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.  However, the rhetorical power of the slogan, “old 
enough to fight, old enough to vote” was limited by certain inconvenient facts, and 
advocates distanced themselves from the military service-voter link rather more 
frequently than has generally been acknowledged.  To bolster their case, those who 
sought to lower the voting age cited young people’s increased educational 
accomplishments, the need to redirect youthful dissent into more acceptable channels, 
and the inevitability of franchise expansion.  I examine each of these alternative 
rationales in the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 4:  
QUALIFIED VOTERS 
Beyond their arguments about military service and voting, mid-century advocates 
of a lower voting age also insisted that contemporary youth were uniquely well-qualified 
to exercise the franchise.  Thanks to technological and educational advances, they argued, 
the eighteen-year-old of 1960 was as least as politically sophisticated, if not more so, as 
the twenty-one-year-old of previous generations.  Indeed, proponents of eighteen-year-
old voting maintained that contemporary youth were, on the whole, remarkably well-
informed about current events, interested in politics, and committed to the public good.  
Enfranchising them was not only fair, but it would also enrich the polity. 
 Interestingly, commentators on the Twenty-sixth Amendment have rarely devoted 
much attention to the role of this line of reasoning.165  Indeed, one of the only scholars 
who has noted the frequent references in the voting age debates to young people’s 
supposed competency for voting dismisses such arguments as having “the flavor of a 
second-order justification for an essentially political decision” about synchronizing the 
voting and draft ages.166   
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 Two possible reasons for this omission spring to mind.  First, discussions of the 
voting age amendment have tended to focus largely, if not exclusively, on the events 
leading up directly to the amendment’s passage: Congress’s addition of an eighteen-year-
old voting provision to the Voting Rights Act in 1970, the Supreme Court’s reversal of 
that clause a few months later in Oregon v. Mitchell, and the subsequent rapid passage 
and ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Although the sort of arguments I 
discuss in this chapter were present throughout the voting debates, they were more 
conspicuous in the 1950s and early-to-mid 1960s.  As I will explain in greater detail, by 
the time the eighteen-year-old voting issue garnered widespread national attention in the 
late 1960s, claims that college-aged Americans would make responsible voters met a 
much more skeptical audience.  Commentators who have concentrated on the events of 
1970 and 1971, then, may not have realized how central arguments about political 
knowledgeability had long been to the voting age debates. 
 Second, advocates’ assertions about young people’s superior qualifications may 
have been overlooked because such claims sound so odd to modern ears.  The idea that a 
sophisticated public education system, as well as the new phenomenon of television, were 
remaking young Americans into more intelligent, politically savvy citizens was, as I will 
explain, perfectly in accord with other social trends of the 1950s and early 1960s.  In the 
early twenty-first century, though, when our dominant narratives about public education, 
media, and young people generally are so much more negative, it is hard to imagine that 
anyone ever could have made—much less taken—such claims seriously. 
 This oversight is unfortunate, not only because the history of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment is incomplete without a comprehensive understanding of the different 
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arguments advanced for and against lowering the voting age, but also because this 
particular line of reasoning throws into relief the fundamentally conservative nature of 
the eighteen-year-old voting movement.  For the most part, those who sought to lower the 
voting age to eighteen most emphatically did not want to change either the essence of 
voter qualifications or the meaning of the franchise.  They maintained only that eighteen- 
to twenty year-olds now met longstanding standards for voting.  Arguments about young 
people’s political knowledgeability, together with assertions that lowering the voting age 
would redirect youthful dissent into more acceptable channels—which I discuss at length 
in Chapter 5—highlight that the campaign for eighteen-year-old voting was anything but 
a revolutionary movement. 
In this chapter, I detail the important role that arguments about voter 
qualifications played in the voting age debates, especially before about 1967.  I further 
argue that these arguments served important functions in bolstering advocates’ assertions 
that the voting age should be lowered.  I then examine how the effusive praise that 
advocates of eighteen-year-old voting heaped on modern youth was all of a piece with 
broader trends and ideas in 1950s and 1960s America.  Finally, I discuss how the events 
of the late 1960s, especially the demonstrations on college campuses nationwide, 
seriously undermined the power of proponents’ claims that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds 
were intelligent and mature enough to vote. 
I. A New Breed 
 The notion that the voting age should be pushed downward primarily because 
eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds possessed the requisite intellectual and 
emotional qualifications to be good voters was a crucial strand in the voting age debates.  
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Indeed, more than a few politicians explicitly declared that they found such rationales for 
eighteen-year-old voting more compelling than arguments connecting voting rights to 
military service.  In a 1968 campaign speech, for example, Richard Nixon declared his 
support for lowering the voting age (albeit only by individual state action):  
The reason the voting age should be lowered is not that 18-year-olds are old 
enough to fight—it is because they are smart enough to vote.  They are more 
socially conscious, more politically aware, and much better educated than their 
parents were at age 18.  Youth today is just not as young as it used to be.167 
 
The next year, Senator Stephen Young (D-OH) of Ohio, a supporter of eighteen-year-old 
voting, described the ‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’ claim as “the perfect 
example of a non sequitur.”  “The real reason 18-year-olds are entitled to vote,” he 
maintained, “is that a youngster of today upon graduation from high school has attained a 
better education and is better informed than a college graduate of 30 or 40 years ago.”168   
 One might be tempted to dismiss such claims simply as crass pandering to a 
potential new constituency.  And indeed, it seems entirely possible—especially after it 
began to look like an eighteen-year-old voting law would actually pass—that elected 
officials would try and court this untapped pool of new voters with false praise.169    
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that this entire line of reasoning was a sham.  
On the contrary, arguments about young people’s academic and personal qualifications 
for the franchise served at least two important functions in the voting age debates: 
papering over weaknesses in the military service-voting rationale; and perhaps more 
importantly, safely cabining any radical potential inherent in the campaign for eighteen-
year-old voting. 
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 Furthermore, assertions that modern young people were an improvement on 
previous generations were consistent with the optimistic spirit that prevailed in postwar 
America during the 1950s and much of the 1960s.  The baby boom generation in 
particular was the locus of almost impossible hopes, and declarations that old traditions—
such as a minimum voting age of twenty-one—were now outdated had a particular 
resonance. 
A.  Knowledgeability 
Postwar advocates of eighteen-year-old voting repeatedly insisted that thanks to 
an improved and expanded public education system, as well as technological changes 
such as the advent of radio, television, and jet airplanes, modern eighteen-year-olds were 
exceptionally well-informed about politics.  They suggested that a minimum voting age 
of twenty-one might have been appropriate for earlier generations, but it was obsolete in 
this brave new world of compulsory public education and televised presidential debates.   
Some emphasized the contrast between the supposedly unsophisticated rubes of 
America’s distant past and the allegedly savvy urbanites of the modern era.  Senator Blair 
Moody (D-MI), speaking in a 1952 Senate subcommittee hearing, maintained that unlike 
the well-educated, well-informed youth of the present day, earlier generations of voters 
had made simplistic choices, “I remember reading of presidential elections in the past 
decided by such phrases as ‘Tippecanoe and Tyler too’ and the people around the country 
with the lack of communication systems never did realize the big issues.”170  In the 1954 
Senate floor debates, Senator William Langer (R-ND) asked: 
                                                 
170 Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States to Grant to Citizens of the United States Who Have Attained the Age of Eighteen the Right to Vote, 
82d Cong., 2d sess., May 27, 1952, 61. 
 
 65
How many voters 50 years ago had gone through high school?  How many of 
them had an opportunity to come to Washington to see and interview their 
Representatives and Senators in Washington?  How many of them had access to 
radios, televisions, daily newspapers, and periodicals, which today keep American 
voters alerted to political developments, not only in the United States, but also 
throughout the world?  Never in this history of man have the young people have 
been as well prepared to exercise the franchise as they are today.171 
 
Perhaps the most memorable statement, however, came later in the debate from Senator 
Everett Dirksen (R-IL), who remarked: 
It is rather interesting to consider what a young man of 18 was up against in the 
backwoods days, as compared with the situation today.  In the old days, such a 
young man probably grew up in a log cabin, and probably drank water from a 
gourd which he dipped into a wooden bucket—a practice which today by any 
standard probably would be classed as insanitary.  Yet somehow or other, those 
young people lived through those conditions.  They lived on bacon and corn pone.  
They were no dulcet tones of orchestra music coming, via the air waves, from 
Kansas City, to waft them to sleep.  There were no McCarthy hearings to be seen 
on the TV in the mornings and in the afternoons.  Oh Mr. President, how lacking 
they were in the availability of information and knowledge, and one thing and 
another.  Today, information and knowledge are at the beck and call or everyone, 
both the young and the old.172 
 
  Education, in particular, was credited with sparking this miraculous 
transformation.  Politicians who favored lowering the voting age stressed that far more 
children were attending school, and for a longer period of time; they frequently offered 
statistics showing that rates of literacy, high school attendance, high school graduation, 
and college enrollment were all rising.173  In 1959, Representative Kenneth Hechler (D-
WV) commented: 
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At the time when the voting age was set at 21, our school system was vastly 
inferior.  Boys and girls only went to school a few months during the year.  Now 
they become educated faster and should be allowed to assume their civic 
responsibilities faster.174   
 
Testifying before a Senate subcommittee in 1961, the chairman of the Republican 
National Committee enthusiastically endorsed proposals to reduce the voting age:  “I 
think that in this day and age in 1961, the level of education in our country has risen 
considerably, that among 18-year-olds we have a group of Americans well educated, 
interested in the problems of our country and of free men everywhere.”175  Representative 
Edward Patten (D-NJ) agreed, declaring in 1967 that “[a]s advanced education becomes 
more a part of a citizen’s heritage, we must recognize that a fuller knowledge of 
government, issues, and candidates, is a national byproduct.”176  
 Advocates maintained that not just the greater quantity, but also the improved 
quality, of American education had made the voting age of twenty-one outdated. Some 
praised the ostensibly broad scope of modern education; in particular, proponents of 
lowering the voting age argued that public school classes in history, civics, and/or social 
studies gave contemporary youth a sophisticated understanding of the American political 
system.  In 1951, Representative Carroll Kearns (R-PA) asserted, “The advances made in 
the study of public affairs in the high schools throughout the Nation today, especially the 
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classes in problems of democracy, have . . . trained [youth] sufficiently to make them 
intelligent voters.”177  Representative Richard McCarthy (D-NY), speaking in 1967, 
concurred: 
Our 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds are better educated than any citizens of their age 
have ever been before.  History and social studies courses offered in high school 
today are finer and have deeper scope than ever before, and youths graduating 
from high school possess a strong knowledge of political and historical affairs.178 
 
In 1970, Senator Warren Magnuson (D-WA) recalled his own high school civics class, 
“[W]e learned basically that there were three branches of the Government . . . we also 
learned how they operated, and that was about all.  There was no discussion about what 
really made things work. . . ”  In comparison, he remarked, modern high school and 
college students received a much more comprehensive and critical political education.179 
 Indeed, more than a few politicians seemed truly impressed by the contrast 
between their own education and that of the new generation.  Testifying before Congress 
in 1968, the chairman of the Young Republicans noted, “When I hear my 9- and 10-year-
old children knowingly discuss the Paleozoic era, gamma radiation, and the Japanese 
current (sic) I sense, as I reach for my copy of Webster’s dictionary that their education is 
far beyond mine at that age.”180  In the same hearings, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-MT) 
remarked that he himself had left school at the eighth grade, and suggested, “I would 
guess that a high school graduate of today would be at least the equivalent of a freshman 
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in college two or three decades ago, and very likely the equal of a sophomore in 
college.”181 
Proponents of eighteen-year-old voting also attributed young people’s newfound 
political sophistication to the mass media.  Modern teenagers were not only better 
educated than their ancestors, they maintained, but also far more up-to-date on political 
events, thanks to the expanded reach of newspapers, magazines, radio and especially 
television.182  Speaking in 1951, Representative Edward H. Jenison (R-IL) asserted: 
The present limit of 21 was determined in a period when the public was without 
the means for obtaining with ease a general knowledge of public affairs, public 
issues, and candidates for public office.  Greater educational opportunities and 
present-day newspaper, radio, and television facilities bring the problems of the 
day to all the people, young persons included.183 
 
“Who dreamed half a century ago,” Senator Moody asked in 1952, “of radio, television, 
and the news magazines which today keep the voters apprised of political developments 
not only in the United States but in the world at large?”184   
In the mid-1960s, advocates began to emphasize the unique way that television, in 
particular, was educating young people about political affairs.  In 1968. Senator Jacob 
Javits (R-NY) remarked:   
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We can only guess at the broadening effects of the media on our youth . . . Many 
political scientists claim that television has given all of us a feeling of immediacy 
and involvement concerning international and domestic social problems never 
before experienced in this country . . . For the most part, the 18- and 19-year-old 
today has grown up in a world of impressions formed by actually witnessing the 
historic events of our era – the demonstrations on behalf of civil rights, 
congressional hearings on Vietnam, the funeral of President John F. Kennedy and 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.185 
 
Senator Albert Gore (D-TN) echoed this in 1969, declaring: 
 
Young Americans have been brought up on Presidential news conferences and 
national conventions.  They have been nurtured by the evening news at 
suppertime and national question-and-answer programs with Sunday dinner.  
Their perspectives are not limited to national occurrences alone, for they learn 
instantly what is happening in Cairo and Singapore, Saigon and London.186 
 
In the words of Senator Jennings Randolph (D-WV), America’s youth were “literally 
tuned in on the times in which we live.”187 
For the most part, proponents of lowering the voting age concentrated on 
comparing young people across generations, arguing that modern eighteen-year-olds 
were far more well-informed about politics than were eighteen-, or even twenty-one-year-
olds of earlier eras.  But some dared to go further, delicately—and not so delicately—
suggesting that not only were contemporary eighteen- to twenty-year-olds more 
politically astute than teenagers of the past, they were just as, if not more, knowledgeable 
as were many present-day Americans over twenty-one.  In the 1954 Senate debate, 
Senator William Knowland (R-CA) put into the Congressional Record assorted statistics 
to the effect that young Americans were more politically aware, had higher rates of 
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literacy, and even demonstrated greater intelligence than those in older age groups.188  
Senator Kenneth Keating (R-NY) referenced one such study in 1959, declaring: 
The strongest reason for lowering the voting age is the political awareness of our 
young Americans.  A Gallup poll has found that the people between 18 and 20 are 
the best informed of any age group on basic political facts.  The proposition that 
this group be given voting rights is perfectly logical; only hoary custom is against 
it.189 
 
Similarly, in 1967 Representative Edwin Meeds (D-WA) maintained that the “one, 
overriding point” that convinced him of the merits of granting eighteen- to twenty-one 
year-olds the right to vote was “simply that they are ready; ready in the sense that they 
have the knowledge of government and current events at least equal to that of citizens 
over 21.”190  
 But a few advocates of eighteen-year-old voting went even further, criticizing 
outright the educational and mental qualifications of many adult voters.  Senator Dirksen, 
for one, remarked in the course of the 1954 floor debate on S.J. Res. 53: 
Having been a part of a political organization, I may say that I do not believe the 
youngsters will do any worse than the people who will be hauled to the polls, and 
have printed ballots placed in their hands, and be told how to mark the ballots, 
and for what candidates.191 
 
In 1963, Representative Hechler declared, “There is far more illiteracy among people 
over 60 than there is among people between 18 and 21.”192 And in 1970 floor debate, 
Senator Mansfield asked acerbically, “[W]hy should a 50- or 60-year-old illiterate be 
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allowed to vote when we have high school and college graduates in the 18- to 21-year-old 
classification, some with degrees, certainly all of them with a great deal of knowledge, 
who are not being allowed to vote.?”193 
 This was a precarious rhetorical strategy, to say the least.  It was of course 
exceptionally risky for publicly elected officials to so much as suggest that certain 
subsets of already-enfranchised Americans were unqualified to vote.  But these 
legislators were committed to the idea that although it might have been reasonable to 
expect their own generation to wait until age twenty-one to cast their first votes, it was 
simply unfair to demand the same of their children. 
B.  Better People  
 In addition to their claims about young people’s political savvy, advocates also 
insisted that contemporary college-aged youth had the requisite emotional maturity to 
exercise the franchise responsibly.  Indeed, some proponents maintained that eighteen- to 
twenty-year-olds’ tended to possess certain personal qualities—such as idealism and 
freedom from economic responsibility—that would make them especially good voters.  
Many characterized youthful eagerness and energy as a civic asset. Speaking in 
1952, Senator Moody declared:   
It seems to me . . . that we can well use the spark and enthusiasm which our 
young people would contribute to the political scene.  We can well use the 
idealism and vigor with which young people traditionally challenge boundless 
frontiers.  We can well use their new ideas, their selfless devotion, and their 
pioneering spirit in conquering the roadblocks which lie in the way of a better 
tomorrow.194   
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Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) similarly suggested in 1968 that “the idealism and 
enthusiasm of youthful voters would have a beneficial influence on the conduct of the 
Government and lead toward future good citizenship.195  
Some advocates of eighteen-year-old voting linked such youthful virtues to an 
image of America as a young and vibrant nation.  In 1953, one Young Republican leader 
captured this sentiment: “The strength of America has always been characterized and 
reflected by the youthful vigor of its people.”196  Speaking at a Senate subcommittee 
meeting in 1961, Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming declared that lowering the voting age 
“would tend to strike a balance back towards the youthful spirit and the youthful face that 
has traditionally been associated with America.”197 
Others suggested that young people would be able to offer new solutions to 
stubborn social and political problems.  Representative William St. Onge (D-CT) claimed 
in 1967 that reducing the voting age would force the government “to be much more 
aware of, and responsive to, a new group of voters with fresh ideas and new approaches 
to our problems.”198  In 1970 Senate floor debate, Senator Randolph argued that 
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eighteen- to twenty-year-old voters would be like “outside consultants called in to take a 
fresh look at our problems.”199 
Furthermore, proponents maintained, young people would also contribute a much-
needed dose of idealism to the national political discourse.  More than a few advocates 
pointedly suggested that eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds were generally more public-
spirited than were older citizens.  In a 1952 Senate subcommittee hearing, Senator Harley 
Kilgore (D-WV) asserted, “My experience with Boy State [sic] over a period of 10 years 
taught me that younger people do not let selfish personal interests influence their vote and 
they think more of the general welfare than do people who have gotten into business later 
in life when selfish interests may intervene.”200  Eighteen-year-olds, maintained Senator 
Hubert Humphrey (D-MN) were “more apt to place the national interest above those 
particular interests which they will later acquire.”201  The notion that enfranchising 
eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds would “help raise the moral tone in government”202 
was a theme with Representative Hechler; in 1959 he declared: 
I am convinced that passage of this constitutional amendment will not only stir a 
greater interest in public affairs, but will inject a new note of idealism into our 
politics at all levels.  Youth is the age of idealism, unfettered by personal, selfish, 
or economic group interest.203 
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One legislator, Representative John Rooney (D-NY) even suggested that younger voters 
would make more grateful constituents, wistfully remarking: 
[T]oo often a successful candidate find himself a lonely and discouraged 
individual.  Too often the criticisms leveled at him for doing some things and not 
doing others outnumber by far any recognition of the job he is doing on behalf of 
his noncomplaining constituents.  But young people possess an inherent honesty 
which makes them feel equally inclined to praise as to complain to their elected 
representatives.204 
 
 But even those who declined to criticize the older age groups’ lack of public-
spiritedness—or penchant for criticizing their Congresspeople— stressed that lowering 
the voting age would improve society by bringing into the electorate voters who were 
particularly attuned to the public good.  In 1952, former Georgia governor Ellis Arnall 
asserted, “We need some of that idealism that is sometimes disparagingly referred to as 
starry-eyed, but we need ideals in democracy.  I think youth affords that kind of devotion 
to ideal that we need.”205   
Arguments such as Arnall’s were heard even more frequently in the voting age 
debates beginning in the mid-1960s, as proponents insisted that the new ‘baby boom’ 
generation demonstrated an unusually high level of idealism and political engagement 
that qualified them to vote.  Declaring his support for eighteen-year-old voting in 1967, 
Representative William Edwards (D-CA) asserted, “This generation of students 
manifested the concern and idealism of young people regarding the society in which they 
live and the wrongs which can be eliminated.”206  Edwards, like many of his colleagues, 
highlighted youthful participation in organizations like the newly formed Peace Corps.  
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Senator Mansfield captured this same sentiment, suggesting that eighteen- to twenty-
year-olds’ “interest in public affairs and their potential for highly creditable public 
service at home and abroad are attested to by the personal dedication that is characteristic 
of such voluntary programs as VISTA and the Peace Corps.”207 
To be sure, plenty of these paeans to young people’s civic commitment were 
prompted by opponents’ assertions that the rising student protest movement demonstrated 
that college-aged Americans were far too irresponsible and radical to be trusted with the 
franchise.  (I discuss this critique in greater detail in Chapter 6.)  However, some 
legislators, especially those who had visited college campuses as part of a 1969 
Congressional fact-finding tour about campus unrest, seemed honestly impressed by 
students’ political sophistication.  Representative Bill Brock (R-TN), who led the tour, 
declared that the group had “found that today’s young Americans were better educated, 
more informed, and more intensely interested in the political process than ever before.  
On the basis of all available evidence, there was no question about their qualification.”208  
Representative Thomas Railsback (R-IL) agreed, “The students with whom we met are 
not only better-educated than their counterparts of a generation ago, but they are more 
informed of the social problems facing our Nation.”209 
In asserting that young people would make good voters, then, advocates sought to 
paint contemporary youth as simultaneously similar to and different from the adult 
population.  Many stressed that the modern eighteen-year-old was as educated and 
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informed as the average American adult, if not more so.  At the same time, some 
proponents of lowering the voting age also maintained that certain qualities supposedly 
specific to youth amplified young people’s qualifications as good voters.  In view of all 
of this, they argued, it was ludicrous to continue to deny college-aged Americans the 
right to vote. 
C.   A Useful Strategy 
 Arguments about young people’s intellectual and emotional qualifications for the 
franchise served at least two important rhetorical functions in the voting age debates.  
First, such arguments helped to shore up—or at least distract from—some of the logical 
and conceptual problems with other rationales offered for eighteen-year-old voting, most 
notably, the ‘old enough to fight, old enough to vote’ theme discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Second, by emphasizing voter qualifications, advocates of eighteen-year-old 
voting made it clear that they were not in any way seeking to lower the voting age 
beneath eighteen.  Despite the fact that some of the other arguments for eighteen-year-old 
voting could also be used to justify enfranchising children younger than eighteen, 
proponents had absolutely no interest in more radical change.   
The qualified-voter rationale was a useful rhetorical antidote to some of the 
uneasy issues posed by military service arguments.  As I discussed at length in Chapter 1, 
although arguments connecting the right to vote to serving in the armed forces were 
vitally important to the voting age debates, their power was limited by certain 
inconvenient facts.  Paramount among these was the reality that although the minimum 
draft age was eighteen, the majority of eighteen- to twenty-year-olds were not in the 
military.  Most obviously, of course, the fifty percent of eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-
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year-olds who were female were not eligible for the draft, a fact that opponents did not 
hesitate to highlight.  What’s more, plenty of men were also not being drafted.  Thanks to 
the baby boom, the number of eighteen-year-old males surged in the mid-1960s, and even 
though draft calls rose, the percentage of men serving in the military declined.210  
Focusing on education and emotional maturity offered a broader, less-gendered 
rationale for reducing the voting age.  By shifting the discussion away from military 
obligations and towards the matter of eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds’ qualifications as 
good voters, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting were able to avoid getting too deeply 
into the sticky problem of using the military draft as a reason to lower the voting age for 
all eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, not just those in the armed forces.    
Beyond this, qualified-voter arguments also served to justify—and clearly 
demonstrate—the fact that Congressional advocates, at least, had no intention of 
exploring the more radical potential embedded in some of their favorite arguments for 
eighteen-year-old voting. Some of their claims about reciprocity and representation, for 
example, led down uncomfortable logical paths. As detailed in the previous chapter, 
proponents of eighteen-year-old voting often argued that it was only fair to grant those 
who bore the obligations of citizenship the right to elect the politicians who imposed 
those obligations.  Military service, they argued, was merely the heaviest of many civic 
obligations that justified expanding the right to vote, which also included being taxed and 
being criminally and/or civilly liable for one’s actions. 
 This argument, however, would open the door to lowering the minimum voting 
age far below eighteen, if not abolishing it altogether.  Even in the 1950s and 1960s, 
many states had minimum ages for civil and/or criminal liability that were younger than 
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eighteen,211 and children of all ages were taxed on their income, as well as paid sales 
taxes.212  
 Similarly, legislators’ frequent assertion that the current voting age amounted to 
‘discrimination’ against eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-old Americans also had the 
potential to raise unsettling questions.  As I discuss further in Chapter 6, proponents often 
insisted—especially during the 1970 debates on the Voting Rights Act amendment—that 
excluding eighteen- to twenty-year-olds from the franchise was morally and legally 
equivalent to denying blacks or women the right to vote.  However, as opponents 
occasionally noted, this theory could be a slippery slope: if it was now discrimination to 
deny eighteen-year-olds the vote, presumably later it could be considered discrimination 
to disenfranchise seventeen-year-olds, or even twelve-year-olds.  “This pattern of 
thinking,” Representative George Andrews (D-AL) declared in 1970, “could lead to the 
abandonment of all age restrictions.”213 
But even those Members of Congress who most fervently advocated eighteen-
year-old voting strongly resisted any suggestion of extending the franchise to Americans 
under the age of eighteen, much less abolishing it entirely.  In the very first 
Congressional subcommittee hearing on the voting age issue, held in 1943, 
Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY) challenged Representative Randolph: 
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Mr. Celler: Let us suppose—God forbid—that the exigencies of war would turn 
against us and our armies would have to be greatly augmented, and we would 
have to reduce the draft age to 16, as is the case in Germany today.  Would you 
say the voting age should likewise be reduced to 16? 
Mr. Randolph: No, Mr. Chairman.  I would not advocate the lowering of the 
voting age to 16.  I feel there is a point below which we should not go. 
 
 Claims about young people’s intellectual and emotional capability were reasons 
not only to expand, but also to limit, the right to vote. Implicit in arguments that eighteen- 
to twenty-one year-olds should have the franchise because they possessed the qualities 
necessary to be good voters was the belief that those who did not have such qualities—
i.e., those under age eighteen—should not be permitted to vote, regardless of what other 
arguments might be offered for their enfranchisement.  By framing the suffrage not 
simply as a matter of right, but also as a matter of qualification, proponents of eighteen-
year-old voting steered clear of any troubling suggestions about a more dramatic overhaul 
of age qualifications for voting.214 
D.   Great Hopes 
 The effusive praise that advocates of eighteen-year-old voting heaped on modern 
youngsters may strike the modern reader as peculiar, if not downright ludicrous.  
However, viewed against the backdrop of other trends of the time, such claims make 
more sense.  In particular, proponents’ arguments reflected the remarkably optimistic, 
confident mood of many Americans in the years after World War II but before the 
turmoil of the late 1960s.   
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 Commentators have often remarked on the tremendous buoyancy that 
characterized American society in the 1950s and into the mid-1960s.  Astounding 
economic growth and the resulting transformation of many Americans’ standard of living 
fostered a sense of great optimism.  The historian James Patterson, in his magisterial 
survey of postwar America, emphasizes this phenomenon: 
The whole world, many American seemed to think by 1957, was turning over to 
please the special, God-graced generation—and its children—that had triumphed 
over depression and fascism, that would sooner or later vanquish Communism, 
and that was destined to live happily every after (well, almost) in a fairy tale of 
health, wealth, and happiness.215 
 
Children and young people were at the heart of these great hopes.  The postwar 
baby boom, which began in mid-1946 and continued until 1964, when the first ‘boomers’ 
began to turn eighteen, put children at the heart of a newly and ever-increasingly affluent 
society.  Many assumed that this huge cohort of children, growing up in a world of peace 
and abundance, would be both more accomplished and happier than their parents.216  One 
scholar who has studied the baby boom writes: 
By the mid-sixties . . the size and economic power of the boom generation had 
helped it muscle its way onto the center stage of the nation’s life.  Most 
Americans were delighted at what they saw.  This generation of the young was 
richer and stronger than theirs had been.  It was confident and articulate about its 
dreams.  Its ideals were outstripping those of previous generations bogged down 
by Depression and war. . . . The editors of Time honored the ‘Under-25 
Generation’ as its Man of the Year in 1967.  In its lifetime, Time wrote, this 
promising generation could land on the moon, cure cancer and the common cold, 
lay out blight-proof, smog-free cities, help end racial prejudice, enrich the 
underdeveloped world, and no doubt, write an end to poverty and war.217 
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Legislators’ claims that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds deserved the vote because 
they were more intelligent, politically knowledgeable and civic-minded than previous 
generations, then, arose in this context.  Statements like that of Representative Stephen 
Young (D-OH), who argued that “this generation of young people is the best ever . . . 
they are healthier, quicker of mind and better trained than their predecessors”218 may 
sound utterly false to twenty-first century ears, but they were not out of place in the social 
and political climate of the 1950s and early-to-mid 1960s. 
Advocates’ frequent derision of the twenty-one year-old minimum voting age as 
“archaic,”219 “an anomaly in the 20th century”220 also makes sense within these broader 
narratives about progress and modernization.  Those who favored eighteen-year-old 
voting often referenced the supposed medieval origins of the current voting age, arguing 
that while such a criterion might have been reasonable at one point, it was completely 
irrelevant in the fast-paced, technologically sophisticated world of mid-twentieth century 
America.  As Representative James Howard (D-NJ), declared in 1967, “Those dark ages 
are over—long over—and it makes no sense to support that 21 is a relevant determinant 
of majority today.  In fact, the quality of our education has rendered it obsolete.”221 
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To be sure, not everyone wholeheartedly agreed that America’s young people 
were so wonderful.  As I discuss in the next section, the concerns about adolescent 
rebellion that mushroomed in the 1960s were present as early as the mid-1950s. 
However, at least until the latter half of the 1960s, there was a significant popular 
perception that the nation, and especially the nation’s youth, were getting better all the 
time.  Advocates sought to frame a lower voting age as an expression of this faith in 
progress.  In 1952, Ellis Arnall asserted: “If the young people are not an improvement 
over our generation and the generations before us, the world is going backwards.”222  
And going backwards was simply inconceivable. 
 All of these would change during the second half of the 1960s, however, as the 
social and political climate changed for the worse and the behavior of young people 
because a flashpoint for controversy. In the next section, I discuss how these shifts 
profoundly undermined advocates’ claims about young Americans’ personal 
qualifications for the franchise. 
II.  Dangerous Radicals 
Beginning around 1968, advocates’ claims that eighteen- to twenty-year-olds 
were intellectually and personally superior to previous generations were greeted with 
increasing skepticism.  The general optimism of the previous two decades soured as the 
Vietnam War escalated, racial tensions worsened, and levels of violence and civic unrest 
rose quickly.  And young people, especially college students, featured prominently in the 
disorder of the times.  Opponents of eighteen-year-old voting were increasingly vocal, 
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arguing that contemporary youth were overemotional, out of control, and dangerously 
prone to radicalism. 
To be sure, such concerns were not entirely new.  The sentiment that young 
Americans were the harbingers of a new, better world had never been a universal one.  
During the 1950s, many adults were alarmed by the rise of rock-n-roll and feared that 
adolescents were becoming rebellious and unruly.  The Senate held high-profile hearings 
on juvenile delinquency throughout the decade.223  Critics also complained that the 
schools were sacrificing quality for quantity, substituting popular ‘life skills’ classes for a 
rigorous academic curriculum.224  The Soviet Union’s launch of the Sputnik shuttle in 
October 1957 sparked much hand-wringing over the state of American science 
education.225  
 And well before the turmoil of the late 1960s, those who opposed eighteen-year-
old voting had challenged advocates’ rosy descriptions of America’s youth. Opponents 
emphasized that teenagers were, simply by dint of their age and inexperience, suggestible 
and prone to radicalism.  Although some worried that young voters would merely express 
their parents’ preferences, not their own,226 the more meaningful issue was whether 
eighteen-year-old voters would be sufficiently independent from the potentially insidious 
designs of those other than their parents.  (Indeed, advocates for reducing the voting age 
were abundantly aware that the claim that teenagers would not simply vote in accordance 
with their parents’ instructions did just as much as work as an argument against lowering 
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the voting age.227)  In particular, opponents of eighteen-year-old voting fretted that 
unformed, malleable youth would be easily manipulated by unscrupulous leaders.  
Representative Celler warned:  
The teen-ager is likely to take the extreme point of view.  He does not know how 
to compromise, and the essence of politics is compromise. . . . It is the dictators 
with their absolute doctrines who have abused the extremism of youth , and put it 
to their advantage.  Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin all gave the teen-agers the right to 
vote and herded them into line228   
 
In 1954 Senate floor debate, Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) noted ominously that “the 
largest nation which permit[s] voting by 18-year-olds [is] Russian.”229  
In response, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting agreed wholeheartedly that it 
was—in theory, at least—crucial for an American voter to cast his or her vote 
independently, free of others’ influence.  They maintained, however, that contemporary 
young people could be relied upon to vote their own preferences.  Eighteen- to twenty-
year-olds were politically knowledgeable and savvy enough not to be taken in by 
demagoguery.  Speaking in 1952, Senator Moody disagreed with critics who argued that 
eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds did not think for themselves: “I have found 
that the questions which are propounded on matters of public importance by college 
students, for example, are direct.  They have no patience generally with weasel-worded 
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answers.”230  Ellis Arnall, speaking of Georgia’s nine-year experiment with eighteen-
year-old voting, concurred:  “It has been my experience in watching youth voting in my 
State that the young people evaluate the issues and the candidates.  They exercise a very 
informed opinion, not just some hearsay.”231 
Indeed, proponents of lowering the voting age occasionally tried to turn their 
opponents’ arguments about independence on their head, declaring that young people 
might be freer from influence by political parties than were older citizens.  As early as 
1943, Senator Randolph declared:   
I feel . . . that men and women [of older age] are more inclined to vote along strict 
party lines, because of the channels along which their lives have been fashioned; 
whereas we find the younger age group more desirous of probing into parties and 
considering the candidates and then making their own decisions.232 
   
 In the late 1960s, however, those who opposed eighteen-year-old voting gained 
new momentum.  As the student protest movement intensified and images of youthful 
demonstrators became a media staple, some charged that modern young people were 
obviously too radical, emotional, and susceptible to dangerous influences to be allowed to 
vote.  Increasingly, advocates found themselves on the defensive. 
 Those who opposed lowering the voting age argued that campus unrest was a 
natural product of young people’s tendency towards extremism. Speaking in 1968, 
Senator Jack Miller (R-IA) lamented: 
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[M]any teenagers, lacking the experience and maturity, are prone to take an 
extreme point of view and to push their ideas to the exclusion of all others.  One 
need only look at what has happened and is happening on the campuses of some 
of our great universities to see the results of this lack of maturity.”233 
 
 Opponents argued, with increasing urgency, that young people’s propensity for 
extreme positions, coupled with their general malleability and excessive emotionalism, 
left them vulnerable to the evil designs of radical demagogues.  Senator Spessard Holland 
of Florida echoed Celler’s earlier remarks, declaring: “[W]e all know that leaders of 
radical movements understand that patience is not a particular virtue of the young and 
that radicalism has had its greatest appeal to the youth between 18 and 21.”234   If the 
voting age was lowered to eighteen, he ominously predicted, political organizations 
would organize “with a vengeance” on college campuses, creating a “most dangerous 
situation.”235 
 Opponents also finally began to more forcefully challenge advocates’ longtime 
claims that modern eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds were better educated and therefore 
better qualified to vote than were previous generations.  In 1970, Representative John 
Rarick (D-LA) vehemently rejected the notion that contemporary youth were more 
intelligent and  better informed than previous generations: 
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 To the contrary, records in our public schools, the Selective Service 
System, and our Armed Forces show a constant decline in both intelligence and 
aptitude averages. 
 The common experience of adults – especially employers – is that today’s 
young people cannot spell, cannot read, and cannot reason. 
 Yet, this is not to say that many of our young are not proficient in 
parroting loudly the emotional slogan [sic] programed [sic] into them by the left-
wing pseudo-intellectuals dominating our schools and the mass media.236   
 
Representative Charles Griffin (D-MS) asked rhetorically:  
 
 Can we safely assume that modern education has brought such a high level 
of judgment to the typical 19-year-old that the precepts of our forefathers are to be 
sloughed off?  
 What actions by the persons we are asked to enfranchise suggest their 
readiness to accept responsibility?  Is it found in the smoke from the Bank of 
America over California?  Do student strikes over the country suggest a cool and 
reasoned approach to the problems facing America in 1970?237 
   
In response, advocates insisted that the student protesters, while reprehensible, 
were not representative of the great majority of eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds.  
Proponents of lowering the voting age hurried to characterize the demonstrators as a “tiny 
minority”238 in a vast sea of unthreatening, stable, law-abiding young people.  Senator 
Alan Bible (D-NV) declared, “For every rowdy demonstrator there are thousands of 
serious, responsible, hardworking youngsters going about their daily business of earning 
a living or getting an education.”239  “The vast majority of our young citizens,” asserted 
Representative Cornelius Gallagher (D-NJ) , “have no taste or agreement for those who 
would tear apart the fabric of American society under the guise of revolutionary 
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rhetoric.”240  Indeed, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting repeatedly lamented the 
supposed excessive media focus on unruly protesters; speaking in 1969, Representative 
John M. Zwach (R-MN) declared, “[W]hile the minorities at our colleges get 95 percent 
of the press and television coverage . . . . the vast majority of our collegians and 18-, 19- 
and 20-year-olds do not agree with the destructive shenanigans of the minority.”241 
 Those who favored lowering the voting age rejected opponents’ claims that young 
people were drawn to radical and extreme political positions.  Many noted that several 
states, as well as Great Britain, had instituted eighteen-year-old voting with minimal 
effect.  In 1970, then-Representative George H.W. Bush (R-TX) remarked that he had 
“carefully looked at the voting patterns in Georgia and Kentucky, where 18-year-olds are 
already enfranchised, and have found nothing radical about them.”242  Senator Claiborne 
Pell (D-RI) pointed out that in the first British elections in which eighteen-year-olds were 
permitted to vote, the conservatives won.243 
 Proponents of eighteen-year-old voting also tried to frame increased political 
activism among the young as evidence of a greater commitment to the public good.  As I 
discussed earlier in this chapter, those who favored a lower voting age frequently argued 
that young people’s idealism and enthusiasm were civic assets.  In 1968, Senator Jacob 
Javits (R-NY) maintained that “the most compelling reason for lowering the voting age at 
this point in our national history” was that “today’s 18- to 21-year-olds . . . are more 
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highly motivated toward political action and more of them are better educated than their 
fathers or grandfathers ever thought possible.”244 
 From approximately 1968 until mid-1970, then, proponents and opponents of 
lowering the voting age battled vociferously about whether eighteen- to twenty-year olds 
were serious-minded and dedicated to the public good, or excessively emotional and 
frighteningly prone to radical extremism. Despite advocates’ best efforts, however, the 
escalating student protest movement seriously weakened the rhetorical force of their 
claims, and increasingly they had to draw on other rationales for lowering the voting age. 
III.  Conclusion 
 Before concluding, it is worth noting that there was one other development that 
one might think would have also undermined proponents’ focus on young people’s 
academic qualifications for voting.  During the 1960s, Congressional liberals (along with 
President Johnson and some federal courts) became increasingly concerned about the 
widespread use of literacy tests, especially in the South, for voter registration.  The 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 suspended literacy tests in most of the Deep South, and the 
renewal act of 1970—the same bill to which the eighteen-old-voting was attached—
suspended such tests nationwide for another five years.245  Moreover, although support 
for abolishing literacy tests and support for eighteen-year-old voting did not map 
perfectly on one another, plenty of legislators favored both—Senator Mansfield, for 
example, was a most vocal advocate for both causes. 
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 At first glance, this antipathy towards literacy tests seems inconsistent with 
advocates’ repeated insistence that young people’s superior education qualified them to 
vote.  However, there is virtually no evidence in the Congressional debates that there was 
actually any tension between these two issues.246  Presumably, this is because the the 
literacy test issue was really about race, not literacy; those in Congress and on the Court 
who opposed literacy tests were not so much troubled by the notion that voters should 
have to be literate as they were by the way that many Southern states blatantly misused 
these tests in order to prevent African-Americans from voting.247   
 Arguments about eighteen- to twenty-year-olds’ academic and personal 
qualifications for voting were an important part of the voting age debates, although they 
lost some of their power to convince amidst the tumult of the late 1960s.  However, while 
the student protest movement worked against advocates in some ways, it also spurred 
concerns that unless youth were given a legitimate outlet for their political concerns, the 
situation might worsen even further.  The next chapter discusses the notion, which proved 
quite compelling in galvanizing support for eighteen-year-old voting, that lowering the 
voting age would create a much-needed safety valve for youthful dissent. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
A SAFETY VALVE
As discussed in the previous chapter, the student protests of the late 1960s lent 
powerful ammunition to those who opposed lowering the voting age to eighteen.  
Skeptics pointed to political demonstrations on college campuses nationwide as evidence 
that eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds were much too disruptive, irresponsible, and 
radical to be permitted to vote.  Proponents of eighteen-year-old voting were acutely 
aware that the campus demonstrations were hurting their cause; as one activist noted 
resignedly, “Until the turmoil of the universities subsides, 18-year-olds will be without a 
vote.”248  
However, the student protests may well have actually bolstered support for 
eighteen-year-old voting, at least at the Congressional level.  During the late 1960s, a 
surprising number of federal legislators seized on the idea that lowering the voting age to 
eighteen would stem the rising tide of student unrest by channeling youthful energies into 
less-frightening forms of political expression. Proponents of this ‘safety valve’ theory 
argued that although extending the vote was unlikely to divert the very small group of 
true militants away from radical activities, it would substantially undermine the 
revolutionaries’ appeal to their largely conventional and law-abiding classmates. 
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A number of commentators have casually remarked on this aspect of the 
campaign for the Twenty-sixth Amendment.  Most notably, Benjamin Ginsberg cites 
eighteen-year-old voting as a “clear-cut example” of the way in which governments often 
use elections as a method of social control.249  “By providing routine electoral channels 
for political expression,” he maintains, “governments attempt to discourage more violent 
or disruptive forms of mass political activity.”250   
The safety valve rationale warrants further examination, however.  While it is 
likely impossible to conclusively determine whether the student protests of the late 1960s 
ultimately harmed the eighteen-year-old voting movement more than they helped it, or 
vice versa,251 it is something of a puzzle why these ‘channeling’ arguments gained so 
much traction.  As I explain, the fundamental logic underpinning this set of arguments 
conflicted sharply with the particular understanding of the franchise that otherwise 
dominated the voting age debates.  Nevertheless, I argue, these conceptual tensions paled 
next to federal legislators’ palpable fear about what was happening on the nation’s 
campuses.  In this context, safety valve arguments had a powerful appeal.   
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This discussion also illustrates a broader point that I have made before, that the 
campaign for eighteen-year-old voting was, at its core, a profoundly conservative 
movement. Unlike other suffrage campaigns, the charge for eighteen-year-old voting was 
largely led by legislators, rather than by potential enfranchisees.  By and large, these 
legislators were not interested in radically overhauling either the franchise or young 
people’s political status.  On the contrary, the notion of lowering the voting age took on 
real momentum only when members of Congress began to believe that giving voting 
rights to eighteen- to twenty-year-olds would help to restore order, soothe dissent, and 
preserve the authority of existing political institutions. 
I.  Redirecting Dissent 
 Left-leaning students began to organize on college campuses during the early 
1960s.  Inspired by the civil rights movement, groups like Students for a Democratic 
Society—which would later became the standard-bearer for the antiwar cause—focused 
mainly on social justice issues.252  As the Vietnam War escalated, however, student 
activists became increasingly radicalized.  One commentator notes that during the 1968–
69 academic year, there were 150 violent demonstrations—not to mention many more 
nonviolent protests— on campuses across the nation, including Columbia, Cornell, 
Harvard, Berkeley, and San Francisco State.253  After a brief lull in protest activity during 
the winter of 1969 and spring of 1970, the American invasion of Cambodia on April 30, 
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1970, sparked a new wave of demonstrations.254  In May 1970, National Guardsmen 
killed four student protesters at Kent State University and Mississippi police killed two at 
Jackson State College; nearly twenty-five percent of college students were involved in 
some sort of demonstration, and more than seventy-five colleges and universities had to 
close down for the rest of the year.255 
Members of Congress—like most Americans256—were overwhelmingly outraged 
and frightened by what was happening on college campuses during the late 1960s. 
Speaking in the summer of 1968, Representative John Rooney (D-NY) captured the 
dominant sentiment: 
 They [the protesters] represent the socially immature who respond to 
pressures by emotional reactions rather than by any mental process.  They are the 
ones who think with their glands instead of their brains.  They are the ones who 
find it easier not to conform to society’s established rules and customs but to 
protest and demonstrate without actually being aware of what they are against or 
what they are for. 
 They are the ones who in protest against the ‘establishment’ find 
themselves the willing slaves of the lunatic fringe who manipulate them as though 
they were puppets on a string. 
 They are the ones who think that an unkempt appearance – whether it be 
beards and flowing hair, unwashed bodies and filthy garments, or loose and 
shoddy morals – give them the solace and distinction to which they aspire.257 
 
At the same time, though, some began to argue that expanding the franchise 
downward was the only way to contain youthful rebellion. In 1968, Representative 
Kenneth Hechler (D-WV) wondered “whether the senseless violence, animal energy, and 
nihilistic attacks on the ‘Establishment’ could not be tempered and directed into useful 
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channels if opportunities for expression were afforded at the ballot box.”258  Senator 
William Proxmire (D-WI) commented, “The situations on many of our college campuses 
today, alarming as they are, raise this question: ‘Why not allow students the right to make 
a positive choice as an alternative to a negative protest?’”259 
Many proponents warned that unless young Americans were given the right to 
vote, the tide of dissent would only continue to rise.  Speaking in 1968, Senator Birch 
Bayh (D-IN) declared: 
This force, this energy, is going to continue to build and grow.  The only question 
is whether we should ignore it, perhaps leaving this energy to dam up and burst 
and follow less-than-wholesome channels, or whether we should let this force be 
utilized by society through the pressure valve of the franchise.260   
 
In the same set of hearings, Representative Hechler ominously predicted, “At this crucial 
point, if we deny the right to vote to those young people between the ages of 18 and 20, it 
is entirely possible that they will join the more militant minority of their fellow students 
and engage in destructive activities of a dangerous nature.”261 
 Indeed, advocates often noted that demography was on the side of the young; the 
enormous baby boom cohort began to turn eighteen in 1964, and the proportion of those 
in their late teens and early twenties subsequently skyrocketed.262  In 1967, 
Representative John Saylor (R-PA) noted that “it is hard for us to recognize adequately 
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the impact of the statistical projection that one-half of our population will be under 25 
within five years.”  Ignoring this group, he warned, could only lead to disaster.  “By 
allowing these energetic young persons of the 20th century to drift rather than immerse 
themselves in our society, we may be encouraging them to become permanently alienated 
politically.”263 
 Because these college-aged Americans were excluded from the mainstream 
political process, proponents argued, they were easy pickings for the small coterie of 
truly radical militants supposedly at the helm of the student protest movement.  
Legislators repeatedly suggested that the protests were spearheaded by a tiny but very 
dangerous group of leaders.  Representative Charles Price (D-IL) described these leaders 
as “a small revolutionary cadre bent on destroying the so-called system that we live in 
and the ‘establishment’ that runs it.”264  More than a few legislators who favored a  lower 
voting age darkly warned that the student protests were affiliated with enemies of the 
state.  Representative Richard Fulton (D-TN) described the demonstrations as “antisocial 
and often anti-American activities.”265  Representative Thomas Railsback (R-IL) went 
further:  “We really have not given these young people power, but they have found that 
they do have power—power to disrupt, to disturb, to ruin, to destroy.  And they have 
sinister support and encouragement from outside this country.”266 
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 The vast majority of young people, on the other hand, were largely conventional, 
law-abiding folk, proponents maintained.  In 1969, Representative Robert Michel (R-IL) 
declared: 
Only an infinitesimal minority of students is guilty of criminal, seditious, 
treasonable, and anarchic conduct.  The overwhelming majority of our young 
people, whether they are in high school or college, are anxious to continue their 
education and resent having it interrupted by juveniles of all ages.267 
 
On this logic, these ‘good kids’ were drawn to the protest leaders not because they 
truly believed in the merits of public demonstrations, but because they lacked other 
options for political expression.  Lowering the voting age, advocates claimed, would 
dramatically undercut the protest leaders’ appeal.  In 1968, Senator Jacob Javits (R-IL) 
declared,  “I am convinced that self-styled student leaders who urge . . . acts of civil 
disobedience would find themselves with little or no support if students were given a 
more meaningful role in the electoral process.”268  A presidential commission established 
to investigate violence in society concluded in 1969 that reducing the voting age to 
eighteen would help ameliorate the student protests.269  In a 1970 Congressional hearing, 
one commission member explained: 
[T]he radical minority, the dissidents are going to cause a fuss, whether they have 
got the vote or not.  But how much support they have in the rest of the 
community, the silent majority if you will, of young people, is going to depend on 
the options available to the majority.  We can take a lot of the wind out of the 
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sails of some of the radicals by giving all young people an opportunity to 
participate legitimately in the system.270  
 
 Conveniently, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting suggested, the radical 
student leaders were unlikely to cast votes themselves.  Speaking in early 1970, Senator 
Marlow Cook (R-KY) asserted that the most dedicated protesters would not register and 
vote:  “They probably feel that the system that they want to overthrow is, in their mind, 
so bad that they would not even participate anyway.”271 
 These safety valve arguments for eighteen-year-old voting were remarkably 
popular between 1968 and 1970.  Legislators across the political spectrum repeatedly 
voiced hopes that lowering the voting age might quell the student protests mushrooming 
on campuses nationwide.  In the Congressional debates of June 17, 1970, when the House 
debated and finally passed the eighteen-year-old voting amendment to the Voting Rights 
Act renewal bill, the sense of urgency was almost tangible; expanding the franchise, 
advocates claimed, was a key to bringing disaffected youth back into the fold and 
restoring order. 
II.  A Problematic Argument 
Few opponents of eighteen-year-old voting directly challenged these safety valve 
arguments, preferring to concentrate their critiques elsewhere.  This silence is especially 
notable given the conceptual tensions surrounding this particular rationale for lowering 
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the voting age.  Specifically, the theory of the vote underlying safety valve arguments 
clashed with other conceptions of the franchise that predominated elsewhere in the voting 
age debates.   
Arguments about rechanneling dissent rested on the notion that the right to vote 
can—and should—be used to make people into better citizens.  Proponents of eighteen-
year-old voting maintained that eighteen-year-voting would inspire young people to join 
in the process of self-government.  “It is self-evident,” Representative Hechler declared, 
“that [lowering the voting age] will awaken [young people] to a new sense of 
responsibility toward our Nation, and direct their energies and interests toward the 
constructive task of making democracy work.”272   
 This perspective was at odds with the idea of the franchise as a reward for or 
emblem of good citizenship that prevailed elsewhere in the voting age debate.  Two of 
the key arguments for eighteen-year-old voting—the soldier-voter theory and the 
qualified voter rationale—rested on the idea that voting is a fundamental right of those 
who have demonstrated that they are good citizens.  When talking about soldiers, 
advocates suggested that the franchise was the prerogative of those who assume 
significant civic burdens.  Similarly, the argument that young people should have the 
right to vote because they were highly educated and well-informed about politics hinged 
on the idea that the right to vote is properly granted as a reward to those who have 
demonstrated their civic commitment.   
An even stronger conception of the franchise as fundamental right underpinned 
the argument that the movement for eighteen-year-old voting was akin to campaigns for 
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African-American and woman suffrage.273  On this line of reasoning, a vision of the vote 
as an ‘emblem’ or mark of true citizenship underpinned many advocates’ insistence that 
it was not only mistaken, but also profoundly insulting to deny eighteen- to twenty-year-
olds the vote.   
All of these perspectives, while distinct from one another, conflicted with the 
vote-as-training-device idea that lay at the heart of the safety valve argument for 
eighteen-year-old voting.  However, this theoretical conflict about the nature of the vote 
largely went unnoticed.  Most advocates seemed to move seamlessly between the various 
arguments for eighteen-year-old voting, disregarding underlying inconsistencies about 
the nature of the vote, and opponents failed to remark on this dissonance. 
Indeed, the rare mentions of this issue in the Congressional debates generally 
came from outside the legislature.  For instance, Harvard law professor Paul Freund, 
whose letters of support were frequently entered into the Record, seemed to distinguish 
between voting as a right and voting as a mechanism for building better citizens in a 1968 
address that was later reprinted in committee hearings:   
The road to reconciliation here is to devise new forms of participation and shared 
responsibility.  'Responsibility,' said Justice Brandeis, the wisest man I have 
known, 'is the great developer of men.' When the struggle for woman suffrage was 
raging, Brandeis argued for the reform in his own distinctive terms: not that it is 
woman's right, but that we cannot afford to shield her from sharing in the 
responsibilities of citizenship.  When the radical labor tactics of the I.W.W. 
brought pressures for repression, Brandeis' [sic] advice was to place 
representatives of the I.W.W. in positions of common responsibilities.  If I make a 
similar suggestion in the case of students, I hope it will not be construed as a 
patronizing counsel any more that Brandeis was patronizing toward women as 
voters or radical labor leaders as collaborators in the industrial community.274  
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 In his testimony to Congress, Theodore Sorensen, former special counsel to 
President Kennedy, betrayed a certain discomfort with the idea of expanding the 
franchise in order to alleviate social unrest, as opposed to granting it as a matter of right 
or reward.  Sorensen, former special counsel to President Kennedy, passionately argued 
that young people’s dissent was a understandable consequence of their 
disenfranchisement, only to quickly back away from the logical consequences of his own 
argument:  
We should not [lower the voting age to eighteen] in the foolish expectation that it 
will greatly enlighten or transform either the electorate or the young.  We should 
do it because there is no longer a legitimate reason not to do it—because unfair 
and arbitrary distinctions are repugnant to a democracy—and above all, because it 
is right.275 
 
By and large, however, members of Congress were untroubled by any tensions 
between the theory of the vote that underlay arguments about channeling dissent and the 
perhaps more familiar conceptions of the franchise as right, reward, and/or emblem that 
appeared elsewhere in the debates.  In the next section, I examine why despite their flaws, 
safety valve arguments gained such momentum in the waning years of the 1960s. 
III.  A Powerful Appeal 
The safety valve argument’s success is largely due to the fact, noted above, that 
the campaign for eighteen-year-old voting was primarily spearheaded by legislators, 
rather than by young people themselves.  From the perspective of those in government 
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during the late 1960s, the safety valve theory resonated in three ways:  First, it offered the 
hope of restoring young Americans’ faith in the established political process and the 
power of the vote to effect change.  Second, some legislators cherished the notion that 
they might benefit concretely if young people refocused their political energies on, say, 
congressional campaigns.  Finally, there was a often-unarticulated but distinct wish that 
granting eighteen-year-olds the franchise would undermine the legitimacy of political 
action outside the voting booth. 
A.  Building Faith 
As described above, many members of Congress were infuriated by the campus 
demonstrations.  Some legislators, however, responded more with fear than with anger.  
They fretted that the youth demonstrations, and the social changes that accompanied 
them, represented not simply unhappiness with certain governmental policies but a more 
profound disaffection with the institutions and mechanisms of American society.  They 
hoped that expanding voting rights downward would do more than offer an alternative 
venue for political expression; they suggested that it would also encourage young people 
to believe in the efficacy of representative democracy itself.  In the halls of Congress 
during the late 1960s, this was a powerful argument.   
To give some context, it is worth noting that the idea of using the franchise to 
redress youthful alienation was, at least in part, a new version of an old argument that had 
percolated throughout the voting age debates for decades.  Specifically, proponents of a 
lower voting age had long argued that eighteen-year-old voting could be a useful antidote 
to youthful voter apathy, as evidenced by low turnout rates.  They pointed to the three-
year period between the average high school graduation age of eighteen and the 
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minimum voting age of twenty-one as the chief culprit behind low voting rates among 
Americans ages twenty-one to thirty. Speaking in 1943, Representative Estes Kefauver 
(D-TN) asked rhetorically: 
[I]sn’t the strongest argument [for eighteen-year-old voting] that boys and girls 
ordinarily finish high school when about 18 years of age, and at that time civics, 
political science, and matters of responsibility in government are very much in 
their minds, and if they don’t exercise those responsibilities immediately, in the 3 
years they may lose interest?276 
 
 Advocates of eighteen-year-old voting reiterated this theme with surprising 
frequency through the 1950s and into the 1960s.  The modern educational system 
produced politically knowledgeable and engaged eighteen-year-olds, they argued, but the 
schools’ good work was undone by the three-year wait for voting rights.  In 1959, 
Representative Hechler suggested that while military service–voting, reciprocity, and 
qualified-voter claims were all compelling reasons to lower the voting age, addressing 
this dropoff in civic interest was a more urgent rationale: 
The first great stirring of intellectual interest in public affairs takes place in high 
school, both as a result of social studies courses and participation in student 
elections, Hi-Y, Boys State, and other activities.  Dampen that interest by 
postponing voting responsibility until age 21 and you are dulling the edge of their 
interest in civic affairs.277   
 
Representative Arnold Olsen (D-MT), speaking in early 1967, echoed these sentiments:  
 
Our high schools are succeeding in instilling in our young citizens an interest in 
their Government, and it is my conviction that we are discouraging this important, 
vibrant segment of our population if we continue to insist that young Americans 
remain on the sidelines for 3 years after so many of them have reached the peak of 
interest and enthusiasm.278 
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 Young Americans might be full of civic energy at high school graduation, but 
without the vote, their interest quickly faded, proponents claimed.  In a report to 
President Johnson in December 1963, the President’s Commission on Registration and 
Voting Participation recommended lowering the voting age specifically to remedy low 
voter turnout rates among the young.279  Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN), speaking in 1967, 
warned that high school graduates soon became consumed with worldly concerns that 
distracted them from civic issues:  “By the time they have achieved the age of 21, many 
young people have become deeply involved in military, educational, family, or vocational 
activities.  Consequently, their previous interest in public affairs has diminished or has 
been overshadowed.”280  
Underpinning these concerns about low voter turnout among the young were 
deeper worries about young Americans’ attitude towards the democratic process.  
Throughout the 1950s and into the mid-to-late 1960s, legislators occasionally fretted that 
during the three years between high school graduation and eligibility to vote, many young 
Americans became not just distracted from voting, but profoundly alienated from 
political life.  In 1966, Representative William D. Ford (D-MI) suggested that in that 
crucial three-year period “a kind of political vacuum develops, and through stagnation, 
frustration, and apathy, the Nation is denied a substantial number of potential lifetime 
voters.”281   
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Not only was this disengagement a matter of concern in and of itself, but at the 
height of the Cold War, many worried that alienated eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds 
were easy targets for Communist recruiters.  At a 1952 Congressional hearing, Senator 
Harley Kilgore (D-WV) noted ominously: 
I find that a great number of people who . . . went astray after false gods such as 
communism went astray during those early periods before the age of 21 because 
they were seeking for some way to express themselves.  The Communist groups 
very cleverly made that up and allowed them to have a large voice in their 
meetings with the idea of developing Communism from them.282 
 
 Lowering the voting age, advocates argued, would remedy youthful voter apathy 
as well as its related civic pathologies.  The theory was that eighteen-year-old voting 
would pull youth into the political process at the peak of their interest and enthusiasm.  
Representative William St. Onge (D-CT) reiterated Senator Bayh’s concerns that by age 
twenty-one, most youth were “preoccupied with family and work . . . and thereafter they 
usually follow a course of indifference toward their voting rights.”  But by “[a]llowing 
this group to participate in national elections at the point when their political knowledge 
and enthusiasm is highest,” he argued, they “would develop the habits necessary for a 
lifetime of civic responsibility.”283  Others invoked similar arguments:  In 1951, 
Representative Edward Jenison (R-IL) suggested, “Voting, or not voting, is a habit . . . . 
[G]ood habits should be developed early in life.  A young person interested in meeting 
this primary responsibility of representative government is likely to continue this interest 
and continue to meet that responsibility.”284  Senator Joseph Tydings (D-MD), speaking 
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years later, concurred: “[E]arly participation in the elective process is likely to lead to a 
lifetime of active citizenship.”285  
 Safety valve arguments for eighteen-year-old voting evolved out of these earlier 
ideas that lowering the voting age would mitigate youthful voter apathy.  Like their 
predecessors in earlier decades, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting in the late 1960s 
argued that reducing the voting age would pull young Americans into the mainstream of 
political life.  Worries that young people lost all interest in politics between the ages of 
eighteen and twenty-one, however, were replaced by new concerns that these same young 
people were highly politicized.  One of the few people to acknowledge the connection 
between these arguments was Representative Hechler, who remarked in 1968: 
In the ] 1950’s when gray-flanneled youth declined to be identified with civic 
issues lest the corporate recruiters would regard overactive participation as a 
blemish on student records[,] I favored the 18-year-old vote then in order to blast 
some students out of their indifference.  Today, the 18-year-old vote is needed to 
harness the energy of young people and direct it into useful and constructive 
channels. . . .”286 
 
If low voter turnout rates among Americans aged eighteen to twenty-one had been 
symptomatic of a lack of interest in public affairs among youth, according to advocates, 
then the student protests were evidence of quite the opposite.  Proponents of eighteen-
year-old voting argued that campus demonstrations were merely the natural manifestation 
of young people’s desire to express themselves politically: without the right to vote, 
college-aged Americans had no way other than demonstrations to make their voices 
heard.  Representative William Hathaway (D-ME) explained, “If we deny them the right 
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to vote, they must seek other channels for expressing their views and influencing 
decisions of Government, including various forms of protest.”287  Senator Ralph 
Yarborough (D-TX) agreed, “I think it is hypocritical to criticize young people for 
demonstrating in the streets and for not expressing their dissenting views through proper 
channels of dissent when we close to them the most widely accepted channel of dissent—
the ballot box.”288 
Representative Hathaway spoke for many when he suggested that the protests 
were problematic simply because they were “destructive to our social order.”289  
However, just like those who had fretted that youthful voter apathy revealed a troubling 
disengagement from politics, more than a few advocates of eighteen-year-old voting 
voiced concerns that the student demonstrations betrayed deeper pathologies.  Over and 
over again, proponents of lowering the voting age referred to pervasive feelings of 
“frustration and alienation; a dislike for and distrust of ‘the establishment.’” among 
young Americans.290 In May 1968 Senate subcommittee hearings, Senator Howard 
Cannon (D-NV) asserted: 
There have been increasing signs that the young people of this nation are not 
‘tuned in’ to the political process in this country.  Day after day we read that the 
most talented – and articulate – of our young people harbor deep suspicion that 
those in positions of political authority are unresponsive to the needs and the 
values of this democratic republic.291  
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Indeed, the specific attitudes—disillusionment, frustration, and cynicism—that so 
alarmed legislators of the late 1960s were similar to those that had concerned their 
predecessors in earlier years; the difference was that now, youthful discontent was 
manifesting itself not just in low voter turnout, but in direct challenges to political 
authority.  
 In such a charged atmosphere, the perennial fear that alienated young people were 
easy targets for dangerous influences took on new force.  In 1970 Representative James 
Cleveland (R-NH) warned: 
A consequence of not lowering the voting age seems to be that young people who 
are interested and involved in public issues tend to become frustrated, thus 
providing a ready audience for the small number of radical disrupters who are 
always looking for a confrontation.292 
 
Similarly, Representative Railsback declared dramatically, “It is perfectly clear to me that 
[lowering the voting age to eighteen] is the only realistic hope of challenging our youth to 
work within the system rather than turning them aside to be picked up and used by those 
who seek to destroy the system through violence.”293 
Nothing short of the survival of the American political system was at stake, 
advocates claimed.  In 1970, Representative John Anderson (R-IL) remarked that White 
House staffers who had toured college campuses had been “shocked” by students’ 
distrust of established political institutions.  He warned: 
We can either convince [these young people] that the ballot box and the elective 
process is an effective means of accomplishing change or inevitably they will 
succumb to the same pressures that have brought the demise of democracy when 
faith in man’s right to choose has begun to fade.294 
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Lowering the voting age, proponents maintained, would show young people that 
the democratic process was responsive to their needs.  Representative Lawrence Hogan 
(R-MD) suggested that the “ratification of a constitutional amendment to give [eighteen- 
to twenty-year-olds] an active role in our elective system would demonstrate most 
effectively to disbelievers and dissenters that progressive change is possible within our 
governmental system.”295  In 1968, Representative Charles Price (D-IL) declared: 
 [W]e must prove that our faith in the democratic electoral process is 
stronger and more productive than [the radicals’] belief in violence and civil 
disobedience as instruments for producing social change. 
 We must unclog the political channels of the ‘system’ that they rail 
against.  We must give the amateurs and the young a chance to partake of the 
sense of accomplishment that comes from victories for progress and sanity that 
are won at the ballot boxes and not in the streets.296 
 
Legislators further argued that lowering the voting age would be a statement of 
confidence in American youth’s ability to participate in the process of self-government, 
which in turn would inspire young people to join in those processes.  “It is self-evident,” 
declared Representative Hechler, “that confidence placed in young people will awaken 
them to a new sense of responsibility toward our Nation, and direct their energies and 
interests toward the constructive task of making democracy work.”297  Representative 
Herbert Tenzer (D-NY) agreed:  
In these troubled times, [lowering the voting age] will give us the opportunity to 
bridge the ‘generation gap’ by reaching out to the youth of the Nation and not 
merely allowing them—but asking them to join hands in the process of self-
government and share in the establishment of the goals necessary for the 
improvement of society.298  
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The notion that lowering the voting would build faith in the processes of 
representative government among American youth was not born solely out of the chaos 
of the late 1960s.  Proponents of eighteen-year-old voting had been making related claims 
since the early 1940s, although with limited success.  However, with the rise in student 
activism during the mid-to-late 1960s, the idea that eighteen-year-old voting would 
rectify the alienation and frustration that ostensibly fueled the student protests gained 
considerable appeal. 
B.  An Untapped Resource 
 Although legislators’ concern for the health and stability of the American political 
system often seemed genuine, more than a few politicians revealed rather less lofty 
reasons for seeking to rechannel young people’s political efforts into mainstream politics.  
If college students could vote, they suggested, they might well be willing to volunteer 
their copious time and energy for all sorts of political campaigns, not least of all those of 
members of Congress running for reelection. 
 In this respect Senator Eugene McCarthy’s 1968 presidential campaign was a 
watershed event.  Attracted by McCarthy’s antiwar stance, among other things, thousands 
of college students volunteered in the New Hampshire and other primaries.  Cutting their 
hair to ‘get clean for Gene,’ they enthusiastically stuffed envelopes and canvassed door-
to-door for their candidate.299 
 Senator McCarthy ultimately lost the Democratic nomination, but the effect of his 
campaign on the eighteen-year-old voting movement was long-lasting.  His fellow 
politicians frequently referred with admiration to McCarthy’s squads of young 
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volunteers.  Representative Abner Mikva (D-IL) remarked, “Whether one supported 
Senator McCarthy or not, it is impossible to deny the impact which he and his initially 
youthful supporters had on the American political system.”300  Senator Ted Moss (D-UT) 
declared, “Whether we agree with their choice of candidates or not, this is the kind of 
constructive activity we should encourage our dissenters to take.”301 
Some could barely contain their hopes that they, too, might be able to inspire the 
same sort of dedication, especially if young people were given the vote.  In arguing for 
eighteen-year-old voting, Senator Javits cited the McCarthy campaign as “a very 
constructive object lesson about how to turn boundless energy, great ideals, and the 
burning resentments which young people have about many things . . . into action 
channels which are entirely in line with our system.”  Although McCarthy was a 
Democrat and he was a Republican, Senator Javits noted, he was “absolutely convinced 
that . . . candidates in my party . . . could benefit from similar infusions of youthful talent 
and dedication to their own cause.”  In his own reelection campaign, he added, he 
“hope[d] very much to have just this kind of youthful enthusiasm.”302 
C.  Undermining Protest 
Beyond these cheerful hopes that lowering the voting age would mitigate the 
student protests and encourage young people to participate in the established political 
system, another, darker, thread also ran through the safety valve argument: the idea that 
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public protest itself was an illegitimate form of political participation.  By arguing that 
the demonstrators had taken to the streets because they were denied the vote, many 
advocates implied that only the disenfranchised had an acceptable reason to protest; those 
who could vote had no business conducting public demonstrations.  Again, this notion 
resonated strongly with members of Congress who were angered and frightened by what 
they were seeing on the nightly news.   
Advocates of eighteen-year-old voting emphasized that the vote was the best and 
most acceptable way for American citizens to express their political preferences.  In the 
words of one Congressional witness, the ballot box was the “most effective, most 
desirable, and most legitimate channel of political participation and expression.”303  
In particular, proponents maintained, voting was the most appropriate venue for 
expressing dissent.  Representative Allard Lowenstein (D-NY) characterized the vote as 
“the most basic tool for [avoiding] more violent redress of grievances in this country.”304  
His compatriot Representative Bertram Podell (D-NY) concurred, “[W]e still look upon 
the vote as the ultimate weapon in our society . . . the instrument by which citizens may 
peacefully challenge the status quo . . . .”305 
Implicit—and occasionally explicit— in these arguments was the idea that casting 
a vote was the only legitimate way for an American citizen to voice political preferences.  
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Speaking in 1968, Senator Gale McGee (D-WY) made this point obliquely: “The desire 
of young people to improve their world is a healthy sign, and it needs only to be 
channeled into an acceptable means of expression.”306  Representative Saylor suggested 
that the vote was at least the most obvious avenue for political participation: 
Since our present political system has evolved as a practical—and effective—
system of resolving conflict, I cannot readily imagine what kind of system could 
be created to replace it in the future.  Certainly our young people should be given 
the opportunity to express themselves in our democratic and traditional way—at 
the polls.307 
 
 Other advocates of eighteen-year-old voting were more pointed, picking up on 
Representative Saylor’s implication that voting was the sole “democratic” way to voice 
political dissent.  Representative Hogan argued that the vote was “the only way to strike 
out against the deficiencies in our society without destroying the system itself.”308 
But the student protest leaders, declared Senator Charles Percy (R-IL) were 
“really trying to wreck society.”309  In one May 1968 Senate subcommittee hearing, a 
college-aged witness tried to defend the protesters, suggesting that students’ exclusion 
from decisionmaking processes was to blame for campus violence.  He was promptly 
reprimanded by Senator Bayh, who was usually a steadfast supporter of youth concerns: 
[T]his would be the same type of lack of maturity that would cause a group of 
citizens of the State to take arms and march on the State capitol and perhaps do 
bodily harm to the Governor because he vetoed a bill dealing with alcoholic 
beverages.  We just do not do things this way in this country.310   
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By urging that the voting age be lowered in order to channel youthful dissent 
away from the streets and towards the ballot box, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting 
emphasized the importance of the franchise while simultaneously undermining the 
legitimacy of political demonstrations, especially demonstrations by those entitled to 
vote. College-aged Americans themselves did not entirely fail to notice this phenomenon:  
In a Senate subcommittee hearing in early 1970, Senator Bayh asked witness and 
anthropology professor Margaret Mead why young people themselves did not uniformly 
favor a reduction in the voting age.  Mead replied: 
Well, there are some young people who feel if they are given the vote, then 
everybody will say, 'Now, you have got the vote, why don't you use it?  You can 
settle everything by the vote.'  I think there probably are people who will 
condemn any form of demonstration, no matter how peaceful, from people who 
have the vote.  We have seen this before.  We have seen minority groups told that 
because they have the vote they should use no other method of bringing things to 
the attention of the American public.311 
 
Mead’s words were prophetic: after the Supreme Court partially upheld 
legislation reducing the voting age to eighteen in December 1971, longtime eighteen-
year-old voting advocate Senator Michael Mansfield of Montana declared:  
Up to now the youth of today had a legitimate grievance . . . Now much of this 
has changed . . . . the Supreme Court has shifted the burden and placed it where it 
belongs—on the young people themselves—on those who have raised their voices 
and pointed their fingers.312 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 In the years between 1968 and 1970, as the student protest movement swelled and 
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its leaders’ rhetoric became ever more heated, members of Congress became increasingly 
panicked.  Beyond the immediate concerns of disrupted classes, unruly demonstrators, 
and burned draft cards, many legislators began to fear that the new generation was 
becoming dangerously cynical about the efficacy of established political institutions.  
They saw eighteen-year-old voting as a promising way to redirect young people’s 
considerable energies and inspire new confidence in the mainstream political process. 
 It should be noted, of course, that lowering the voting age was far easier and 
certainly much cheaper than other possible ways of defusing the protests, such as 
abolishing the draft and/or pulling American troops out of Vietnam.  Many politicians 
therefore eagerly seized on the safety valve rationale for lowering the voting age, despite 
its conceptual problems, in the hope that this small ‘fix’ would remedy a situation that 
seemed to be spiraling completely out of control.
116 
CHAPTER 6:  
DISCRIMINATION
In March 1970, the voting age debates took a new and fateful turn.  Frustrated by 
the ossified Congressional committee process and energized by recent Supreme Court 
decisions that expanded Congress’s authority to protect voting rights, Senators Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA) and Mike Mansfield (D-MT) proposed amending the Voting Rights 
Act renewal bill to provide for eighteen-year-old voting.  As I detailed in Chapter 2 this 
controversial maneuver proved to be just the catalyst that the voting age movement 
needed, setting into action a chain of events that led directly to the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment. 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the legislative strategizing around the eighteen-year-
old voting rider was rooted in advocates’ many years of thwarted efforts.  In this chapter, 
I demonstrate that the intellectual underpinning of Kennedy and Mansfield’s proposal 
was similarly grounded in an argument that had been central to the voting age debates 
since the 1940s.  Specifically, in asserting Congressional authority to lower the voting 
age through statute alone, those who supported the voting age rider to the Voting Rights 
Act maintained that excluding eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds from the 
franchise was as legally unacceptable as racial or gender voting discrimination.  The legal 
angle was new; however, analogies between young Americans and other traditionally 
discriminated-against groups, especially African-Americans and women, were a longtime 
staple of campaigns for a lower voting age. 
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Interestingly, this particular dimension of the voting age debates barely surfaces 
in the secondary literature.  This may be in part because, as I have discussed before, 
commentary on the Voting Rights Act rider and its subsequent treatment by the Supreme 
Court has generally been the province of legal scholars, who have tended to focus on the 
events of 1970 and early 1971 independently of the longstanding debates that preceded 
them.  
It is also likely that, as with the qualified-voter arguments I discussed in Chapter 
4, contemporary writers have tended to overlook the significance of advocates’ analogies 
to blacks and women because such arguments are not necessarily compelling, especially 
to modern ears.  Political theorist Judith Shklar, for example, has written that the Twenty-
sixth amendment itself was utterly misguided in large part because the position of young 
Americans was nothing like that of other disenfranchised groups.313 
Nevertheless, the Congressional voting age debates demonstrate that whatever 
their limitations, comparisons between eighteen- to twenty-year-olds and other 
historically excluded groups played an important role in the quest for eighteen-year-old 
voting.  Furthermore, such analogies were uniquely powerful during the late 1960s.   By 
framing the voting age issue as a matter of unfair discrimination, advocates sought to tap 
into Congress’ and the Court’s newfound enthusiasm for protecting minority rights, 
especially voting rights.  More subtly, proponents also both relied on and reinforced 
legislators’ sense of themselves as being part of an inexorable historical march towards 
universal suffrage. 
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I.  Woman Suffrage, African-American Voting, and the Minimum Voting Age 
The core of advocates’ argument for the legitimacy of the Voting Rights Act rider 
was that denying voting rights to eighteen- to twenty-year-old year olds amounted to 
unconstitutional discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Congress both could and should act to remedy this 
discrimination, proponents insisted, just as it was trying to remedy voting discrimination 
against blacks and other minority groups.  As I explain in more detail below, the legal 
aspects to these arguments were derived from several Supreme Court cases and law 
review articles published in the mid-1960s.  However, the notion that the situation of 
young Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one was comparable to that of 
other previously-disenfranchised groups had been around for decades. 
A.  Unfair Treatment 
During the 1940s and 1950s, advocates repeatedly compared their campaign to 
the woman suffrage movement.  When the eighteen-year-old voting issue first surfaced at 
the national level in 1943, the Nineteenth Amendment was recent enough history that 
some members of Congress could still remember and draw parallels to those debates.  At 
the outset of the very first Congressional hearing on lowering the voting age, 
Representative Jennings Randolph (D-WV) reminded the group that women’s voting 
rights had once been an unpopular cause as well. “I can remember, as a young man, 
listening to heated debates . . . on the subject of woman suffrage.”314  Later in the same 
hearing, Georgia governor Ellis Arnall suggested that the arguments against eighteen-
year-old voting were strikingly similar to those that had been offered against woman 
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suffrage, remarking, “As I remember it, one of the argument [sic] against woman suffrage 
was that women had no place in public affairs, that they knew nothing about it, and that 
therefore we would bring in a group who knew nothing about public affairs.”315 
Comparisons to the Nineteenth Amendment surfaced a number of times in the 
1954 Senate debate on Senate Joint Resolution 53, the one proposal for an eighteen-year-
old voting constitutional amendment ever to make it to the chamber’s floor prior to 1971.  
In particular, proponents referenced the woman suffrage amendment in response to 
critics’ frequent charges that a constitutional amendment lowering the voting age would 
trample traditional state authority over voting.  Replying to Senator Richard Russell (D-
GA), who was the standard-bearer for states’ rights, Senator Everett Dirksen (R-IL) 
declared that it was the campaign for women’s voting all over again: 
There is no constitutional distinction between the amendment relating to woman 
suffrage and the question which is before the Senate today.  The same argument 
was made on the floor at the time when the then Senator from California, Senator 
Sargent, introduced a joint resolution proposing the amendment to the 
Constitution to provide for women’s suffrage, and it took 41 years before it was 
adopted.316   
 
Throughout the 1960s, advocates of lowering the voting age continued to 
analogize the situation of modern young people to that of pre-Nineteenth Amendment 
women.  Speaking in 1968, Representative Frederick Schwengel (R-IA) asserted, “For 
the most part, the argument against the 18-year-old vote smacks of that against woman 
suffrage: a supercilious view that women had no place in public affairs and that they were 
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not well enough acquainted with political issues to make intelligent choices.”317  Senator 
Joseph Tydings (D-MD) elaborated further: 
[A]ll of the arguments made against giving young adults the vote . . . were used 
against extending the right of franchise to women in the United States. . . . It was 
argued that giving the vote to women would add to the population many persons 
whose idealism had not been tempered by practical experience.  It was argued that 
women would be influenced by their parents and schools, by handsome rogues, by 
demagogues.  Women, it was said, would affect elections even though they had 
little knowledge of or interest in local affairs.318 
 
In Senate debate on the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal, Senator Fred Harris (D-OK) 
reiterated the point, “Many of the arguments used today against the right of 18-year-olds 
to vote were also used in the fight against women’s suffrage 50-odd years ago.  They are 
no longer acceptable.”319 
 Beginning in the mid-to-late 1960s, though, proponents increasingly expanded 
their analogies beyond woman suffrage.  Many, like Representative Shirley Chisholm (D-
NY), the first black woman elected to Congress, drew comparisons to the African-
American experience, noting that there were “close parallels between [the] situation [of 
young people] and the struggle of black Americans for political freedom in this 
country.”320  In Senate hearings held in early 1970, representatives from the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People testified in favor of lowering the 
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voting age to eighteen, explicitly connecting their own organization’s core mission of 
racial equality to the campaign for eighteen-year-old voting.321   
 Advocates repeatedly stressed that the reasons being advanced for the twenty-one-
year minimum voting age were identical to the wrongheaded reasons that had historically 
been advanced to deny the franchise to various groups of American citizens.  In the same 
set of 1970 Senate subcommitee hearings, Theodore Sorenson, who had been special 
counsel to President Kennedy, referenced earlier campaigns to abolish voting restrictions 
based on property ownership, race, and gender: “The arguments heard now—that the new 
group will be gullible, reckless, or improperly swayed—were heard and rejected then.  
Today there is no longer any valid reason or evidence to distinguish between the voting 
rights of 21-year-old citizens and 18-year-old citizens.”322  Representative Lee Hamilton 
(D-IN), speaking in 1969, argued that eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds, like previously 
disenfranchised groups, were being held to unreasonable standards:  
Those opposed to lowering the voting seek proof positive that youth will handle 
their franchise intelligently even before having the opportunity to vote.  The same 
impossible demand was made in opposition to female sufferage [sic] 50 years ago 
and equal voting rights for Negroes only 3 years ago.”323  Recognizing the error 
of these previous judgments, proponents insisted, meant further expanding the 
franchise.  
 
Before the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal appeared on the horizon, these sorts of 
arguments went largely unchallenged by those who opposed eighteen-year-old voting. 
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Opponents were clearly troubled by advocates’ comparisons to previous suffrage 
campaigns, but they struggled to articulate their objections.  In debate on the Senate floor 
in 1954, Senator Russell became agitated when advocates analogized eighteen-year-old 
voting to woman suffrage, sputtering, “[I]f people cannot understand the difference 
between discrimination on account of sex and a classification on the basis of age, it is 
useless to argue and debate with them this or any proposed constitutional amendment.”324  
When the voting age debates peaked again in 1969–70, President Nixon trod cautiously, 
coming out in favor of a constitutional amendment permitting eighteen-year-old voting in 
national elections only.  In explaining the President’s rationale to a Senate subcommittee, 
Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst betrayed discomfort with analogies to 
African-American and woman suffrage but did not elaborate: “I am not urging an across-
the-board provision as in the existing 15th and 19th amendments because in my judgment 
age—unlike race and sex—may be a legitimate qualification on the right to vote.  It is a 
question upon which differences of opinion may properly exist.”325 
B.  Unconstitutional Discrimination 
The Kennedy-Mansfield proposal gave new energy what had been up to that point 
a rather muted debate.  By repackaging their arguments about discrimination into specific 
constitutional claims, and also by attaching the voting age issue to a landmark African-
American rights bill, advocates raised the stakes of their analogies between young 
Americans and other historically excluded groups. 
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The proposed voting age rider to the Voting Rights Act renewal bill was inspired 
directly by the Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan,326 in which the 
Court upheld a challenged section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The Act had 
dramatically expanded the federal government’s authority over state voting practices.  
Designed to end persistent racial voting discrimination in the Deep South, the statute 
immediately suspended the use of literacy tests and other exclusionary ‘devices’ in 
jurisdictions that used such tests and had reported low voter turnout in the 1964 elections.  
These same jurisdictions were also required to obtain “preclearance” from the federal 
government before making any changes to their voting practices.  The law further 
authorized federal examiners to go into the South to register voters and monitor local 
compliance.327 
 In a pair of 1966 cases, the Supreme Court upheld the Voting Rights Act as a 
legitimate exercise of federal authority under both the Fifteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,328 the Court held that the Act’s core 
provisions were an “valid means” for Congress to enforce the long-ignored Fifteenth 
Amendment.  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted that gentler 
measures had been unsuccessful: “Congress felt itself confronted by an insidious and 
pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our country through 
unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”329 
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 In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 330 the Court further rooted federal power over voting 
in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Morgan dealt with the 
constitutionality of a provision in the Voting Rights Act establishing that no person who 
had successfully completed the sixth grade in a public or accredited private school in 
Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English could be denied 
the right to vote because of his or her inability to read or write English.  This clause, 
Section 4(e), effectively outlawed New York’s then-requirement that prospective voters 
pass an English literacy test.331   
The Court upheld Section 4(e) as a legitimate exercise of Congressional authority 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,332 which grants Congress “the power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”333  
Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan construed Congress’s enforcement 
powers broadly.  The legislature, he said, had clearly passed Section 4(e) as a way to 
enforce the equal protection clause.334  He offered two possible theories:  First, Congress 
might have thought that disallowing New York’s literacy test would enhance the Puerto 
Rican community’s political power, which would “be helpful in gaining 
nondiscriminatory treatment in public services . . . .”335  Alternatively, Congress might 
have considered New York’s literacy requirement in and of itself an “invidious 
discrimination” that violated the equal protection clause.336  In any event, the Court 
declined to second-guess Congress’s judgment.  “It is not for us to review the 
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congressional resolution of these factors.  It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis 
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.”337 
The Morgan decision formed the intellectual basis for Senators Kennedy and 
Mansfield’s argument that Congress, could, and should, further amend the Voting Rights 
Act to provide for a lower voting age.  (Actually, Kennedy may well have first gotten the 
idea from former Solicitor General-turned Harvard law professor Archibald Cox, who 
had argued in a 1966 Harvard Law Review article that in light of Morgan, Congress 
could likely reduce the voting age without a constitutional amendment.338)  In March 
1970 Senate hearings, Kennedy maintained that the Court’s logic applied as well to 
eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds as it did to New York’s Puerto Ricans.  In his written 
statement, Kennedy drew on Brennan’s first theory, suggesting that those between the 
ages of eighteen and twenty-one needed the franchise in order to protect themselves 
against discriminatory treatment:   
Congress could reasonably find that the reduction of the voting age to 18 is 
necessary in order to eliminate a very real discrimination that exists against the 
nation’s youth in the public services they receive.  By reducing the voting age to 
18, we can enable young Americans to improve their social and political 
circumstances, just as the Supreme Court in the Morgan case accepted the 
determination by Congress that the enfranchisement of Puerto Ricans in New 
York would give them a role in influencing the laws that protect and affect 
them.339 
 
In his oral testimony, though, Kennedy extrapolated from Brennan’s second 
theory, arguing that denying the franchise to eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-one year-
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olds was itself ‘invidious discrimination’ that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 
Just as Congress has the power to find that an English literacy test discriminates 
against Spanish-speaking Americans, so Congress has the power to recognize the 
increased education and maturity of our youth and to find discrimination in the 
fact that young Americans who fight, work, marry, and pay taxes like other 
citizens are denied the right to vote, the most basic right of all.340 
 
 This constitutional angle breathed new life into advocates’ analogies between 
young Americans and other traditionally discriminated-against groups.  Furthermore, the 
very fact that the voting age issue was now connected with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
intensified the analogy to black Americans in particular.  By seeking to attach an 
eighteen-year-old voting provision to a landmark piece of legislation that was specifically 
designed to redress persistent voting discrimination against African-Americans, 
advocates pointedly linked the plight of eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds to that of 
disenfranchised Southern blacks.  Representative Howard Robison (R-NY) made the 
connection explicit in June 1970: 
There are two groups in our Nation which are excluded from the elective process 
in significant numbers—black citizens and those young people under 21.  This 
legislative package is aimed at bringing to significant numbers in both groups the 
right of suffrage.341   
 
Similarly, Representative Carl Albert (D-OK) warned, “The House, if it votes down [the 
eighteen-year-old voting amendment to the Voting Rights Act], will have informed both 
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the young and the Blacks that there is no place for them in the orderly political 
process.”342 
The Kennedy-Mansfield proposal also finally galvanized a coherent response 
from those who resisted the notion that age restrictions on voting were comparable to 
racial or gender voting discrimination.  Foes noted that some point of eligibility for the 
vote had to be set; after al, no one was suggesting that the minimum age requirement be 
discarded entirely.  Testifying before a Senate subcommittee in March 1970, then-
Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist asked: 
[W]hat is the ‘discrimination’ which Congress would seek to eliminate?  Unless 
voting is to be done from the crib, the minimum age line must be drawn 
somewhere; can it really be said that to deny 20-, 19-, and 18-year-olds is 
‘discrimination,’ while to deny the vote to 17-year-olds is sound legislative 
judgment?343   
 
In a letter introduced into the Record by then-Representative Gerald Ford (R-MI), 
President Nixon noted, “[T]o set the limit at 18 is to recognize that it has to be set 
somewhere . . . . If it is unconstitutional for a State to deny the vote to an 18-year-old, it 
would seem equally unconstitutional to deny it to a 17-year-old.”344  Representative 
George Andrews (D-AL) warned that lowering the voting age on a theory of equal 
protection could be a slippery slope: 
If 18-year-olds are denied equal protection of the laws, simply by not having the 
vote, what about 17-year-olds and younger?  This pattern of thinking could lead to 
the abandonment of all age restrictions, as a denial of the amendment’s equal 
protection clause.345 
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 Interestingly, however, those legislators who opposed the voting age rider mostly 
shied away from confronting advocates’ assertions that eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds 
to the vote was philosophically akin to racial or gender discrimination.346  By and large, 
they did not try to draw meaningful distinctions between the situation of eighteen- to 
twenty-one year-olds and those of African-Americans, women, and nonpropertyholders 
in earlier eras.347  The very few legislators who dared to suggest that differential 
treatment based on age was just not as problematic as other kinds of discrimination 
confined themselves to arguing that advocates’ analogies were legally inapt.348 
While it is of course impossible to determine the extent to which proponents’ 
arguments about discrimination actually propelled the voting age rider to the Voting 
Rights Act to victory, advocates had the upper hand in setting the terms of debate with 
respect to this particular issue.  In the next section, I argue that framing the voting age 
issue as a matter of unfair discrimination was a uniquely powerful rhetorical strategy, at 
least in the halls of Congress during 1969 and 1970.   
II.  A Most Congenial Climate 
While analogies between young Americans and other traditionally discriminated-
against groups had been part of the voting age debates since the 1940s, as detailed above, 
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such arguments had unprecedented resonance in the late 1960s.  By repackaging these 
arguments into constitutional form, Kennedy and Mansfield sought not only to bypass 
legislative deadlock, but also to tap into important political trends.  
A. Victims of Discrimination 
Most broadly, the claim that eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds were a distinct 
discriminated-against group was all of a piece with the rights consciousness of the time 
and place.  Late 1960s and early 1970s America saw a wide array of groups making equal 
rights claims. Inspired by the success of the African-American civil rights movement of 
the early 1960s, groups representing women, Latinos, Native-Americans, the disabled, 
and the elderly followed black Americans in lobbying the federal government to act to 
ensure their social and/or economic equality.349  While some of these groups were 
considerably more successful than others, all three branches of government responded 
with a dramatic increase in laws, regulations, and court decisions establishing 
antidiscrimination policies, a phenomenon that scholars refer to as the “rights 
revolution.”350 
While commentators disagree over much about the rights revolution, it seems 
uncontroversial to say that during the late 1960s, the language of discrimination and 
rights was very familiar to federal legislators.  It is rather more controversial, but 
supportable, to suggest that by 1970, when Congress began considering the voting age 
issue with renewed seriousness, many of these politicians were not only familiar but also 
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quite comfortable with this language.351  In this atmosphere, descriptions of eighteen- to 
twenty-one year-olds as a distinct, discriminated-against class had unusual resonance. 
Indeed, a striking feature of the 1970 debates in both the House and the Senate is 
the way in which advocates reframed longstanding arguments for lowering the voting age 
in terms of ‘discrimination.’  Senator Tydings, for example, put this new spin on the ‘old 
enough to fight, old enough to vote’ chestnut:  
Certainly one can perceive a basis for a congressional conclusion that the 
application of State voting requirements to deny the vote in Federal elections to 
that class of citizens who bear the total burden of compulsory military service 
constitutes discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause.352  
 
Senator Marlow Cook (R-KY), speaking in a Senate subcommittee hearing, energetically 
made the same point: 
These people have assumed the responsibilities of adulthood, they are subject to 
adult criminal penalties, they are subject to taxes, and as a matter of fact, I will 
remind you that if you think they are not being discriminated against that as of 
June 1968 of a military force of 3,510,000, 956,000 of those are aged 18, and 19, 
and 20, and of those then through December of 1969 who have lost their lives in 
Southeast Asia, of 40,000 people 19,202 of then were 18-, 19- and 20-year-
olds.353 
 
Others used the discrimination label more broadly, suggesting that the general 
lack of reciprocity between civic obligations and rights for those between eighteen and 
twenty-one qualified as unconstitutional discrimination. Speaking on the Senate floor, 
Senator Kennedy declared: 
We give responsibility to 18-year-olds in terms of contracting, in terms of 
criminal responsibility, in terms of being able to drive, and in terms of owning 
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guns or weapons.  It is generally agreed that 18 is the appropriate age of maturity 
with respect to many basic responsibilities.  It is not unreasonable for Congress to 
make a finding that the 18 to 21 age group has been denied the equal protection of 
the laws by having been denied the opportunity to vote.354  
 
Representative Tom Railsback (R-IL) made a nearly identical statement on the House 
floor:  
T]here is ample basis for a congressional determination that states unfairly 
discriminate against persons between eighteen and twenty-one when they deny 
those persons the right to vote.  The fact that eighteen year olds assume so many 
of the responsibilities of older citizens. . . offers sufficient justification for a 
congressional judgment that it is unreasonable to deprive them of the essential 
right to vote.355 
 
 Some proponents of lowering the voting age by statute also began to couch 
qualified voter arguments in terms of discrimination.  Representative Robison, for 
example, suggested that under Morgan, Congress could make a factual finding that 
restricting the franchise to those twenty-one and older was “an irrational and [ ] invidious 
discrimination. . . . by making its own factual assessment that an 18-year-old of today is 
equal in judgment, maturity, character, education and knowledge to a 21-year-old of 50 
or 100 years ago.”356  His fellow New Yorker Representative Bertram Podell (D) 
concurred: “This Congress cannot claim to be upholding and enforcing the 14th 
Amendment, which provides for the equal protection of the laws, when it denies the right 
to vote to these individuals who are so informed about the issues of our society. . . .”357 
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B.  Broadening the Franchise 
 Just as the notion that eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds were a discriminated-
against class fit neatly with the heightened rights consciousness of the time, so too did the 
notion that exclusion from the franchise was a particularly invidious form of 
discrimination.  Voting rights were a core element of the rights revolution.  Beginning in 
the mid-1960s and continuing for about ten years, Congress and the Supreme Court, with 
the support of some state governments, largely abolished all restrictions on adult citizens’ 
right to vote.  Formal and informal racial barriers to the franchise were effectively 
outlawed through the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and a series of Supreme Court decisions 
that upheld and interpreted various of the Act’s provisions.  The Twenty-fourth 
Amendment, ratified in 1964, prohibited poll taxes in federal elections, and only two 
years later the Court held that state poll taxes were unconstitutional as well.358  During 
these years, some states abolished pauper exclusions and shortened residency 
requirements, but the 1970 Voting Rights Act renewal bill went further; beyond the 
eighteen-year-old voting provision, the extension act also contained provisions that 
banned both literacy tests and lengthy residency requirements throughout the country.  
Finally, beginning with its 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr,359 the Supreme Court plunged 
into the area of legislative apportionment, an issue that would occupy the Court for 
decades.360  
Those who favored a lower voting age often characterized eighteen-year-old 
voting as an integral part of this bigger movement towards a broader and more 
meaningful franchise.  Speaking on the House floor in 1967, Representative Daniel 
                                                 
358 Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
359 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
360 For more details on all of these developments, see Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 256–77, 285–287. 
 
 133
Button (R-NY) cited a number of recent Congressional and Court actions, arguing. “In 
our day, when the whole thrust of democracy is to make it easier for qualified people to 
vote, the maintenance of the arbitrary and artificial 21-year limit is unjustified and 
undesirable.”361  The next year, Representative Claude Pepper (D-FL) similarly linked 
his proposed eighteen-year-old voting to other contemporaneous electoral reforms: 
Recent years have seen a liberalization of both State and Federal laws dealing 
with the right to vote. . . . Action on [this] proposal to amend the Constitution to 
permit 18-year-olds to vote will be another important step in the effort to assure 
that every qualified citizen has a hand in molding the Nation’s political future.362 
 
Representative Seymour Halpern (R-NY) agreed: “In this same decade, in which voting 
discrimination based on poll taxes, on race or color, or on voting districts have all been 
outlawed, the discrimination which deprives over 10 million of our younger citizens of 
their rightful vote must be our next objective.”363  Rather more floridly, Representative 
Abner Mikva (D-IL) made the same connections, speaking on the House floor in defense 
of the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal: 
 Nor is there substance to the captious charge that 18-year-old voting is 
some kind of ‘ungermane’ rider to this bill.  It is a very easy rider – because age, 
like race, residence, and reading, has a history of being used as an excuse to keep 
people from participating in the choosing practice. 
 If the question of voting eligibility means something more than eligibility 
of a fraternity – then we have the obligations to remove all impediments that deny 
people the most fundamental blessing of liberty, and that keep the Union from 
being more perfect.364  
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Indeed, a couple of legislators seemed somewhat more enthusiastic about 
lowering the voting age than they were about some of these other changes. In March 
1970 Senate hearings, Senator Cook became asked Rehnquist with irritation how he 
could oppose eighteen-year-old voting but still maintain that literacy tests should be 
abolished and “that everyone should be allowed to vote in a presidential election who 
seems to be wandering all over the country.” 365  Even the staunch liberal Mike Mansfield 
let slip the rather caustic remark, “[W]hy should a 50- or 60-year-old illiterate be allowed 
to vote when we have high school and college graduates in the 18- to 21-year-old 
classification. . . who are not being allowed to vote?”366 
A few legislators connected eighteen-year-old voting not only to other 
contemporaneous suffrage reforms, but also to an even broader agenda of further 
democratizing the political process.  When he introduced his own voting age bill in 
February 1969, Representative Podell cited not only the abolition of poll taxes and racial 
barriers, but also recent proposals to elect the President and Vice-President though direct 
elections.367  Representative James O’Hara (D-MI) elaborated further:   
Our political parties have pledged themselves to making their proceedings more 
responsive to the people.  We in Congress are working to abolish the electoral 
college and to establish a procedure for the direct election of the President and 
Vice President.  Again, our goal is to insure that the will of the people will 
govern. If full participation in our political process is to be more than a high 
sounding ideal, I believe we must extend the franchise to those between the ages 
of 18 and 21.368   
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Senator Mansfield went furthest with this line of thinking; in 1968 he urged a series of 
electoral reforms that included not only eighteen-year-old voting, but also abolishing the 
convention system and the Electoral College, holding all primaries on the same day 
throughout the nation, limiting the President to one six-year term, and reforming the 
campaign finance system.369  
C.  The Federal Government and States’ Rights 
 The eighteen-year-old voting movement also fit neatly with another crucially 
important theme of the times, the idea that it was the federal government’s job to protect 
minorities against discrimination, especially voting discrimination by the states.  
Determining who could vote had long been the prerogative of state governments; Article 
I, Section 2 of the Constitution established that the right to vote in Congressional 
elections was dependent on state voting qualifications.370 The Civil War Amendments 
and, later, the 19th amendment put some limits on the states’ authority, but by and large, 
voting rights were a state issue until the 1960s.  The Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the 
Supreme Court decisions supporting the law’s constitutionality, radically rejiggered this 
power dynamic.  From the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s, Congress and the Court 
together essentially supplanted the states’ traditional role as the arbiters of voting 
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qualifications, establishing a franchise that was not only broader but also more uniform 
across the country.371  
 The notion that Congress both could and should mandate a single, lower voting 
age throughout the nation meshed with this broader trend of federal intervention into 
what had been the states’ domain.  Indeed, defenders of states’ rights had long argued 
that a national voting age, even one established by constitutional amendment, would 
trample on state sovereignty. Senator Richard Russell (D-GA), speaking on the Senate 
floor in 1954, argued strenuously against the proposed eighteen-year-old voting 
amendment: 
I . . . can see no reason on earth for [this legislation], except to promote the idea 
that all the wisdom of government resides in the Chief Executive and here in this 
Capitol Building—the idea of saying to all 48 States, to the State legislatures, and 
the State governors, ‘You are incapable of performing the State function of 
prescribing the qualifications of your voters, or of classifying them by age.  
Therefore, the Federal Government is going to put you in a straitjacket and coerce 
you into taking the steps which, we in our omniscient, all-pervading wisdom, 
think you should take.’372 
 
 As the voting rights revolution got under way, some legislators continued to 
object to eighteen-year-old voting as yet another in way in which the federal government 
was abrogating the states’ control over voting. In 1968, Senator Spessard Holland (D-FL) 
suggested that the eighteen-year-old vote campaign was the work of “ultraliberal 
Americans” who sought “to take the complete control of voters and voting in Federal 
Elections away from the States and vest it exclusively in the Federal Government.”373 
 The Kennedy-Mansfield proposal, however, took the debate about eighteen-year-
old voting and states’ rights to a whole new level.  The idea that the federal government 
                                                 
371 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 281–84. 
372 Extension of Voting Rights to Citizens at Age of 18, 83d Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 108 
(May 21, 1954): 6966. 
373 Lower Voting Age, 90th Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 114 (May 24, 1968): 14913. 
 
 137
could simply legislate a national minimum voting age for both federal and state elections, 
without having to bother with the constitutional ratification process, was a radical notion 
even by 1970 standards.  But at that particular moment, there was unprecedented 
enthusiasm among both members of Congress and the Supreme Court for using the 
power of the federal government to shield citizens against any potential discrimination in 
exercising their right to vote.  An eighteen-year-old voting statute, which would have 
been a preposterous suggestion only a few years earlier, was no longer outside the realm 
of possibility. 
 Advocates were particularly emboldened by the Supreme Court’s recent series of 
decisions interpreting the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Morgan 
was but one of several cases in the 1960s in which the Warren Court upheld federal 
intervention into state voting practices on equal protection grounds.  The Court rooted its 
decisions in a theory of “fundamental rights;” according to this new strand of doctrine, 
state classifications that burdened individuals’ ability to exercise certain core rights were 
subject to close judicial review, or “strict scrutiny.”  Voting was the paradigmatic 
fundamental right, being “preservative of other basic civil and political rights,” 374 and in 
practice, strict scrutiny nearly always meant striking down the law in question.375 
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Needless to say, these jurisprudential developments were highly controversial 
both inside and outside the legal world.  Among legal scholars, the proposed voting age 
amendment to the Voting Rights Act became something of a touchstone for both those 
who supported and opposed the ‘new equal protection.’  Indeed, in reading the 
Congressional debates on the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal, one is struck by the 
prominent role of legal academics.  As noted earlier, Senator Kennedy may have first 
gotten the idea of lowering the voting age through statute from a law review article.  As 
the proposal moved forward, numerous law professors weighed in on both sides of the 
debate, testifying before Congressional committees, offering statements, and writing 
letters. At one point, Kennedy wrote to every professor of constitutional law listed in the 
Directory of Law Teachers to ask their opinion about the constitutionality of his proposed 
legislation.  He proudly announced that of twenty-five respondents, eighteen agreed that 
the statute was constitutional.376 
 The legal commentary added a certain depth to the voting age debates, as the 
professors argued amongst themselves about whether Congress could reasonably find that 
the equal protection clause mandated a lower voting age.  One group of professors—
hailing mainly from Yale Law School—argued that the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment simply did not extend to those treated differently because of their age.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment had long been interpreted as specifically protecting racial and 
ethnic minorities, they maintained, and it was a mistake to read the Morgan decision as 
expanding the amendment’s scope to other groups, especially eighteen- to twenty-one 
year-olds.  Testifying before a Senate subcommittee in March 1970, Yale Law Dean 
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Louis Pollak acknowledged that the minimum voting age might qualify as a form of 
‘discrimination,’ but not one that the Constitution forbade: 
 [I]t was perfectly clear that what was passed by Congress in section 4(e) 
of the Voting Rights Act and supported by the Court in Katzenbach v. Morgan 
was a remedy addressed to a particular situation of disadvantage to a definable 
racial group, which is the kind of situation to which the 14th amendment is 
conventionally addressed. 
 Now, in that sense, Katzenbach v. Morgan is very unlike the far more 
diffuse ‘discrimination’ that we are concerned with in a proposal which seeks to 
enlarge the voter population by lowering the age from 21 to 18.  I do not mean 
there is not any distinction there, but it is not a distinction that falls along the 
central line that the 14th amendment is conventionally addressed.377 
 
A month later, Pollak joined five Yale Law colleagues in a collective letter to the editor 
of the New York Times, asserting, “Katzenbach v. Morgan makes sense as part of the 
main stream of 14th amendment litigation, policing state restrictions on ethnic minorities.  
But it has little apparent application to a restriction affecting all young Americans in 46 
states.”378 
 What’s more, they argued, the very text of the Fourteenth Amendment 
acknowledged a minimum voting age of twenty-one.  They pointed to Section 2, which 
establishes that a state’s number of federal Representatives is proportional to its 
population, except in cases of voting discrimination: 
[W]hen the right to vote at [federal and state] election[s] . . . is denied to any of 
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of 
the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
                                                 
377 Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Committee of the Judiciary United States Senate 
Ninety-First Congress Second Session on S.J. Res. 7, S.J. Res. 19, SJ. Res. 32, S.J. Res. 34, S.J. Res. 38, S.J. 
Res. 73, S.J. Res 78, S.J. Res. 102, S.J. Res. 105, S.J. Res. 141, S.J. Res. 147, 91st Cong., 2d sess., March 
10, 1970, 264. 
378 Alexander Bickel, Charles Black, Jr., Robert Bork, John Hart Ely, Louis Pollack, and Eugene Rostow, 
“Amendment Favored for Lowering Voting Age, New York Times, April 5, 1970,  introduced into Record 
by Senator Gordon Allott (R-CO), Lowering the Voting Age, 91st Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record 
116 (April 6, 1970): 10396. 
 
 140
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
 
In light of this passage, maintained the Yale professors, the Equal Protection Clause 
could not possibly be interpreted as mandating a lower a voting age.  “It surpasses belief 
that the Constitution authorizes Congress to define the 14th amendment’s equal 
protection clause to as to outlaw what the Amendment’s next section approves.”379 
 This was not an altogether new argument; opponents of eighteen-year-old voting 
had long noted the Section 2 reference to twenty-one as a minimum age qualification.380  
Still, when advocates began to offer constitutional arguments for lowering the voting age, 
Section 2 took on new importance, at least among the legal academics enmeshed in the 
debates.  Pollack, for example, emphasized that the presence of Section 2 seriously 
undermined the argument that Congress could deploy its Section 5 authority to lower the 
voting age by statute: 
It is to me particularly interesting . . . to refer to the language in section 2 . . . that 
when the amendment spells out the legitimate criteria for exclusion from the 
franchise it . . . mentions not being male.  That was legitimate.  It mentions being 
under 21.  That was legitimate.  It mentioned having committed a crime.  That 
was legitimate grounds for being kept out of the voting population.  It mentions 
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having participated in a rebellion.  That was a legitimate reason for having being 
kept out of the voting population.381 
 
Paul Kauper of the University of Michigan agreed, noting that Section 2 reinforced the 
whole concept of a minimum voting age: “[I]indeed, the authority of the state to fix an 
age limit is confirmed in the very language of Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”382 
Other academics offered a much broader interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  They maintained that at least in the voting context, the amendment’s 
protections extended well beyond racial minorities, to any group who suffered arbitrary 
differential treatment.  In response to the Yale professors’ letter, Cox and his Harvard 
colleague Paul Freund, wrote their own letter to the Times:  
To limit Katzenbach v. Morgan to ‘policing state restrictions on ethnic minorities’ 
is to ignore the fact that the equal protection clause, which Section 5 gives 
Congress power to enforce, condemns, in the words of the Supreme Court, ‘any 
unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs 
or the selection of public officials.’383 
 
Freund and Cox further dismissed their opponents’ arguments about Section 2 as 
irrelevant.  Section 2, they argued, was concerned with restriction, not expansion, of the 
franchise: 
The most that can be inferred is that in 1866-68, Congress and the state 
legislatures were willing to accept 21 years as a reasonable measure of the 
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maturity and responsibility necessary to vote at that time.  It is nowise 
inconsistent to conclude that in our time a 21-year requirement unreasonably 
discriminates against eighteen, nineteen, and twenty-year-olds because of changed 
conditions—the spread and improvement of education, the age at which young 
people take jobs, pay taxes, marry and have children, and their interest in public 
affairs.384 
 
 Numerous scholars chimed in on both sides of this debate, especially during the 
several months in between the Senate and House debates on the Kennedy-Mansfield 
debate.385  However, this academic squabbling paled next to the vitrolic sentiments 
voiced by conservative Southern legislators, who immediately recognized the eighteen-
year-old voting provision as part of the broader movement towards nationalizing the right 
to vote.   
Legislators like Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) were irate at what they viewed as yet 
another instance of the federal government intruding into the traditional domain of the 
states, telling them whom they could and could not exclude from the franchise.  In debate 
on the renewal of the Voting Rights Act, Ervin specifically targeted efforts to lower the 
voting age by statute, asking rhetorically: 
Are we going to strive to have an indestructible Union composed of indestructible 
States, or are we going to attempt to destroy, in an unauthorized manner, in an 
unconstitutional manner, that Union by usurping for the Congress the powers 
reserve to the States to prescribe the qualifications for voting[?]386   
 
A few months later, in House debate on the Kennedy-Mansfield proposal, his fellow 
North Carolinian Representative Lawrence Fountain (D) was even angrier, “This is pure 
bosh to cover up a bold attempt by some in the Congress to usurp jurisdiction in this 
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matter. . . . [T]here is no end to the folly of man.  Let us be done with this charade; with 
this flimsily disguised seizure of power.”387 
` For these legislators, it was bitterly fitting that the voting age proposal was 
attached to the renewal bill for the despised Voting Rights Act.  Representative George 
Andrews (D-AL) remarked that it was “hard to imagine that anything could worsen the 
Voting Rights Act,” but the voting age provision managed to do just that: “[T]he Senate 
amendment lowering the voting age to 18 shares a common evil with the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act, to which it is attached; both trample on the rights of the States.388  
A few politicians, from the South and elsewhere, noted that the eighteen-year-old 
voting provision was a particularly offensive attack on state sovereignty because the 
states, by and large, had emphatically rejected eighteen-year-old voting. In floor debate, 
Senator Holland detailed the defeats of various voting age proposals around the country.  
“I know of no issue submitted so often to so many voters by so many legislatures which 
has been so generally and heavily repudiated and defeated as has been this one.”389  
Representative J. Edward Hutchinson (R-MI) voiced similar sentiments: “What an affront 
to the people of States would it be for us to cavalierly set aside their decisions at the 
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polling places and in the ballot box, and impose upon them conditions contrary to their 
will. . . .”390 
 It is worth noting that not all legislators who opposed the Kennedy-Mansfield 
proposal on states’ rights grounds were against the whole voting rights revolution, and 
vice versa.  Senator Holland had long campaigned against the poll tax and was one of the 
architects of the Twenty-fourth Amendment.391  And über-conservative Senator Barry 
Goldwater, who had run for President in 1964 on an extreme pro-states’ rights, anti-
federal government platform,392 enthusiastically supported the proposed law.  Speaking 
in a March 1970 Senate subcommittee hearing, he distanced himself from the Morgan 
decision but candidly admitted, “Since I happen to like the idea of 18-year-old voting, I 
feel it is entirely appropriate to use the Morgan approach.”393 
 Still, the most vociferous objections to lowering the voting by statute came from 
those who saw themselves as the victims of Congress’s and the Court’s efforts to stamp 
out voting discrimination during the latter half of the 1960s.  During debate on the 
Kennedy-Mansfield proposal, especially in the House, Southern politicians lamented that 
the Voting Rights Act “shackle[d] and humiliate[d]”394 the South, making their own 
states into “the whipping boys for the Nation.”395  Representative John Rarick (D-LA) 
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was perhaps the most dramatic, declaring that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had 
“reduc[ed] our States to the condition of conquered provinces and our citizens to the 
status of less than 100 percent Americans.”396  The eighteen-year-old voting provision 
was just insult on top of injury, according to Senator James Allen (D-AL).  In Senate 
debate, Allen introduced an amendment to remove the extension bill’s penalty provision 
(which may or may not have actually applied to the voting age provision): 
Where in the world does this come from, to fine somebody $5000 or imprison 
him for 5 years, or both, because he denies an 18-year-old the right to register?  
We have enough Federal registrars, Federal vote observers, Federal election 
officers, and Federal bureaucrats swarming over Alabama.  They cover the State 
like locusts.  We do not need somebody down there fining any of our citizens 
$5,000 or sending them to the penitentiary for not more than 5 years.397 
 
Despite the protestations of a small but vocal group of dissenters, though, by mid-
1970 advocates of eighteen-year-old had momentum on their side, and they knew it.  
Indeed, as I discuss in the next section, a sense of being part of a historically significant 
trend was itself a powerful force in propelling the eighteen-year-old voting movement to 
victory.   
III.  On the Right Side of History 
 Characterizing eighteen- to twenty-one year-olds as a discriminated-against 
minority group was a particularly powerful argument in the political environment of the 
late 1960s, as Congress at that time was unusually sympathetic to claims of 
discriminatory treatment, especially in the voting context.  However, in analogizing 
young Americans to the propertyless, African-Americans, and women, advocates also 
tugged on some unexamined but powerful assumptions about the nature of political 
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change.  In particular, they both relied on and reinforced the notion that the nation’s slow 
shift from a sharply limited franchise to near-universal suffrage had been, and continued 
to be, an inexorable process of reform. 
 During the decade’s waning years, those who favored a lower voting age 
frequently described eighteen-year-old voting as the inevitable next step in a long but 
consistent progression.  In 1968, Senator Birch Bayh (D-IL) declared: 
The religious and property requirements for voting were removed in colonial 
America.  Racial barriers to voting have been coming down for a century.  
Women were given the right to vote in 1920.  [Lowering the voting age] seems to 
me to be in keeping with the tradition of expansion of the franchise . . . .398 
 
Representative Halpern of agreed, “The history of the United States describes a long but 
unbroken process from the rule of a tiny minority in its earliest day to what is now an 
almost universal suffrage. . . . [O]utlaw[ing] [ ] the discrimination which deprives over 10 
million of our younger citizens must be our next objective.”399   
This motif recurred during the House debate on the voting age amendment to the 
Voting Rights Act renewal bill.  Representative Robison, for one, maintained: 
During our Nation’s history, various groups of people have found themselves 
without the right to vote, but gradually and steadily we have extended the 
franchise to most portions of our population.  Today, however, there is a large 
segment of our population which is denied access to the voting booth.  This group 
is not delineated by race, by sex, by education, or by wealth, but by age.400 
 
Representative Charles Vanik (D-OH) similarly asserted, “We have taken giant strides to 
bring about equality among the races.  Women have gained throughout the years a 
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substantial part of their goals of equal rights.  And now we deal with the rights of our 
younger citizens.”401 
This history, proponents suggested, had been a march from darkness into 
enlightenment. Representative Frederick Schwengel (R-IA) remarked in 1968:  
In the beginning, the only person uniformly assured of the right to vote was the 
white 21-year-old male, propertied, literate, a fixed resident, and with means to 
pay any tax.  Gradually these restrictions have fallen by the wayside, as custom 
and prejudice gave way to reason, or the coercion of law.402  
 
Two years later, Representative Albert described the expansion of the suffrage in even 
more lofty terms: 
The history of our Republic is a record replete with the continuing broadening of 
the franchise.  Our has been a chronicle without parallel of the further 
implementation of democracy by the inclusion of an ever greater segment of our 
citizenry in the political decisionmaking process.403   
 
Against this backdrop, advocates argued, the minimum voting age of twenty-one was the 
last “medieval vestige”404 of an earlier, more ignorant age, an anachronistic and unfair 
custom that could not withstand the “compelling force of reason and reality.”405 
 To be sure, this perspective was not unique to the voting age debates.  As I have 
discussed elsewhere, the historian Alexander Keyssar has argued compellingly that 
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scholarly discussions of the franchise have long been dominated by the assumption that 
the history of voting rights is a story of unidirectional, steady, movement towards 
reform.406  Furthermore, he argues, this “progressive presumption” was especially strong 
among historians and political scientists during the 1960s and 70s.407 
 In the context of Congressional debate, however, characterizing eighteen-year-old 
voting as the natural next step in a long process of inevitable reform was arguably an 
effective political strategy.  For one thing, it was politically infeasible for opponents to 
openly challenge the assertion that the move towards universal suffrage had been 
progress, regardless of their personal feelings about the subject.  What elected official 
could publicly quibble with, for instance, Senator Tydings’s assertion that “our political 
system is much richer and wiser because of the participation of women in the electoral 
process.”?408   
 Indeed, advocates missed no opportunity to note that the “dire predictions”409 of 
those who had opposed previous expansions of the franchise had not been borne out.  In 
1969, Representative Peter Rodino (D-NJ) noted that after the Nineteenth Amendment 
was ratified, “[t]here was no chaos, no confusion, no problems,” contrary to naysayers’ 
warnings.  Senator Javits commented in 1968: 
Mr. Chairman, it has always been difficult to enlarge the voting franchise in this 
country.  The colonists who wanted to remove ownership of property as a 
requirement for voting faced similar arguments about a deluge of irresponsible 
people entering the voting roles.  So did those who fought to grant the vote to 
women, and those who joined in the struggle to assure the vote to Negroes.  But in 
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each case the eventual expansion of the electorate brought new ideas and new 
vigor to our national political life.410 
 
History, proponents implied, had not judged kindly those who had spoken out against 
broader voter rights. Naysayers and “obstructionist[s]”411 had tried to stop each and every 
expansion of the suffrage, they suggested, but “those who feared adding more people to 
the voting rolls”412 had always ultimately failed.   
 Advocates framed eighteen-year-old voting as yet another potential landmark for 
democratic progress, just as woman suffrage and African-American voting rights had 
been.  The warning was subtle, but clear: no reasonable Congressperson should take the 
chance on being caught on the wrong side of history. During House debate on the 
Kennedy-Mansfield proposal, Representative Carl Albert (D-OK) declared: 
 Our forebearers were endowed with unique pragmatic political insight.  
They thus succeeded in accomplishing the greatest revolution, bloodless or 
otherwise, ever experienced by mankind.  They in effect translated into reality the 
democratic ideas of the Declaration of Independence.  Swept into the dust bin of 
history were religious tests for public office, property qualifications for voting, 
the indirect election of U.S. Senators, and bars to voting because of sex, color,or 
ethnic origin. 
 Within the hour, the membership of the House will be tested on the 
fundamental proposition of whether or not we possess a political sagacity and 
faith in the democratic way of life equal to that of our predecessors.413 
  
 Before concluding, it is worth noting that one of the greatest weaknesses of this 
strategy, of painting eighteen-year-old voting as the inevitable next step in a long 
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historical process, was largely defanged by 1970.  Specifically, in earlier suffrage 
campaigns, those who favored expanding voting rights always had to respond to charges 
that they were stepping on a slippery slope, that recognizing one group’s right to vote 
would inevitably lead to enfranchising other, less desirable groups.  Keysssar suggests 
that “this dynamic—the embrace of rights arguments by advocates of an expanded 
suffrage met by a conservative counterargument emphasizing the unacceptable contents 
of the Pandora’ Box”414 dominated discussion of the franchise for most of American 
history.   
 But by 1970, the Pandora’s Box was practically empty.  The vast majority of 
American citizens had already been enfranchised, at least officially, and the federal 
government was making concerted efforts to try and enforce these voting rights.   To be a 
sure, many states still applied a number of exclusions—based not only on age, but also 
felony convictions, mental competence, and citizenship status—but the sharply limited 
franchise of the Founding was most definitely a thing of the past.   
 To be sure, as I mentioned earlier, those who opposed the Kennedy-Mansfield 
proposal did their best to deploy slippery slope arguments, arguing that if it was 
unconstitutional to deny eighteen-year-olds the vote, than surely it was unconstitutional 
to prohibit seventeen-year-olds from voting as well.  This rider, they suggested, would 
only lead to pushing the voting age further downward. 
 Nevertheless, these fears did not seem to gain as much traction as opponents 
likely hoped.  As I discussed in Chapter 4, advocates of eighteen-year-old voting made it 
absolutely clear that they had no interest in lowering the voting age beneath eighteen, and 
in fact frequently employed arguments of their own—namely, arguments about education 
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and political knowledgeability—that served to justify lowering the voting age to eighteen 
but no lower.   
IV. Conclusion 
 The Kennedy-Mansfield proposal was the quintessential right idea at the right 
time.  Although advocates of eighteen-year-old voting had long sought to analogize their 
quest to the campaigns for woman suffrage and African-American voting rights, it was 
not until Senator Kennedy repackaged such arguments into a constitutional framework 
that they really gained momentum.  Claims that it was not just unfair, but actually 
unconstitutional to exclude eighteen- to twenty-year-olds from the franchise met an 
unusually warm reception in the halls of Congress during the last years of the 1960s, 
when legislators were especially attuned to issues of minority discrimination, especially 
when it came to voting rights.   
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected advocates’ constitutional arguments, 
striking down the part of the voting age rider that applied to federal elections.  
Nevertheless, the eighteen-year-old voting amendment would likely not have come to 
pass for years, if ever, had it not been for Kennedy and Mansfield’s machinations.  The 
importance of their proposal, and the logic that underpinned it, cannot be overstated. 
152 
CHAPTER 7:  
CONCLUSION
 In her well-known and justly lauded collection of brief essays about American 
citizenship, published in 1991, political theorist Judith Shklar argues that the right to vote 
is, above all, an emblem of one’s full membership in the political community.  The 
women, African-Americans, and unpropertied men who so urgently sought the franchise 
were fighting not just for representation but also for the recognition that they too were 
first-class citizens, she maintains.415 
 In contrast to these “primordial struggle[s] for recognition,”416 Shklar asserts, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment was a “frivolous exercise . . . based on a complete 
misunderstanding of the value of enfranchisement.”  There is nothing inherently 
degrading about being young, she notes, and the fact that young people themselves were 
not especially interested in the eighteen-year-old voting movement demonstrates that 
their political standing was not at stake.417 
 While I can understand why Shklar finds the story of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment irksome, I must disagree with her conclusions.  For one thing, the 
amendment was not based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of the vote.  Rather, it 
was based on multiple understandings of the franchise, only one of which was the notion 
that the right to vote is valuable chiefly because it is a symbol of membership.  In the 
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voting age debates, some suggested the franchise was important primarily because it 
gives citizens a way—albeit a weak way—to influence the government’s actions.  Others 
suggested that that voting rights were properly doled out as a reward for good citizenship.  
Still others maintained that the vote could be a useful training device for socializing 
young people into the habits of good citizenship.  
Nor is it accurate to describe the voting age debates as “frivolous.”  To be sure, 
some of the arguments that were offered in favor of a lower voting age seem 
unconvincing or even foolish to some contemporary readers.  Claims that young people 
were better educated than those in previous generations, for instance, grate oddly on 
modern ears.  Nevertheless, the voting age debates were not frivolous to those involved in 
them.  Both sides simultaneously tried to respond to immediate pressing political needs 
while also grappling—sometimes explicitly, sometimes more subtly—with difficult 
theoretical questions about citizenship, adulthood, and voting.  The resulting discussions 
may have been messy and sometimes confused, but they were not thoughtless. 
It is interesting to think about the arguments that animated the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment in light of contemporary conversations about the minimum voting age.   
For those who have missed it, in recent years, a number of legislators—in the United 
States and elsewhere—have introduced proposals to reduce the voting age below 
eighteen.  State lawmakers in Texas, Minnesota, and Maine have considered the notion of 
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old voting, as have city council members in New York City, 
Baltimore, and Cambridge, Massachusetts.418  In 2004, a California state legislator made 
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headlines by introducing a bill that would have granted fractional votes to those between 
fourteen and seventeen: sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds would be able to cast half a 
vote in state elections, and fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds would have a quarter of a 
vote.419   
In America, at least, such efforts have been so far largely unsuccessful, although a 
number of states do permit seventeen-year-olds to vote in primary elections if they will 
turn eighteen before the general election.  Outside the United States, though, several other 
nations—some of whom lowered their voting ages to eighteen around the same time of 
the Twenty-sixth Amendment—have recently instituted sixteen-year-old voting.  Austria, 
Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Isle of Man have lowered their voting age to sixteen for 
all elections, and both Germany and Slovenia allow sixteen-year-olds to vote in certain 
circumstances.  The British prime minister has suggested that he might support a lower 
voting age, and the government of the Australian Capital Territory is currently reviewing 
a proposal to lower the voting age to sixteen.420 
A number of the arguments offered in support of lowering the voting age below 
eighteen are virtually identical to those voiced by those who advocated for eighteen-year-
old voting several decades ago.  In particular, proponents have been emphasizing the 
notion that lowering the voting age will improve turnout among younger voters, rates of 
which have fallen steadily since 1971.421  Interestingly, advocates seem entirely 
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undaunted by the fact that the Twenty-sixth Amendment failed to live up to exactly the 
same promise, continuing to insist that involving even younger citizens in the political 
process will get them in the habit of voting before leaving home for college.422  
Some also echo the qualified voter arguments of the earlier voting age debates; 
the California state senator mentioned above remarked in one interview that 
contemporary children were “profoundly different” from earlier generations, being 
“exposed to the internet, through television, through the cell phones, to all kinds of 
information, and their experiences in life are far more diverse and profound than mine 
were.”423  It is hard to tell how much resonance such claims have in today’s climate, 
when the dominant narratives about teenagers are so overwhelmingly negative.  The 
presence of such arguments, though, prompts broader questions about what—if 
anything—one really needs to know in order to be a responsible voter.  At the moment, 
United States law seems to embody two wildly different approaches to this issue.  By and 
large, the law prohibits states from subjecting native-born Americans to any but the most 
minimal of competency standards; literacy tests, English-language requirements, and poll 
taxes are all prohibited.  At the same time, immigrants must take what is reported to be a 
fairly demanding civics examination before they can receive citizenship, and hence, the 
right to vote.  
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Finally, advocates often cite reciprocity concerns, although in the absence of a 
draft, they have focused largely on the unfairness of taxing teenage workers who cannot 
vote.424  (Proponents of noncitizen suffrage frequently stress the same point.)  As I noted 
in Chapter 3, the American colonists’ slogan “No taxation without representation” has 
continued to do real political work more than two hundred years after the Revolutionary 
War.  At the same time, though, reciprocity arguments seem to lose quite a bit of their 
rhetorical power when military service—perhaps the prospect of death?—is taken out of 
the equation.  The image of a seventeen-year-old worker at the Gap being forced to make 
FICA payments before he or she can cast a ballot certainly has less emotional heft than 
the vision of an eighteen-year-old soldier being involuntarily drafted to fight in a war 
launched by leaders against whom he cannot vote. 
Beyond these similarities, though, there are some important differences between 
the voting age debates of yesteryear and those of today.  For one thing, the fact that 
advocates do not appear to be offering any sort of theory analogous to the ‘channeling’ 
rationale that appeared in the voting age debates is likely a serious political weakness.  As 
I discussed in Chapter 5, during the late 1960s, federal legislators’ worries about the 
seemingly-unstoppable and ever-escalating campus demonstrations of the late 1960s 
drove them to finally consider an issue that had been a minor political concern since 
World War II.  Absent a similar or equally galvanizing series of events, it is frankly 
difficult to imagine that sixteen- or seventeen-year-old voting will find much momentum. 
The analogies to woman and African-American suffrage that were so popular in 
the debates leading up to the Twenty-sixth Amendment also seem to have fallen off the 
table.  Presumably this is connected with the fact that, as I discussed at length in Chapter 
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6, the political and legal climate of the late 1960s was unusually receptive to such 
arguments.  However, it is also worth noting that although opponents of eighteen-year-
old voting tended not to challenge such claims, arguments that young people are like pre-
Civil War blacks or pre-Nineteenth Amendment women have always been especially 
problematic.  As a number of commentators—including Shklar— have remarked, youth 
is a transitory state, unlike being black or female.  While it is fair to describe the 
minimum voting age as discriminatory, it is a peculiarly egalitarian form of 
discrimination.  Youth is a status that everyone experiences and everyone—barring 
tragedy—eventually outgrows.  Even if one were to argue that excluding anyone from the 
franchise on the basis of age is unfair—an argument never heard in the voting age 
debates—the fact that age is both a universal and temporary disability arguably makes 
such exclusions less morally problematic than restrictions based on race, sex, or even 
property ownership. 
 The general lack of scholarly interest in the history of the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment is in many ways understandable.  The amendment was ratified very quickly, 
has a relatively narrow focus, and includes little ‘open text’ that might lend itself to 
creative legal analysis.  Nonetheless, I believe that legal scholars, historians, and political 
scientists have been too quick to dismiss the voting age amendment as a legitimate topic 
for serious inquiry.   
 As I hope that I have convinced my readers, the story behind the amendment itself 
is considerably more complicated and multifaceted than it is commonly thought to be.  
The Twenty-sixth Amendment was not, as has often been suggested, merely Congress’s 
way of correcting an administrative oversight that had resulted in a three-year gap 
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between the minimum voting and draft ages.  To be sure, arguments about military 
service played a crucial role in the voting age debates, but the eighteen-year-old voting 
movement was bound up with the trends and events of the time—including but not 
limited to the war in Vietnam—in a number of complex ways.   Furthermore, just like 
other substantial political questions, the voting age controversy implicated a number of 
difficult questions about the meaning of the franchise, the relationship between voting 
and citizenship, and the contours of membership in the American polity.  The politicians 
involved in the voting age debates did not always do these questions justice, and the 
arguments they offered were frequently undertheorized and sometimes logically 
problematic.  Nevertheless, for better or for worse, the debates over eighteen-year-old 
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